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The orthodox interpretation of Michael Foot's election as Labour Party leader in 1980 is 
that it resulted from a left-wing surge within the broader Party throughout the 1970s. This 
thesis challenges this assumption. It does so by presenting a contextualised analysis of 
Foot, the Labour Party and the leadership elections of 1976 and 1980. This thesis argues 
that it was Foot's reputation and loyalty in government that enabled his political evolution 
to accelerate towards becoming a conciliatory figure during his leadership.
To undertake this reconsideration of the orthodoxy, this thesis has adapted a previously 
illuminating research approach as utilised by Timothy Heppell.  Heppell has produced a 
number  of  analyses  upon  ideological  compositions  of  the  Conservative  Party  during 
leadership elections, and, more recently, the Labour Party. This research approach was 
initially devised to consider only ideology. The approach has been improved by this thesis 
by including non-ideological considerations in order to draw out Labour specific factors in 
this analysis, because the extent to which the approach can be transferred to a different 
party at a different time required scrutiny. 
It  is also necessary to acknowledge the need for a re-categorisation of the ideological  
factions  within  the  Labour  Party  in  order  to  gain  a  more  complete  understanding  of 
Labour's ideological eclecticism. The social democratic right, the centrists, the inside left 
and outside left demonstrate that the simple assumption of 'left' and 'right' conceals a more 
complex Parliamentary composition. 
It is important to contextualise the analysis with a philosophical and historical discussion 
which places Michael Foot within Labour history. This enables a greater understanding of  
why he became the Labour leader to emerge. Foot's appropriateness as leader can only 
be fully appreciated by considering those who influenced him and his career in the Party 
along with the divided nature of the Labour Party over the period prior to his election. 
Through these discussions it becomes clear that Foot was able to secure the leadership 
because of his loyalty to the Labour Party, his record in government, and his Parliamentary 
interpretation of socialism which separated him from the outside left. This enabled him to 
be a leader the mainstream of the Party were able to broadly accept at a time of extreme 
division. His increased appropriateness as leader becomes more evident when contrasted 
against the likelihood of destructive divisions had a more ideologically dogmatic candidate 
such as Denis Healey or Tony Benn secured the leadership. The prevailing circumstances 
as well as the man must, therefore, be considered.
This  thesis  also  evaluates  Foot's  leadership  with  a  view to  demonstrate  his  ability  to 
navigate  the  Labour  Party  following  his  election.  The  conclusion  must  be  drawn  that  
Labour's ability to prevail without disintegrating illustrates Foot's success as leader, and 
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A deep affection for the aspirations and values which underpinned the evolution of the 
Labour Party ensured the central theme of this doctoral thesis should be the Party of my 
upbringing.  No other  political  Party  would  have been able to  appeal  on  such a level.  
Growing up in a socialist home, with a dedication to socialism from a young age and a  
strong sense of opposition to the laissez-faire policies of Thatcherism, it was clear that any 
period of sustained political research would revolve around the Party. 
New Labour studies did not appeal to me on a similar level. As a result, I felt the research 
for  this  thesis  should  revolve  around  a  period  of  pre-New  Labour  history  where  the 
debates of previous decades resonated strongly within the Party. This was the Party of the 
people; the party of  Clement Attlee, Hugh Gaitskell,  Aneurin Bevan,  Michael  Foot and 
Tony Benn. The Labour Party is not, in my view, a mechanism for gaining power for a 
selection of elitist individuals. It exists to defend the exploited through engagement with the 
people through a strong rank and file movement.
My supervisor, Professor Brendan Evans continually guided this research by pointing out  
areas for development and also potential  shortfalls of  specific arguments made during 
various chapters. By doing so, Professor Evans prevented this thesis being much less 
than has materialised, and provided the tracks through which it was guided. My second 
supervisor, Professor Jim McAuley also made a number of valuable suggestions which 
have improved this thesis. 
As part of their formal role in the research monitoring process, Dr Andrew Mycock and Dr  
John Craig made valuable suggestions. It  is a common trend in contemporary political 
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analysis  to  specifically  use  the  memory  of  Foot's  leadership  as  an  illustration  and 
justification for the development of New Labour. This risks being at the expense of  both 
traditional left and old right ideologies of the Labour Party. In reality, Foot's contributions to  
the Labour Party go beyond merely providing a justification for New Labour; rather, Foot 
should be commended for campaigning for the leadership, against his initial desires, to 
ensure the survival of the Party. He also fought against the threat of entryism and potential 
disintegration of the Party. He deserves credit for this achievement, and so this research 
seeks to avoid the orthodoxies of the New Labour historical narrative. 
Robert Nicholls, a fellow doctoral researcher provided invaluable advice and direction for 
this  thesis.  On  our  trips  to  Manchester  and  Leeds  together  to  conduct  research,  I  
developed a great  deal  of  respect  for  his ability  to  see clarity.  He also recommended 
amendments to parts of the thesis in order to ensure its presentation and arguments were 
drawn out to their full potential. 
The  University  of  Huddersfield  has  provided  the  opportunity  for  me  to  conduct  this 
research,  and  especially  Dr  Ian  Pitchford  has  been  of  considerable  administrative 
assistance throughout. He enabled all the pitfalls of procedure to be adequately navigated. 
Thanks  must  also  be  extended  to  the  People's  History  Museum  in  Manchester  for 
providing me with copies of Labour Weekly, The New Statesman and of course The Foot  
Papers among other sources. Finally, thanks must be made to all those in other various 








How and why did Michael Foot become the leader of an ideologically riven Labour Party in  
1980 when he had apparently shown no previous aspirations towards the leadership? 
Such an outcome would have been unlikely even in the late 1960s. This thesis presents 
the results of research into the composition of Foot's electoral performance in the Labour 
leadership  elections  of  1976  and  1980.  To  aid  the  analysis  two  sets  of  data  of  the  
Parliamentary Labour Party are presented. The data is supported by a contextual analysis 
of Foot's political education, his evolution to becoming a member of the front bench and 
his period as Labour Party leader. 
This  chapter  briefly  describes  its  main  character,  Michael  Foot.  It  also  presents  the 
approach which  is  used in  the  thesis  to  test  previous work  undertaken on leadership 
elections in British political parties as well as advancing an ideological characterisation of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party in the period under review.
It  must  be  noted  that  both  Kenneth  Morgan  (2007)  and  Mervyn  Jones  (1994)  have 
contributed seminal works on Foot. Both works provide excellent biographical accounts of 
his political and personal life. They discuss his youth, schooling, and family relationships 
as well as his political career up to 1992 and beyond. This thesis, however, is not such a 
biography. It does not strive to provide a detailed narrative of Foot's life. Rather this thesis 
uses Foot to focus upon the ideology of the Labour Party in a particular period, through a  
study of leadership elections in which he was engaged. Morgan dedicated just three pages 
to the 1976 leadership campaign, and just five pages to the 1980 leadership campaign, 
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whilst  Jones dedicates two pages to  the 1976 campaign and nine pages to the 1980 
leadership  campaign.  This  demonstrates  that  the  contests  are  a  significantly  under 
researched area of political analysis (Morgan, 2007, pp.328-330; pp.376-380; Jones, 1994, pp.394-
395; pp.447-455).
11
1.1: An Introduction to Michael Foot's Political Character.
An understanding of Foot's character and political background is important in enabling a 
full  explanation for  his  eventual  election  as  Labour  leader.  It  is  necessary in  order  to 
appreciate why MP's, including some who were agnostic or hostile towards his political  
beliefs, turned to him rather than Denis Healey in 1980. Foot represented a non-dogmatic 
interpretation of socialism within the Labour Party and also maintained respect for  the 
history  of  the  British  Parliamentary  system.  His  personal  character  and  loyalty  to  the 
Labour Party enabled him to develop an appeal beyond his ideological roots. His socialism 
evolved  from  liberal  and  socialist  ideas  and  he  eschewed  the  certainties  of  Marxist 
scientific socialism.
Foot rejected Communism as a viable political system because of its anti democratic and 
illiberal restrictions on individual liberties; he only opposed the policies of any government 
when they appeared to ignore the aspirations of his liberal socialism (Schneer, 1988, p.1;9;12). 
He was  also  a  highly  literate  man with  a  sound comprehension of  the  importance of 
history,  the  impact  of  literature  towards  inspiring  political  ideals  and  he  had  a  deep 
affection for the romanticism of some liberal reformers. This approach to his socialism 
enabled some commentators to ask...
...in what role was a man with such talents most useful to his party? One suspects 
that Foot himself preferred to be a spur, a voice, exhorting the government to live 
up to its heritage, and the people to support it. Probably he did not even conceive  
that he could be the future leader of the Labour Party (Schneer, 1988, p.222).
"Unusually, for a senior politician, Michael Foot was not fired by strong personal ambition"  
(Shore, 1993, p138). Foot was not a careerist. The means by which such an individual, who 
had few apparent  aspirations towards achieving  high political  office,  came to lead the 
Labour Party during one of its most turbulent periods is a journey of significant interest. 
12
The quotations which have been cited suggest that Foot's preferred position within British 
Politics was to remain on the edges of government and Party, acting to promote the ideals 
and aspirations of the inside left.  How then did he become Party leader?  It  is  vital  to 
understand his background, political ideals and experiences and to couple them with a 
greater understanding of the ideological divisions of the PLP in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Without an understanding of both Foot's and Labour's political history the answer would be 
less clear. 
Since joining the Labour Party, Foot opposed those who sought to appease capitalism and 
place restrictions on civil liberties (Morgan, 2007). Throughout his career, Foot saw himself 
as the enemy of dogmatic theories of economic management from both the right and left. 
His opposition to Bennite socialism was almost as fierce as his opposition to Thatcher's  
free market ideas. He retained his left-wing credentials throughout his career, including the 
1970s when his evolution towards the mainstream was being consolidated. 
In government Foot successfully established himself  as a Secretary of  State who was 
capable  to  effecting  virtually  immediate  improvements  to  the  circumstances  that  had 
undermined  Edward  Heath's  government.  He  repealed  Heath's  divisive  anti-union 
legislation,  swiftly  ended the miners strike and he also campaigned against  continued 
British membership of the Common Market  (Pelling,  1985, pp.162-174). His effectiveness in 
government  enabled him to  perform impressively  during  the  1976 leadership  election,  
which in turn helped establish his credentials and credibility for the subsequent leadership 
election  in  1980.  Throughout  the  decade  Foot's  reputation  continued  to  grow.  These 
events  are  discussed  later  in  chapters  4  and  5.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Foot's 
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development  owes  much  to  his  experiences  in  the  1970s,  and  that  without  such  an 
evolution his leadership potential would have been much reduced. 
Both Healey and Benn were more identified with their respective ideological bedfellows 
and  so  lacked  the  confidence  of  MP's  required  to  unify  the  PLP.  Healey's  personal 
shortcomings resulted in his potential supporters doubting his ability to lead the Party. It 
must also be remembered that increasingly influential militant left-wing groups within the 
broader  Labour  movement  created  an  image  of  entryism  and  extremism.  Foot  was 
perceived to  be a potentially healing figure when these problems were  bedevilling the 
Labour Party.  With both James Callaghan and Healey,  Foot's main opponents in each 
respective leadership election favouring a 'right'-wing position, and Tony Benn, Foot's main 
'left'-wing challenger in 1980 favouring a harder 'left'-wing position, only Foot appealed to 
the PLP as the candidate most likely to maintain the traditional coalition of views.
Even  committed  social  democrats  within  the  Labour  Party  such  as  Giles  Radice 
acknowledged Foot was "an honourable man and an outstanding orator, journalist and 
writer"  (Radice, 2004, p.500). Over the course of his political lifetime, he evolved within the 
Labour Party from political protest and towards the mainstream of cabinet government. His  
membership of the cabinet from 1974-1979 provided the launching pad for his successive 
bids for the leadership of the Labour Party.
14
1.2: The Development of the Research Approach.
This thesis goes beyond political  history in explaining how Foot  became leader of  the 
Labour Party. The leadership elections of 1976 and 1980 were the final ones in which the  
electorate was confined to the members of the PLP. Such a limited electorate facilitates 
the utilisation of the approach previously devised by Heppell to undertake an analysis of 
the ideological affiliations of MP's in leadership elections within the Conservative Party. 
Heppell has produced a number of journal articles relating to purely ideological conflicts 
within  the Conservative  Party.  These conflicts  enabled Heppell  to  produce illuminating 
insights of the Conservative Party. Given the success of his approach to the Conservative 
Party, might an application of an adapted version to the Labour Party possess the potential 
to  produce  equally  insightful  results?  An  adapted  version  is  necessary  because  a 
shortcoming  in  his  approach  is  his  assumption  that  the  exclusive  dominance  of  a 
ideological variable can explain an MP's voting behaviour in leadership elections. Given 
the complex character of the Labour Party's internal debates, a simplistic dualism between 
left and right is inadequate.
Heppell's  approach  has  its  origins  in  an  article  entitled  Rebels  and  Rebellions:  
Conservative MP's in  the 1992 Parliament  by Phillip  Cowley  and Phillip  Norton  which 
examined the leadership of John Major  (Cowley  & Norton,  1999).  Influenced by Cowley & 
Norton's findings, Heppell developed his own approach to assess voting behaviour of MP's  
during leadership elections. By doing so, he argues that it becomes possible to see the 
ideological motivations underpinning leadership votes. 
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For his research into the leaderships of John Major, William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith 
and more recently David Cameron, Heppell (2002; 2006; 2008; 2010) proceeded to construct 
ideological  typologies  that  consisted  of  three  similar  variables.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
Heppell's ideological typology was also the genesis1 of the approach of this thesis. The 
three ideological divides which Heppell analysed were the attitudes of Conservative MP's 
towards social, sexual and morality issues, economic policy, and Euroscepticism. Heppell 
argued that Conservative MP's were either 'wet' or 'dry' on his three ideological divides. As 
will be argued later in the chapter a nuanced approach to Labour in the 1970s prevents an 
analogous typology of simply left and right.  This was supplemented by a database of MP's  
positioned against the candidate for whom they voted. The anonymity of the vote was 
overcome by researching broadsheet newspapers published around the day of the ballot, 
analysing published interviews, and writing to Conservative Parliamentarians (Heppell & Hill, 
2008,  p.70).  By undertaking these actions, Heppell  was able to construct  an ideological  
typology.
While Heppell influenced the collection and analysis of the data in this thesis it proves 
unsatisfactory as a complete approach in the context of the leadership elections in which 
Foot  was  a  candidate.  Heppell's  simple  dualism can not  simply  be  transferred  to  the 
Labour Party.  First, Labour's ideological tensions were more complex than those which 
Heppell  discerned in the Conservative Party.  Second, Heppell  assumes ideology to be 
mono-causal in shaping voting behaviour in leadership elections. The reverse could be 
true. Downs (1957) argues that ideology can be adapted to acquire power and can shift to 
achieve that aim. A Labour MP's voting behaviour may be linked to his or her region or 
external affiliations such as trade union and Clark (2010) suggests that MP's elected in or 
after 1970 had a different outlook from those who served in the earlier postwar debates.
1 The typology subsequently utilised has been augmented by additional factors in order to operate effectively for the PLP.
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The particularly fractious and ideologically riven nature of the Labour Party in the 1970s 
predisposed MP's to consider candidates for the leadership who might be able to unify the 
Party (Clark, 2010). It would be an oversimplification to argue that ideology played no role in 
this.  Heppell  et  al (2010)  subsequently  attempted the  transfer  of  his  approach  to  the 
Conservative  Party  on  to  the  Labour  Party  in  a  paper  entitled  'Ideological  Alignments 
within the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Leadership Election of 1976' (Heppell  et al, 
2010). The three issues which Heppell utilised to classify Labour MP's as either left or right  
were British membership of the Common Market, defence policy and economic policy (ibid). 
There appears to be no problem in accepting defence as an issue since MP's were either 
unilateralist,  and therefore to the left,  or multilateralist, and therefore to the right of the 
Party. Positions on the Common Market are also acceptable as an indicator of left or right 
leanings  although  it  must  be  recognised  that  there  were  exceptions  with  left-wing 
supporters of  the Common Market  and right-wing opponents sometimes being evident 
(Hayter, 2005, p.6). Heppell's utilisation of the economic dimension is particularly inadequate 
owing to his view that Labour MP's can be readily classified as either consolidators or  
expansionists and with the consequent assumption that they respectively reflected a right-
wing or a left-wing position. In the economic sphere they did not appreciate the complexity 
of the economic issues at the time and assumed a simple dualism of left and right would  
suffice. The variable of economic policy is too complex as applied to the Labour Party 
debates in the 1970s.
This requires a different approach in understanding Labour's leadership elections of 1976 
and 1980. The variable of  economic policy is too complex as applied to Labour Party 
debates in the 1970s. The intra-party debates on economic policy covered a wider range 
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of  issues.  They included whether  an MP was  for  or  against  continued nationalisation,  
attitudes towards public expenditure symbolised by the IMF intervention in 1976, views on 
monetarism, support or opposition to the Alternative Economic Strategy as proposed by 
Holland (1975), opinions on incomes policy and orientations towards trade union reform 
(Booth, 2002, p.125; Cronin,  2004, pp.42-43; Rosen, 2005, pp.331-337; p.353).  Heppell reduced an 
MP's position on economic policy to the simple alternatives of expansionist or consolidator 
(Heppell  et  al,  2010).  Heppell's  distinction  between  expansionist  and consolidator  fails  to 
reflect the realities faced by the riven PLP during the debates on economic policy in the 
1970s. Fortuitously many Labour MP's classified themselves ideologically in the 1970s by 
their decision to join either the Tribune or Manifesto Groups  (Hayter, 2005, p.4; p.6). Whilst 
some MP's chose not to identify themselves as leaning towards the centre right in the 
Party reflected by the Manifesto Group, or the centre left reflected by the Tribune Group, 
nevertheless,  membership  or  non-membership  is  broadly  indicative  of  a  right,  left  or  
centrist position within the Party. For this reason, group membership is substituted here for 
Heppell's use of economic policy as an indicator of stances adopted by Labour MP's.
In order to produce a more meaningful understanding of the leadership election results this 
thesis  includes  a  selection  of  other  determinants  which  Heppell's  approach  excluded.  
These variables seek to produce considerations beyond ideology. Principally,  these are  
the region which  an MP represented,  the majority the MP was defending,  trade-union 
affiliation (if any) as well as the MP's length of service within the House of Commons. An 
MPs'  length  of  service  has the  potential  to  affect  their  voting  intentions because their 
experiences and Parliamentary careers may affect their expectations from a new leader. 
The region and their constituency location may also have the potential to affect their vote.  
For example, an MP from a working-class constituency in the north of England may be 
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expected to behave differently to an MP from a middle-class constituency in the south. 
Also, an MP's voting behaviour may be affected by the size of his or her majority. An MP 
with a smaller majority may vote for a leader most likely to prove electorally beneficial,  
thereby enticing them to vote for a candidate that does not necessarily appeal to them 
politically. Also, an MP's trade union affiliation may affect their vote, given the role of such  
organisations  historically  within  the  Party  and  especially  following  on  from  the  1979 
electoral  defeat.  When  combined  with  the  ideological  factors,  a  more  complete 
understanding of  the  leadership  elections  can be achieved,  thereby building  upon the 
approaches provided by Cowley & Norton and Heppell. The heuristic value of Heppell's 
approach is  undeniable,  but  it  has only partial  validity  when transferred to the Labour  
Party.
Two databases for the leadership elections of 1976 and 1980 are presented and analysed 
in  chapters  4  and  5.  Each  database  has  been  thoroughly  researched  to  ensure  the 
credibility of the results are maintained. Initially, the names of all MP's were gathered from 
the relevant Dods Parliamentary Companions  (Dods, 1977; Smith, 1980),  with any deaths or 
changes researched via  The Times  obituaries throughout the period. Given  The Times 
accepted reputation as the  paper of record, it was utilised for the purpose of gathering 
specific information. The initial ideological database was then constructed, yet when the 
inadequacy  of  the  economic  field  became  clear,  further  research  was  undertaken  to 
construct  the  ideological  groupings.  Biographies  and  diaries  such  as  Benn's  (1989) 
Against the Tide and Hayter's (2005) Fightback! provided information regarding ideological 
group  memberships.  In  addition,  The  Times  was  again  instrumental  in  providing 
membership lists of both groups, enabling the list to be completed. MP's voting behaviour, 
voting lists from The Times and other broadsheets, and Norton (1980) provided invaluable 
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information relating to MP's views on nuclear disarmament and the Common Market. By 
consistently voting in favour or against unilateralist measures, or Britain's position as a 
member of the Common Market, it became possible to determine an MP's view on either 
or both policy areas. 
The other aspects of the database, such as an MP's constituency, age, majority, length of  
service and union affiliation were drawn from the Dods Parliamentary Companion and The 
Times. Once completed, the two databases provided a comprehensive source upon which 
to evaluate the 1976 and 1980 Labour leadership elections.
The role of ideology in an MP's behaviour accounts for a significant part of their vote.  
However, factors such as the personal likability of the candidates remain significant. It was 
apparent that Foot was the object of a great deal of affection within the Labour Party (Clark, 
2010). Heppell produced an analysis which examined ideology as a mono-causal influence. 
Given the riven nature of the Labour Party during the period under review, it would be 
inadequate to follow uncritically Heppell's approach in restricting the analysis to a single  
factor of political analysis such as ideology. For this reason an enhancement to Heppell's 
approach is used. It is necessary to explain why Heppell's simplistic approach requires a 
more penetrating analysis when applied to the Labour Party in the period under review.
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1.3: The Ideological Character of the Labour Party.
It is necessary to explain why Heppell's approach is not sufficiently penetrating within the 
PLP in the 1970s. The Labour Party has since its inception been a disparate collection of  
groups  and  individuals  united  behind  a  quest  for  a  more  socialist  society.  Since  its 
founding, the Labour Party evolved as a coalition of different views and policy positions in  
which diversities coexisted. This ensured that the Labour Party would be characterised by 
division  and  debate.  These  are  normal  enough  components  of  a  democratic  socialist 
Party. Labour evolved over the twentieth century as a colourful, vibrant and divided Party.  
To  achieve socialism in  Britain,  individuals  and groups diverged into  differing  theories 
about  how  to  effect  socialist  change.  Some  believed  the  harsher  characteristics  of 
capitalism could be tamed, whilst others believed it must be abolished entirely, whilst few 
adhered to the Marxist theories of revolutionary change. These ideas, however, all existed 
within the same Labour Party, and so its ideological character was eclectic. Yet, over the 
course of the 1970s, the intra-party coalition started to deteriorate when outside militants, 
some with radical socialist sympathies, began to gain gradual control of the mechanisms 
of the Party through the infiltration into CLP's and annual conference. To understand the 
ideological  characterisations  advanced  in  this  thesis,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
intensifying ideological conflicts which culminated in the period under review. 
Broad  terms  such  as  'left'  and  'right'  are  frequently  used  to  classify  individuals  into 
ideological categories within the PLP2. Heppell was influenced by commentators such as 
Kellner (1976) who defined left and right using arbitrary criteria including an MP's position 
2 It has been necessary to challenge the simple orthodox interpretation of a simple left/right dualism within the Party. MPs should not be 
pigeon holed into easily devised ideological categories. The research undertaken has revealed that model 'left' and model 'right' wing 
MPs are in the minority, with the majority gravitating towards plural positions on specific policies. For example, an individual MP may  
hold an perceived 'left'  wing position on the Common Market,  yet hold a perceived 'right'  wing position on defence. This 'paradox'  
indicates that the composition of the PLP is more complex than a simple binary distinction, beloved of contemporary commentators  
would suggest.
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on  Britain's  membership  of  the  Common Market.  Kellner argued  that  an  opponent  of 
Britain's membership automatically indicated a left-wing perspective. 
However, this definition negates the possibility that the MP may oppose UK membership of 
the Common Market for reasons other than ideology, such as pressure from their more left 
leaning  constituency  party  or  a  view of  British  economic  interests.  Consequently,  this 
dualism is too crude. 
Individual  MP's are frequently not so easy to classify and even those who accept the 
labels of left- and right-wing will often be inconsistent in the policies they support. Because 
of these deviations, determining a set of left- or right-wing policies which can be attributed  
to every MP is highly problematic. Left and right are, therefore inadequate terms without 
considerable qualification, but remain vital aspects of the Labour Party because they are 
commonly used by MP's, journalists and academics. It is argued in this thesis that left and 
right  facilitate  a  lazy  shorthand  account  of  the  complexities  in  the  Labour  Party.  The 
following demonstrates the diversity of "the left" and why accepting simplistic terms must 
be avoided: 
Commentators  lost  few  opportunities  to  contrast  Nye  Bevan's  'passionate 
Parliamentarism'  and  the  Bevanite  'legitimate  left'  in  the  1950s,  with  the  anti-
Parliamentary extremism of the Bennites and the hard left of the 1980s. Asked in 
1980 what Bevan would have thought of the hard left then, Harold Wilson briskly 
replied 'Nye wouldn't have been seen dead with that lot'. (Jeffreys, 2002, p.82).
It  will  be  a  perverse  overreaction,  however  to  abandon the  concepts  of  left  and right 
entirely.  The concepts are so long entrenched in the political  discourse that to discard 
them would be iconoclastic. However,  it  must always be remembered that overarching 
terms, such as Heppell's expansionist in economic policy as an indicator of a 'left' position, 
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would place Bevan and Benn in the same category without any qualification (Heppell et al, 
2010). Clearly this would be inadequate.
Heppell's own extension of this approach to the Labour Party negates the concept of the  
centre of the PLP. This is admittedly fluid as it encompasses MP's with a softer allegiance 
to either social democracy or to the inside left, or who place loyalty to the Labour Party 
over all other considerations. Because of the shifting meaning of ideological terms within  
the Labour Party throughout the twentieth century,  it  is  necessary to briefly define the 
terms  used  throughout  this  thesis.  The  key  terms  are  inside  left,  outside  left3,  social  
democratic right, traditional right and the centre (Bernstein, 1899; Kogan & Kogan, 1982). 
The inside left, also regarded as the legitimate left within the Labour Party, was loyal to  
what  its members saw as the ethical socialism4 of the early Labour Party and did not 
associate with proscribed organisations, nor did the inside left set up pressure groups in 
local constituencies  (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.37). The goals of ethical socialism were to be 
gained through an extension of nationalisation, an active state, greater equality and an 
ethical foreign policy. It argued that through nationalisation came greater equality and that 
an extended role for the state in industry is an effective means of rearranging industry in  
the public interest. Its ethical foreign policy was to be gained by an independent British 
foreign  policy  working  with  other  socialist  groups  throughout  Europe  and  the 
Commonwealth in order to create a third power bloc separate from the United States and 
the Soviet Union, without adopting a fully neutralist foreign policy.  The inside left  were 
willing to criticise Labour governments through publications such as Tribune, yet this did 
3 The  inside  left  and  outside  left  are  also  frequently  referred  to  as  soft  and  hard  left  by  some journalists,  commentators  and 
academics. Soft left and hard left can be interpreted as judgemental terms which imply either a lukewarm approach or a dogmatic  
approach  to  socialism,  both  of  which  carry  negative  commentations.  Inside  and  outside  left  are  preferable  given  their  non-
judgemental and more descriptive nature.
4 Early ethical socialists fused their understanding of socialism with a Christian ethos which sought to improve the lives of those in 
poverty through good works (Clark, 2010).
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not  extend  to  destructive  attacks.  It  argued  that  the  Labour  governments  must  be 
preserved in order to prevent Conservative rule. Yet this did not preclude it from arguing 
against the policies of the Labour government on matters such as Vietnam, the Common 
Market and the pace of socialist change. The pedigree of the inside left in postwar Britain  
can be traced through the  Keep Left group of  1947,  Bevanism in  the 1950s and the 
Tribune  journal.  Its supporters  were  Parliamentary  socialists,  who  believed  in 
representative democracy. Foot must be placed firmly within the inside left throughout his 
active political life, as he remained broadly committed to these ideals even during his time 
on the Labour front benches.  
As Whitely (1983) argues, "one of the apparently innocuous decisions taken in 1973 as a 
result of the swing to the left in the Party was the decision to abolish the list of proscribed 
organisations" (Whitely,  1983,  p.6).  The Proscribed List  had acted as a safeguard against 
individuals belonging to hard, outside left organisations with radical socialist sympathies  
trying to infiltrate and pursue their agenda within the Labour Party. Its abolition, however,  
removed  this  safeguard  and,  subsequently,  the  outside  left  groups  straggled  the 
ideological boundaries of the Labour Party. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the 
outside  left  were  represented  by  groups  such  as  the  Campaign  for  Labour  Party 
Democracy and the Labour Coordinating Committee, inspired by an ideal that underpinned 
Bennite  Direct  Democracy  (Kogan  &  Kogan,  1982,  p.37;  p.50).  Direct  Democracy  was  a 
commitment to both industrial and political democracy, with workers and Party members 
controlling  their  workplaces  and  the  rank  and  file  controlling  the  Parliamentary 
representatives.  Just  as outside left  groups transcended the boundaries of  the Labour 
Party,  so they overlapped with  external  organisations which were  infiltrating the Party,  
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such  as  the  Militant  Tendency5.  Outside  left  adherents  viewed  socialism as  a  unified 
ideology so that all who professed themselves socialists could be retained within the ranks 
of the Labour Party. In short, they were adhering to the Kerensky dictum of "no enemies to 
the  left",  whereas  the  inside  left  implicitly  accepted  the  existence  of  an  ideological  
boundary to the left of the Party (Mosse, 1967, p.107). For example, when called upon to vote 
in favour of naming 25 companies for compulsory nationalisation during 1973, Foot voted 
against other  figures  on the  left  and voted  with  the  social  democrats  arguing  such  a 
statement would be electorally damaging (Hatfield, 31 May 1973, p.1). Admittedly, the desire of 
Labour's leadership to protect the precise definition of the ideological boundaries of the 
Labour Party was difficult  to distinguish from electoral  considerations. The outside left, 
however did not possess such a constraint. It was essentially a hybrid grouping seeking 
radical  social  change  and  encompassed  extreme  democrats  and  various  versions  of 
Marxism, loosely associated with a sometimes messianic view of Benn. A key difference 
between the political ideologies of Foot and Benn was that Benn was radicalised by his  
period  in  political  office  and  that  he  was  a  "pedantic  advocate  of  strict  adherence  to 
manifesto, conference resolution and NEC edict" and that he "chose defiantly to pursue his 
own path" within the outside left  (Benn, 1979, p.16; Morgan, 1987, p.302-303). Benn's socialism 
connects the Levellers and the radicals of the seventeenth century English revolution with 
present  day socialists.  Speaking in Burford in 1976,  Benn remarked that the Levellers 
were part of "a popular liberation movement that can be traced back to the teachings of  
the Bible and which has retained its vitality over the intervening centuries and which speak 
to us here with undiminished force" (Brind, 21 May 1976, p.3). Indeed, Benn also sought to shift 
decision making processes from any Labour cabinet and towards the PLP. In a letter to 
Foot, Benn remarks that
5 The Militant  Tendency was an outside  left  group which  sought  to  infiltrate the Labour  Party  at  constituency  level  in  order  to  
perpetuate and spread their interpretation of Marx and Marxist economic theory (Seyd, 1987, p.51). To advance its aims, it engaged 
in entryism (taking control of existing Labour organisations) and, thereby being able to influence the broader Labour Party through 
the representation this gave it at the annual conference.
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I  think  there  ought  to  be  more  deliberate  arrangements  made also  for  general 
discussions within the Parliamentary Party before any Cabinet decisions are taken... 
I would hope to see many more debates taking place at an earlier stage within the 
Parliamentary Party so that the discussions should have a genuine influence on the 
decisions (Benn, 1976, p.3).
The change of procedure advocated by Benn in this instance would enable the factions 
and ideological groups within the PLP to influence the decisions taken by the cabinet.  
Without wishing to repudiate the role of the conference, Foot, by contrast was an exponent 
of Parliamentary democracy and was content for Members of Parliament to remain the 
main sources of policy scrutiny.
The social  democratic right were those who sought  to  modernise the Labour Party to 
ensure it reflected the expectations of the electorate and the evolving nature of capitalism. 
Social  democracy  aims  to  look  beyond  the  class-war  ideals  which  underpinned 
revolutionary socialism. Their historical philosophy derived from figures such as Eduard 
Bernstein who argued that the influence of socialism 
would  be much greater  than it  is  today if  the  social  democracy could  find the 
courage to emancipate itself from a phraseology which is actually outworn and if it 
would  make  up  its  mind  to  appear  what  it  is  in  reality  today:  a  democratic, 
socialistic party of reform (Bernstein, 1899).  
Anthony Crosland provided the contemporary intellectual weight to the ideas behind this 
wing of Labour thought, arguing that the Party constitution of 1918 had little relevance to 
the Britain of 1955 and that its objectives had to be updated. Labour's 'one class image'  
made it appear outdated to those amongst the electorate who did not subscribe to class 
based politics  (Jeffreys,  1999,  pp.76-78).  Gaitskell  felt  that responsibility  and respectability 
within the Labour Party would be best demonstrated by its gradual, reformist approach to  
capitalism and by rejecting the emotionalism and romanticism of transforming capitalism in 
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"one go" (Brivati, 1997, p.290). Gaitskell, the Labour Leader after 1955, sympathised greatly 
with the ideas that underpinned this argument, yet shied away from constitutional reform 
until  Labour's  electoral  defeat  in  1959  (ibid).  This  defeat  led  to  an  attempt  to  reform 
Labour's commitment to nationalisation by way of Clause 4. This was a key target of the 
social  democrats  because they argued nationalisation was  an unnecessary ideological 
commitment and that the benefits  gained by state ownership of key industries can be 
achieved by other means. They argued that the nature of capitalism had changed and that 
democratic  socialism was  to  be  achieved  and  consolidated  through  increasing  public 
expenditure,  redistributive  taxation  and an egalitarian  education  system  (Crosland,  1956, 
p.46). 
Social democracy in the Labour Party must not be confused with the Social Democratic 
Party. This distinction is encapsulated by the ideas of Crosland, Gaitskell and figures such 
as Giles Radice. Radice warned against those considering defection to the SDP, arguing 
they should "stay in the party and fight" for their ideas rather than establish their own party 
(Radice, 30 January 1981, p.7). "Centre party apologists have made great play of claiming the 
traditions of both Crosland and Gaitskell for their 'new politics'. Lady Gaitskell reminded 
them in the Guardian that her husband would never have considered leaving the Labour 
Party" (Holland, 6 February 1981, p.10). Consequently, the social democrats within the Labour 
Party should not be confused with the SDP.
The traditional right, who dwindled over the course of the 1960s, were content mainly to 
consolidate the achievements of the Attlee administration. The primary advocate of this 
position, Herbert Morrison accepted nationalisation, but did not wish to extend it beyond 
the vital industries that dominated the economy. Those MP's who gravitated more towards 
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this  position  included  Alfred  Broughton,  Michael  Cocks,  Stanley Cohen,  Jack Dunnett, 
Andrew Faulds  and  Brynmor  John  (Evans,  2010).  They initially  identified  more  with  the 
traditional  right  yet  mostly gravitated towards Manifesto Group membership during the 
1970s. This indicates that the traditional right evolved more towards the social democratic 
right of the Party.
Those  MP's,  who  can  be  best  characterised  as  constituting  the  centre,  avoided  the 
conflicts between left and right. Essentially, they were Labour Party loyalists who carried 
little ideological baggage beyond a generalised appreciation of a vague commitment to 
social democracy (Clark, 18 May 2010). Their motivation was maintaining party unity and to 
ensure they remained electable. They also consisted of MP's who gravitated towards more 
rightish perspectives such as social democracy on some issues but tended towards an 
agnosticism towards intra party ideological debates. In some cases they adhered to the 
traditional  Morrisonian dictum that "socialism is what  the Labour Party does"  (Nelson,  1 
January 2006). They eschewed membership of Parliamentary groups as the Tribune and the 
Manifesto Groups, preferring instead to remain independent. While the group of centrist 
MP's  were  relevant  within  the  debates  of  the  1970s,  as  a  group  they  are  under 
researched. 
Some MP's were located in the centre because they were sceptical about the contentious 
issue of the Common Market.  Wilson, whilst  coming initially from a centre left  position 
owing to his associations with Bevan, in many ways symbolises the centre grouping in the 
PLP. "As leader, Harold Wilson had seen it as his prime function to hold the party together,  
whatever  the  cost  in  ideology"  (Castle,  1980,  p.12).  He  remained  unenthusiastic  about 
Common Market membership. The changing economic circumstances did not blind him to 
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the potential benefits of Common Market membership, along with his desire to keep the 
Party together (Clark, 18 May 2010). In short it is suggested here that by the 1970s Labour 
tendencies were not simply those of left and right but were inside left, outside left, centrist 
and social democratic. These categories are utilised in the data analysis in the course of 
this thesis.
This analysis  of  the ideological  tendencies within  the PLP confirms that  Foot  must  be 
positioned within the inside left. As is discussed in chapters 2 and 3, he was initially a  
Liberal who became socialist and went on to evolve politically towards the inside left of the  
PLP  (Harris,  1984, p.143).  As a well  known figure of the broader left,  Foot drew from his 
literary and philosophical knowledge to extend the message of greater social justice and 
the sovereign nature of Parliamentary democracy to both the electorate and those within 
the Party, even if this sometimes meant standing up against his own colleagues. Despite 
these moments of contention, he was fiercely loyal to the Labour Party, even at times of  
great ideological contention. This was partly because he believed it was the sole body 
capable of posing a credible opposition to the established orthodoxies of the Conservative 
Party (Rollyson, 2005, p.160; Foot, 2003, p.150).
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1.4: Conclusion.
This  thesis  uses  Foot's  candidacies  for  the  position  of  Labour  leader  as  a  means  of 
presenting the results of exhaustive research focusing upon the composition of his vote. 
The  leadership  elections  of  1976  and  1980  act  as  windows  through  which  an 
understanding of the PLP in that period can be discerned. Personality matters in politics. 
Through understanding Foot, his loyalty to the Party, his evolution towards the mainstream 
and his cross-party appeal at a time of internal division, it becomes possible to understand 
his election as leader at the second attempt. Foot's personal political history enhanced his 
reputation and explains his evolution towards the leadership. The data analysis presented 
in  the  thesis  is  contextualised  by  describing  his  political  character  and  the  historical 
circumstances in which he conducted his career. 
It  is  clear  that  Heppell's  singular  focus  upon  the  importance  of  ideology  requires 
qualification as does his simple dualism between left and right. The assumption that MP's 
can be subdivided and labelled exclusively on a bipolar dualism is crude. Both left and 
right have their own ideological subdivisions, also any analysis of the Labour Party which  
rejects the importance of the ballast provided by the centre is incomplete. To understand 
the subdivisions of left and right within the Labour Party during the 1970s, it is necessary 
to consider the various debates and contentions in the Party during that period. It is also  
necessary to remember the relevance of non ideological factors, and to exclude them, as 
Heppell  does,  becomes problematic when attempting to determine the motives behind 
MP's voting behaviour.  
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively discuss Foot's political education and his progress from left-
wing critic  to  front  bench stalwart.  Chapters 4 and 5 present the data on MP's voting  
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behaviour  and  an  analysis  of  their  motivations  in  casting  their  vote.  The  immediate 
circumstances following Foot's election and his role in stabalising a turbulent party is the 
subject of Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER TWO
Michael Foot's Political Education
2.0: Introduction.
Foot was a man of deep scholarship and learning which led to him acquiring respect 
within the Labour Party. His scholarship assisted the development of his deep political 
convictions and his learning enabled him to acquire a reputation as a clever man who 
was perceived by many in the Labour Party as occupying a higher intellectual plane 
than most politicians. This enhanced his credibility as a potential leader. His intellectual 
capacity sets him apart from most politicians as an intellectual who drew inspiration and 
determination  from  a  rich  array  of  historical  and  contemporary  figures.  Foot's 
philosophical richness distanced him from the dogmatic socialism of figures such as 
Benn and traditional Labour politicians. Thinkers such as Hazlitt and Marx influenced 
the development of Foot's liberal socialism. Foot's political education was a blend of 
philosophical  influences and contemporary inspirations who comprise an interesting, 
eclectic collection of thoughts and ideas. They both confirm and challenge his liberal 
socialism. They contributed towards his own principles, yet also possessed anomalous 
characteristics within themselves. For example, Beaverbrook's Conservatism conflicted 
with Foot's socialism, whilst Marx's advocacy of inevitable violent revolution contrasted 
to Foot's passionate commitment to Parliamentary democracy6. These anomalies were 
disregarded by Foot  because he drew from them  specific intellectual  arguments or 
inspiration which overrode any evident contradictions.
Foot was also given to a sense of loyalty towards individuals which enabled him to 
conceal  from himself  these inconsistencies.  It  can be a relatively  thin  line between 
6 Foot  rejects  many of  the  revolutionary  arguments  advanced by Marx, but  the critique of  capitalism remained an influential  
argument on Foot's political education.
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being a person of deep principle, rather than of purblind dogmatism, which prevented 
Foot from recognising the contradictions. 
This chapter provides an interpretation and evaluation of a selection of major historical 
and contemporary figures who inspired and challenged Foot. This examination of Foot's 
political development enables the reader to benefit from a greater, richer appreciation  
of Foot's political philosophy and personality. 
Foot's emerging values drew from the philosophers who both reflected and developed 
his views. He was by no means a  tabula rasa which these thinkers determined. The 
philosophers  served  to  confirm  and  nourish  his  existing  values,  although  they 
represented  conflicting  political  ideologies  in  themselves,  such  as  socialists, 
conservatives or liberals as well as independent thinkers. Burke as a Tory, Cobbett as 
a rural nostalgic, Wells as a eugenicist,  Beaverbrook as a patron; these anomalous 
characteristics are subverted by Foot's loyalty to the richness they contributed to his  
broader  political  analysis.  He was,  of  course selective  in  the arguments and views 
which he drew from these influences.  
When considering the political decisions made by Foot during his career, appreciation 
of his positions can be achieved by considering those with whom he drew close as well 
as the philosophical influences. Together they had an impact on his beliefs regarding 
the potential role of a political party as a force for developing a fairer and more equal 
society. 
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Foot  possessed  a  capacity  to  universalise  political  principles  which  cross  political 
divisions and he managed to select common strands. He disregarded temporal political 
limitations if they appeared to distance him from a political principle that he admired 
and  utilise  these  selective  strands  of  philosophical  thought  to  enhance  his  own 
knowledge of politics. 
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2.1: Michael Foot's Political Education.
To  understand  Foot  adequately  and  to  comprehend  his  political  background,  it  is 
necessary to summarise aspects of his political development. To this end, this chapter 
introduces Foot as a political liberal socialist, backed up by an eclectic range of writers 
and thinkers from across the political spectrum. Foot's upbringing coloured him with the 
liberal  arguments  for  political  and  electoral  reform  and  the  need  to  oppose 
Conservatism. His father, his education, and his reading of various political thinkers 
ensured that he retained a liberal instinct throughout his political career. His socialism 
was drawn very much from the political  and social situations he encountered in the 
prewar  years.  The  squalor  of  Liverpool,  the  decline  of  the  Liberal  Party,  and  the 
arguments for greater collectivisation of the economy against the excesses of the free 
market ensured that his political maturity would be as a socialist. Foot merged what he 
considered to be the best ideas of the liberal arguments drawn from the age of reform 
with  the very urgent  need to  advance a socialist  alternative,  thereby making him a 
liberal socialist. 
Foot was from a large Liberal family. His father, Isaac, served as a Liberal MP, read 
widely, and influenced all his children to develop a love of books and intellectualism. 
Before joining the Liberal Party, he trained as a solicitor in Plymouth and served on the 
city  council,  rising  to  the  position  of  Deputy  Mayor.  His  Parliamentary  career  was 
retarded by repeated electoral defeats until 1922, whereby he remained in Parliament 
for two years before losing his seat. However, he returned to Parliament for a longer 
period in 1929, remaining an active Liberal MP until finally losing his seat for the final 
time at the 1935 general election. As a father, he instilled an instinct to fight against  
Toryism into his children and instructed them in such a manner as to ensure that they
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...fight  the  good  fight  and  keep  the  faith.  Books  were  weapons,  the  most 
beloved  and  the  sharpest.  And  there  spread  out  before  us  were  enemies 
enough for a lifetime: historical figures and their modern counterparts melted 
into one; brewers,  Protectionists,  Papists,  apologists  for Lord North and the 
Chamberlain  family;  Spanish  tyrants  and  Stuart  Kings;  Simonites  and 
appeasers, men of Munich and Suez; sons of Belial or Beelsebub, normally 
disguised as West Country Tories, an especially reprehensible branch of the 
species (Foot, 1980, pp.13-14).
The fight was very much to be fought through learning and subverting ignorance by and 
immersing themselves in the knowledge which books provided their reader. For Foot, 
his battle against the Tories would be fought through the Labour Party, which included 
fighting the enemies of liberal socialism. His father gave him the tools with which to find 
the knowledge required to arm himself. This enabled him to use the literary weapons 
which he deployed so well to engage against those who were his political enemies.
Foot characterises his father as a man who possessed a "zest for living and reading, a 
seemingly single unquenchable quality" and that "he was Wordsworth's happy warrior,  
the servant of high causes"  (Foot,  1980, p.11).  He was addicted to reading, who drew 
knowledge and inspiration from sources such as Paradise Lost, Shakespeare, Johann  
Sebastian Bach, Victor Hugo, Thomas Hardy, Thomas Carlyle and The Bible (Foot, 1980, 
pp.19-20).  "He read everything he could lay his hands on about his favourites"  (ibid). 
There can be no doubt that Foot's father aimed to instill a widely read view amongst his  
politically aware children,  which they could then use to  defend their  values against  
Toryism. 
The thirst to read, to expand his knowledge and build a literary library was a quality 
Foot inherited. It was a quality which remained with him throughout his life. His own 
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literary journey brought him into contact with an eclectic array of writers and thinkers 
across  the  political  ages,  from  the  times  of  overt  civil  unrest  in  England  to  the 
Enlightenment and beyond. Foot possessed a solid grasp of the masters of political  
thought.  Before  considering  his  key  influences,  however  it  is  necessary  to  briefly 
consider his youthful years of liberalism. 
Foot developed his passionate hatred for “Tory England” during his liberal upbringing. 
His upbringing propagated the virtues of a liberal England that would be free of the  
excessive  forces  of  conservatism  (Hoggart  &  Leigh,  1981,  p.12).  Prior  to  his  university 
education at Oxford, Foot attended the Quaker-inspired Leighton Park, which appeared 
from the  outside to  be  similar  to  the  many other  fee paying  middle-class  boarding 
schools. Importantly, Foot’s pre-University education was devoid of the military culture 
and  training  which  was  a  familiar  inclusion  of  most  boarders  (Jones,  1994,  p.19).  At 
Leighton Park, Foot excelled at history, motivating him to apply to attend Oxford to read 
this preferred subject. Whilst at Oxford, however, Foot studied Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, which drew in the study of history as a significant aspect  (Hoggart & Leigh, 
1981, p.42). 
At Oxford, Foot retained his pacifist beliefs. Hoggart and Leigh (1981) argue that his 
Quaker education encouraged him to renounce the use of state violence (Hoggart & Leigh, 
1981, p.45). So strong was his pacifism at the time that even under the threat of war  
within  Europe,  he assisted in the passing of  a motion within the Oxford Union that 
emphasised  their  refusal  to  fight  for  the  King  under  absolutely  any  circumstances 
(Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.45). The motion caused outrage outside Oxford, yet it serves to 
demonstrate the depth of feeling and commitment Foot held at this time for his beliefs. 
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This pacifism was also reflected by the then Labour Leader, George Lansbury, who in 
1933 said his government would
...close  every  recruiting station,  disband the  army,  dismantle  the  Air  Force.  I 
would abolish the whole dreaded equipment of war, and say to the world 'do your 
worst'.  I  believe it  would do its best.  England would not become a third class 
power as some people think. She would become the greatest, strongest and the 
safest country in the world... (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.45). 
Foot's  opposition to  war  extended to  opposing foreign armies such as the growing 
National  Socialist  threat  in  Europe,  however  the  Labour  leader  would  advocate 
dismantling Britain's ability to defend herself against such a foe. Lansbury's pacifism 
appealed to Foot, who was at that time sympathetic to that cause. This drew him closer 
to the Labour Party. However it must be remembered that his pacifism waned with age, 
as evidenced by his full support for the military action undertaken by Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany (Foot, 1980, p.99).
Foot’s move towards the Labour Party was not a departure from his liberalism. He 
joined the Labour Party believing it would be in a stronger position to challenge the  
established Conservative Party as the dominant political force in British politics. Given 
Foot had been brought up to oppose the Tories through any means available, his move 
to Labour was compatible with that aim. As a member of the Labour movement, Foot  
brought with him a mature liberalism that had inspired the calls for British Parliamentary 
reforms before and after the revolutions in France and America (Grayling, 2000, p.35). His 
liberalism  was  based  on  the  writings  of  reformers  whilst  his  socialism  would  be 
enriched by Wells and Marx. Through a discussion of the writings of key influences 
such as these,  it  will  enable a stronger understanding of  those who developed his 
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political character to emerge. This understanding will demonstrate how and why Foot 
was able to stand apart from his other Labour colleagues.
To  understand  how  and  why  Foot  was  able  to  stand  apart  from  other  leadership 
contenders whilst  simultaneously demonstrating his conceptual understanding of the 
plight of the working classes, it is necessary to briefly summarise how his inspirations 
coloured his political  ideals.  The defining effect of  the key thinkers such as Hazlitt, 
Cobbett, and Marx upon Foot's political ideals can not be underestimated  (Foot, 1988, 
p.19). Hazlitt inspired and guided Foot throughout his career through both his political 
writings and literary works  (Foot, 1988, p.13). Any understanding of Foot’s politics must 
consider Hazlitt to be of paramount significance. Foot sets Hazlitt apart, describing him 
as his guide and that “no would be reader and writer, no democratic socialist could wish 
for a better one” and that “it was part of Hazlitt’s genius that had anticipated so much of  
the revolutionary impulse of the subsequent century” (Foot, 1988, pp.13-14). 
Foot  places  Hazlitt7 at  the  heart  of  his  socialism.  He  argued  that  Hazlitt's  genius 
enabled  him  to  anticipate  the  social  arguments  of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
centuries,  connecting  Hazlitt's  proto  socialism  with  the  politics  of  contemporary 
democratic socialism. For Foot, embryonic socialism was present in Hazlitt's writings, 
even if the concept had not yet come into being. Foot believed Hazlitt anticipated some 
of the ideas that became characteristic of socialism. By bringing the liberal Hazlitt into 
the family of socialism, Foot attempts to bridge the two ideologies against the common 
Conservative enemy. Hazlitt expressed his views through his writings which extend to 
7 Hazlitt was an essayist, artist and philosopher who wrote on various topics social political reform, intellectualism, and the role of 
Parliament. As a journalist, much of his work received public attention, but following his death his impact upon political debates 
diminished. His life was thwart with poverty and unsuccessful relations with the opposite sex, although his analysis remained  
valuable to his fellow reformist peers.  
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such topics as intellectual  superiority and good nature.  Foot  complimented Hazlitt's 
writing style for its readability and steady wit against Conservatism (Foot, 1980, p.26). 
For  Foot,  political  reforms  were  the  bedrock  of  change  towards  a  democratically 
socialist system and that the risk of violent revolution could be curtailed through reform 
whereas  the  conservative  status  quo potentially  provoked  revolution  through  its 
inaction.  Hazlitt  attacked  and  denounced  this  largely  conservative establishment 
because it fought against calls for vital political reforms. This anti-Toryism drew Hazlitt 
to Foot. The conservative orthodoxy argued that they feared political change because 
they believed reforms increased the risk of Britain repeating the violence of the French 
revolution (Grayling, 2000, pp.1-4). 
Hazlitt's contributions to English thought are regarded by Foot to be at least as equal to 
those of Samuel Johnson or George Orwell. This admiration and respect for Hazlitt is 
beyond  doubt,  as  Foot  says  in  the  opening  pages  of  The  Politics  of  Paradise:  A 
Vindication of Byron:
William Hazlitt  was  my guide.  No would  be reader  and writer,  no democratic 
socialist could wish for a better one. For him, the paths of politics and literature 
crossed and re-crossed in an endless interweaving. (Foot, 1988, p.13).
A contemporary of Hazlitt, Edmund Burke is considered to be a conservative thinker. 
Despite Hazlitt and Foot's opposition to the Conservative Party, Hazlitt speaks well of  
him. Hazlitt  describes Burke as “an orator (almost a poet) who reasoned in figures,  
because he had an eye for nature”, whilst adding that 
I always entertained a great opinion of Burke, and that (as far as I could find) 
speaking of him with contempt might be made the test of a vulgar democratical 
mind. (Hazlitt, 1970, p.49). 
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Hazlitt's great opinion of Burke was based on the intellect conveyed in his work and his  
oratory. In explaining the anomaly of Hazlitt's respect for Burke, Foot argues that the 
romanticism that drew Hazlitt to the French revolution8 was based upon the ideals that 
underpinned the revolt and it was to those ideals which Foot admired (Foot, 1980, pp.27-
28). Both Foot and Hazlitt were republicans, who rejected the absolute divine right of  
Kings to govern, and so supported moves which advanced that aim  (Foot, 1980, p.27). 
Burke's opposition to the French Revolution was to argue that the preferred method of  
change was 'reform' and yet "a state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation"  (Burke, 1969, p.106). Reform, therefore is vital to conserving 
the state. Burke continues to argue that during the Civil War, England had "lost the 
bond of union" which made progressive change impossible, potentially leading the way 
to totalitarianism (ibid). Given Foot rejected revolutionary change, and Hazlitt advocated 
the ideals which underpinned the French revolution whilst rejecting the Reign of Terror, 
it can be concluded that both figures sought progressive reform in opposition to the 
violent revolution witnessed in France. 
However, Burke's preference to use limited reforms to maintain the status quo does not 
reflect the scale of reforms preferred by Foot and Hazlitt. Burke sought to present a 
philosophical framework to conserve elitist institutions, such as the established Church, 
Monarchy and the House of Lords, which Foot wanted to reform out of existence. Foot 
and Burke both opposed the Reign of Terror and their desire not to repeat the violent 
mistakes  of  the  French  Revolution  in  England,  they  were  divided  on  how  non 
revolutionary reformist tools were to be utilised. To this end, Foot's preference was for  
democratic Parliamentary socialism.
8 "The change of English opinions about the French Revolution had begun after the terrors and excesses of the years 1793-4. To 
begin with it was not merely liberals and reformists in England who had welcomed the Revolution, for many believed that the early 
events in France were a sign that the ancien regime prevailing there was being reformed in something like an English direction. But 
the Reign of Terror changed minds" (Grayling, 2000, p.69).
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As an intellectual politician, Foot came into contact with commentators who did not 
possess  his  conceptual  understanding  of  his  politics.  This  was  a  significant 
disadvantage for Foot  when attempting to convey an argument on a contemporary 
issue.  Hazlitt  wrote  an  essay  regarding  the  situation  in  which  Foot  found  himself  
entitled  the  Disadvantages  of  Intellectual  Superiority.  Hazlitt  argued  that  a  man of 
knowledge is potentially disadvantaged because “he strides on so far before you, that  
he  dwindles  in  the  distance!”  (Hazlitt,  1970,  p.187).  This  'superiority'  created  a 
disadvantage for Foot during interviews and other public appearances. Hazlitt went on 
to argue also that if a man of superior knowledge attempts to conceal his wisdom in 
order  to  converse with  people  of  lesser  intellect,  then he would  be found out  and 
ridiculed.  This  is  significant  for  Foot,  as  often  he  would  be  criticised  by  political  
commentators as appearing to be either aloof or out of touch with the issues of the day.  
Foot's  considerable  intellect  undoubtedly  provided  him  with  a  greater  conceptual 
understanding  of  specific  issues,  however  his  incompatibility  with  the  masses  was 
because  most  people  were  unable  or  uninterested  in  connecting  with  Foot  on  his  
intellectual level. This helps to explain why Foot appeared uncomfortable to some.
As well as the writings of Hazlitt, Foot was also drawn to aspects of William Cobbett's9 
political  experiences.  As  with  Hazlitt,  Foot  admired  Cobbett's  anti-Toryism,  who 
expressed  it  by  simply  referring  to  it  as  'the  Thing'  (Foot,  1980,  p.228).  Foot  quotes 
Cobbett's definition of a Tory as:
9 Cobbett stood against the establishment given it represented the authority of the elite over the majority. Following on from his  
release from prison for condemning the public flogging of militiamen, he fled England to the United States where he developed 
a warmth for the liberty enjoyed by the inhabitants. When he returned to England, he campaigned with other reforms for greater 
enfranchisement of the population. 
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one who is governed by sense and habit alone. His principle is to follow the 
leader; and this is the infallible rule to have numbers and success on your side, 
to be on the side of success and numbers (Foot, 1988, p.47).
Cobbett also detested the changes brought about to England by the initial stirrings of 
industrialisation, which established the living conditions for the working classes that 
Foot contested. The effect of the growing towns and industrial machinery undermined 
the England of old, for which Cobbett had considerable admiration (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, 
p.58). Industrialisation enabled money lenders and bankers to become the new power 
elite, with a stronger emphasis on the importance of profit over noble traditions. Those 
who grew to dominate the capitalist system and thereby become the enemies of Foot 
were effectively born in this period. 
Foot admired Cobbett because he was "a man of genius in the use of his pen" and was 
"gifted too in his knowledge of the new phenomenon of popular politics"  (Foot,  1988, 
p265). Foot was drawn to Cobbett's distaste for Tories and their fondness for capital and 
exploitation. Although he did not hearken back to the England of old, Foot embraced 
Cobbett's  writings  for  their  opposition  to  the  inequalities generated  by  embryonic 
capitalism. 
Foot naturally endorsed Cobbett's critique of Thomas Malthus' Essay on the Principle  
of  Population10.  His  proposed  checks  involved  actively  using  primitive  means  of 
contraception to prevent the poor from procreating. Malthus did not believe the poor 
were capable of demonstrating sexual restraint, and that direct physical action must be 
taken to curb their  appetites.  By preventing the poor from engaging in procreation,  
Malthus argued all  forms of  welfare  relief  would  become unnecessary as the poor 
10. To summarise the essay, Malthus argued that population controls amongst the poor were necessary in order to prevent the  
population growing beyond the nations ability to provide for them (Evans, 2001, p.52).
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would ultimately eliminate themselves. These views brought him much disapprobation 
from Hazlitt, Cobbett and later Foot, and he was regarded by reformers as exemplifying  
the inhumanity of unrestrained capitalism. 
Foot attacked Malthus for his inhumanity and remarked that he had put forward a case 
that presented a menacing 
textbook for Tories,  a faith as firm as a mathematical  equation which could 
salve their consciences and cast the cloak of religion over the whole scene of 
human wretchedness (Foot, 1988, p.31).
Foot argues that Malthus attempted to justify greed and inhumanity by using Christian 
doctrine as a shield.  For Foot,  the solution to destitution and poverty presented by 
Malthus was no solution at all, and rejected entirely any suggestion that such ideas 
would be beneficial.
Much like Foot and Hazlitt, Cobbett was also a supporter of Parliamentary reform. He 
attacked “the evil of leaving the making of laws in the hands of men of mere money”  
because money disconnected them from the plights of the people (Cobbett, 1968, p.113). 
He believed that the rich could not possibly address the distresses of the poor because 
they would be unable to empathise with their problems. The lack of wealth amongst the 
people contrasted sharply with that of the rich Parliamentary candidate. 
In  contemporary  society,  the  House  of  Lords  remains  the  anomaly  of  the  British 
Parliamentary System.  Given its unelected status,  it  represents the opposite  of  the 
democratic socialist society to which Foot wished to advance. Foot wanted to see the 
House of Lords abolished because it was undemocratic and was comprised of wealthy 
individuals who were detached from the plight of the working classes (White, 2010). This 
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connects Foot, Cobbett and Hazlitt in their mutual aspirations of abolishing the role of 
money and privilege in Parliament and reforming an unfair Parliamentary system. They 
called  for  reforms  aimed  at  increasing  the  accountability  of  the  Government  by 
ensuring the Houses of Parliament more accurately reflected the conditions faced by 
the  population  of  the  country.  At  the  time  both  Hazlitt  and  Cobbett  were  writing,  
Parliament reflected the interests of only the land and property owning classes. 
As stated earlier, for Foot the changes to Parliament must be achieved through reform 
rather than revolution. Yet for some on the outside left of the Labour Party, who come  
to the forefront from the late 1960s a more radical approach than that suggested by 
Foot, Hazlitt and Cobbett was preferable. The approach suggested by the outside left  
would have more revolutionary undertones and were at least influenced by Marx. Foot 
was drawn to some of Marx's writings, yet Foot was not a Marxist. He appreciated the  
contribution  of  Marxists  to  political  debate  as  they  encouraged  political  discourse 
amongst the intellectual classes, yet he distanced himself from Marxism because of its  
inadequacies as a practical political system (BBC, 1997). Intellectually Marxism offered a 
valuable critique of imperialism and capitalism, yet failed to offer a workable alternative 
to  which  Foot  could  subscribe.  Because of  this  inadequacy,  when  Foot  became a 
socialist he retained many of his liberal beliefs, rejected the Marxist dogma of some of 
his socialist colleagues, making him a liberal socialist rather than a Marxist socialist. It 
is important to remember that Marx's critique of capitalism was attractive to Foot, but 
that its conclusion of inevitable revolution was not. Foot did not advocate a Marxist  
revolution, preferring steady reform instead. Revolution required violent political change 
outside  of  the  Parliamentary  route,  a  method  strongly  condemned  by  Foot  as 
undemocratic, and risking totalitarianism as seen in the Reign of Terror. 
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Despite Foot's rejection of Marxism, he values the contribution of Marx's analysis to 
political debate. Through Marx, the flaws in the capitalist system were illustrated clearly 
to a wider number of workers, making them more politically aware. Although Foot had 
many sympathies for the analysis Marx provided, he continually argued for socialism to 
be brought to Britain through the Parliamentary system. 
After joining the Labour Party, Foot read  Das Kapital,  which argues that the working 
classes  are  exploited  by  capitalism  through  dehumanising  the  workforce  and 
separating them from the produce of their labour whilst paying a wage that generates 
an excessive  surplus  value  for  the  employer  (Marx,  1995).  During  his  lifetime,  Marx 
produced  a  considerable  amount  of  material  on  the  mechanical  process  of  this 
exploitation. Foot read Marx most enthusiastically in the 1930s at a time when many on 
the  left  defined  their  socialist  philosophy  in  opposition  to  the  growth  of  European 
fascism. Some on the political left were drawn to Marx as an alternative intellectual  
inspiration. 
This attraction to Marx was assisted by the emergence of fascist elements in Britain. 
"Oswald  Mosley  had  formed  the  British  Union  of  Fascists  and  was  bringing  his 
blackshirts on to the streets in provocative rallies. We on the left knew that the collapse 
of democracy could happen in Britain too, because there were many secret admirers of  
Hitler  amongst  the  well-heeled  ruling  class  and  many  would  be  appeasers  in  the 
government"  (Castle, 1993, p.66). Because of the clear separation of ideology between 
the  ruling  class  fascists  and  the  intelligentsia  of  the  left,  as  alluded  to  by  Castle,  
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Marxism provided an antitheses to  the  arguments  used by fascist  figures  such as 
Mosley11. 
For Foot, the value of Das Kapital came in his belief that the work “could and should be 
extended  to  establish  a  full-scale  critique  of  imperialism”  because  it  explained  the 
mechanisms through which exploitation occurs (Foot, 1980, p.141). An understanding of 
the means of exploitation laid the foundations of popular support for counter activity 
against  capitalism.  It  must  also  be remembered  that  reading  Marx  was  almost  an 
expectation throughout the intellectual left at the time. In the pages of Debts of Honour,  
Foot remarks that
...almost the entire Labour movement in Britain, left, right and centre was blindly, 
vehemently eager to be pro-Russian and pro-Stalin. (Foot, 1980, p.139).
Foot argues that given the potential  for  fascism taking hold across Europe, the left 
developed pro-Stalin arguments in order to demonstrate their  opposition to fascism 
(Foot, 1980, p.139). Yet, following the Second World War and the decline of the threat of 
fascism, Foot distanced himself from the rhetoric of the Marxists from whom he came 
into  contact.  This  distancing  was  reinforced  when  the  horrors  of  Stalin's  regime 
emerged into public view. Foot summarises Stalin's crimes, saying
He sent to their deaths almost all the leaders of the revolution. He distorted the 
Socialist aim in a manner which would have horrified both Lenin and Marx. He 
then falsified the history of the revolution itself (Foot, 1958, p.230).
Any suggestion that Foot possessed any sympathy for the Soviet Union under Stalin is 
greatly misplaced. For him, socialism promoted liberal democratic freedoms, yet Stalin 
had curbed many of the freedoms which he considered sacrosanct.
11 Mosley, having fallen out of favour within the Conservative Party regarding Britain's approach to Ireland, joined Labour whereby 
be subsequently suggested a programme of public works to establish industrial state capital to combat unemployment. Mosley 
joined the Fabian Society to advance his aims, as well as attempting to align himself with the Left. He was later frustrated by his 
inability to advance within the Labour Party, and so established 'the New Party', which following its heavy defeats during the  
1931 General Election moved towards fascism.
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The role  Marx  played  in  Foot's  life  was  not  as  great  or  inspirational  as  Hazlitt  or 
Cobbett.  Foot  was  an  internationalist,  yet  the  Soviet  Union  promoted  nationalistic 
divisions.  Marx  was  not  a  nationalist,  but  Leninism  and  Stalinism  rejected 
internationalism in favour of collectivism in one country. Foot also opposed the class 
war  in  much  the  same  way  as  he  opposed  both  world  wars.  Given  Foot's 
understanding of socialism was to emphasise cooperation and equality, the notion of a 
class  war  was  contradictory  to  him.  Foot  also  rejected  the  totalitarianism  and 
undemocratic nature of those who claimed to be Marxist; to join such a grouping would 
be to associate himself with those who governed in a manner which offended his belief 
in Parliamentary democracy (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.43-44, p.47, p.53, p.58, pp.65-66). 
Foot also believed that Marxism concentrated too much on the power of economics. He 
believed  that  the  leaders  “attributed  too  much  discernments  and  rationality  to  the 
leaders  of  'financial  capitalism'  who  controlled  events.  Strategy,  not  economics, 
governed diplomacy” (Foot, 1980, p.142). He also believed that opponents of imperialism 
did not need Marxism to explain the horrors inflicted on human beings. Such horrors 
would be self evident to any empathic person. Foot believed that the working classes 
were not as unaware of their exploitation as Marxists often believed, thereby leaving 
themselves open to accusation of under estimating the workers.
Another of Foot's inspirations, H.G Wells was a socialist who also attracted controversy 
amongst those who he encountered. Unlike Marx, however, Foot admired Wells for his 
literary socialism, and attempted to steer him from accusations of elitism. 
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Wells  was  a socialist  who,  like  many other  intellectuals  joined the Fabian Society.  
Whilst  the  Fabians  sought  to  intellectualise  the  transformation  of  society  from 
capitalism to socialism, Wells argued that  direct action in this process was vital. Far 
from being capable of taming, capitalism was in fact a violent and savage animal which 
had to be destroyed before the new order could be created (Foot, 1995, pp.53-55). Foot's 
preference for Parliamentary reform appeared, therefore to contradict with Wells desire 
to embrace direct action. This contradiction suggests that Wells was an anomaly within 
Foot's political inspirations. 
More controversially Wells was also an advocate of  eugenics.  Foot argues that the 
form of eugenics advocated by Wells was  social reformist  rather than biological.  To 
achieve this, humanity would be improved by progressive politics rather than forced 
genetics. Yet eugenics was a popular idea for population manipulation and control in 
the early years of the twentieth century and was highly discredited following the Nazi's  
use of the eugenics arguments. In his work, A Modern Utopia, Wells proposes that:
it is our business to ask what Utopia will do with its congenital invalids, its idiots 
and madmen, its drunkards and men of vicious mind, its cruel and furtive souls,  
its  stupid  people,  too  stupid  to  be  of  use  to  the  community,  its  lumpish, 
unteachable and unimaginative people? And what will it do with the man who is 
“poor” all round, the rather spiritless, rather incompetent low-grade man who on 
earth sits in the den of the sweater, tramps the streets under the banner of the 
unemployed, or trembles. (Wells, 1905).
Wells  believed  in  eugenics  because  he  felt  that  without  a  system  of  human 
improvement, the advancement of socialism would be restricted by those incapable of 
contributing effectively to the collective good. They would be incapable of contributing 
fully to the advancement of a socialist society because of their position imposed upon 
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them by the capitalist system. This disadvantage would cut them off from being able to 
conceptualise the socialist alternative. This position under capitalism may render them 
uneducated or unfit, thereby making themselves unable to effect the socialist change 
Wells advocated. 
Wells argued his views on eugenics could not be divorced from his socialism, and that 
the socialist utopia he sought to envision would need to engage in a form of social  
eugenics.  Foot  explains the eugenics Wells sought  to advocate was achievable by 
abolishing  poverty  by  providing  equal  welfare,  by  abolishing  ignorance  through 
education,  and  creating  gender  equality  between  the  sexes  thereby  improving 
humanity. Wells "became the champion of a social reformist eugenics looking to female 
emancipation, birth control and the welfare state to improve the species"  (Foot, 1995, 
p.61).  Foot  argued  the  arguments  for  eugenics  advocated  by  Wells  could  be  more 
effectively achieved by directing state assistance to those in need. Wells argued that 
through social eugenics, society would be restructured towards socialism. 
Although contemporary society has excluded eugenics as a practical means of social 
reform, at the time Wells was writing, it was very much considered a plausible method 
of reform. Foot's defence of Wells, however falls short of defending his views in their 
entirety. Foot argues that Wells
...remained until his dying day a servant of truth, a champion of youth, and a man 
who could not live without the companionship of women - some of them, in his 
case, among the most powerful and attractive women of the century. But, alas, 
that did not make him a feminist or even an unqualified champion of women's 
rights. At the height of the suffragist or suffragette campaigns, he had looked for 
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other  ways  for  human  advancement,  and  had  never  quite  been  prepared  to 
acknowledge his error (Foot, 1995, p.306).
Foot  championed  Wells  for  his  socialism,  yet  condemned  him  for  retreating  from 
feminism, and for failing to admit this mistake. Equality amongst humanity includes all, 
regardless  of  gender,  yet  Wells  retreated  to  social  eugenics  for  answers  to  the 
problems  faced  by  society  whereas  Foot  argues  the  answer  resides  in  changing 
attitudes.  However,  Wells  use  of  the  language of  eugenics  opens  him  up  to  the 
accusation  of  elitism and  Foot  can  be  accused  of  euphemist  disingenuousness  in 
supporting Wells, although he is correct to want to locate Wells in his temporal and 
ideological context.
When the leader of the Labour Party, Callaghan resigned in 1980, the Labour Party 
was drawn into a leadership crisis. The election of either the former chancellor, Healey 
or the rising champion of the outside left, Benn as party leader was proving to be highly 
divisive. At this time, Foot became the reconciler, a figure who had the respect of both 
wings of the Party to hold them together. Under pressure to stand for the leadership,  
Foot travelled to Dublin undistracted by a lecture tour to commemorate the anniversary 
of the death of another figure of inspiration, Jonathan Swift (BBC, 1995). 
In a speech just prior to his successful election bid to become leader of the 
Labour  Party,  Michael  Foot  told  a  congregation  at  St.  Patrick's  Cathedral, 
Dublin: 'The best recommendation I could make is that everyone standing for 
political office in Dublin, the United States and even in London should have a 
compulsory  examination  in  Gulliver's  Travels  (Labour  Weekly,  19 December 
1980, p.7).
This demonstrates the level of respect Foot held for Swift.  Both Foot and his father 
shared a deep admiration for Swift, with the father pressuring the son to write a book 
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about his life. Foot ultimately respected the wish, writing  The Pen and the Sword  in 
1957, shortly after his defeat at the polls in the previous general election.
Foot  can  be  accused  of  admiring  anti-establishment  figures  simply  because  they 
oppose the status quo. Foot appears to forgive Swift of his Conservatism because of 
his position against the Tories view of Ireland. Swift's defence of Ireland and opposition 
to a selection of Conservative individuals endeared him to Foot.
Foot characterised Swift's Conservatism as “much to be desired” and demonstrates an 
anomalous characteristic  (Foot, 1980, p.221). Foot argued that Swift believed in a static 
society,  opposed modernisation, opposed reform, and would have strongly opposed 
scientific progress. Consequently, why did Hazlitt rally to his defence and why should 
Swift be counted amongst Foot's political influences? 
First, Swift defended the people of Ireland against the English establishment, thereby 
making him an enemy of figures such as Johnson. Indeed, Foot also notes that the 
Irish revolutionaries took him as one of their own and attributes him with the honour of 
giving Ireland the  courage to  stand against  the  dictates  of  Westminster  (Foot,  1980, 
pp.222-224). Second, Gulliver's Travels developed what could almost be described as a 
cult following amongst reformers such as Hazlitt,  Cobbett and the husband of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, William Godwin. The work was also serialised in a number of reformist 
publications. Swift joined the family of anti-Tory reformers as an adopted brother, ready 
to oppose the imperialist war machine of Conservative England. The importance of this 
work to reformers can be best expressed by Foot himself:
Gulliver's Travels is still the most powerful of pacifist pamphlets. And, of course, it 
is  these  aspects  of  his  iconoclasm which  have  won  for  him  such  persistent 
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allegiance on the left. It is not surprising that Hazlitt, Cobbett, Leigh Hunt and 
Godwin, in the midst of another great war when spies and informers were at work 
in the interests of exorbitant authority, in the age of the press gang and Peterloo, 
treasured Gullivers Travels as a seditious tract. (Foot, 1980, p.228). 
Foot  is  arguing  that  Swift  became  a  friend  of  the  reformers  because  his  most 
controversial work, which gained him the attacks of Conservatives such as Johnson, 
carried  a  peaceful,  anti-war  message.  This  is  significant  because  not  only  does  it 
explain  why Swift  gained a place in  the hearts  of  the reformers,  but  it  also brings 
together a selection of Foot's political influences into a single cause. It should also be 
remembered that  given Britain  was  engaged in  warfare  and imperialism at  various 
points during Swift's lifetime, the state feared ideas which counteracted the accepted, 
conservative political orthodoxies. Consequently for Swift, a message of peace in an 
era of war only attracted condemnation and ridicule from advocates of the status quo, 
whilst  gaining  the  admiration  and  respect  of  liberal  reformers  and  subsequent 
progressives such as Foot.
Foot eclectically gathered from an array of varying political thinkers. They fall short of 
being a community of thinkers because of their diverse political circumstances and their  
contradictory views on key political issues. They differ in their eras and styles, yet are 
drawn together to build upon Foot's existing political beliefs. For example, the analysis  
of  capitalism  provided  by  Marx  provides  a  reason  to  campaign  for  the  reforms 
advocated by Hazlitt.  Also, the contrast between the pre-capitalist and industrialised 
systems provided by Cobbett highlighted the demise of an older Britain in favour of  
industrialisation whilst disregarding the merits of the past. For a lover of history, this  
analysis  demonstrates  that  the  capitalist  society  marked  a  sharp  turn  away  from 
traditional  rural  lifestyles  in favour of  industrialisation.  Hazlitt's  demands for reforms 
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appealed to the old Liberal in Foot, as the Parliamentary system must be modernised 
in order to reverse the flaws identified by Cobbett  and Marx through extending the 
franchise.  Wells  directly  attacked the  symptoms  of  capitalism,  which  Foot  believed 
should be a cornerstone of all reformist socialism. 
A deeply significant strand of common purpose which runs through each of Foot's key 
influences is the desire for reform. Reform of Parliament, that would in turn reform the 
economy of the country in order to make society a fairer and more equal place. The 
ridicule received by Swift  for  his work  provided the reformers with  a romantic hero 
defending the moral case for peace. Foot's key influences sought change and reform to 
Britain's  orthodox  conservativism,  and  he  derived  from  their  writings  a  critique  of 
traditional authority and a distaste for the exploitative effects of industrial capitalism.
As well as the key philosophers and political thinkers, a number of other influences 
affected and inspired Foot's  political  education.  These contemporaries include Lord 
Beaverbrook, Aneurin Bevan, and Barbara (Betts) Castle12, each contributing towards 
Foot's  political  development.  Whilst  Bevan  became  a  political  hero  on  the  same 
ideological scale as Foot, Beaverbrook was a Conservative media tycoon who became 
a close personal friend to Foot following the Second World War  (Taylor,  1972,  p.238). 
Through Beaverbrook, Foot was provided with employment within his media empire to 
advance his arguments, and housing to aid his temporal needs. He was a close friend 
as  well  as  inspirational  figure  who  relished the  political  debates  both  men shared. 
Bevan was a life-long Welsh socialist, a man of deep political principle and was deeply 
loyal to the Labour Party.  Despite his loyalty to the Party,  he also had an ability to 
12 Barbara Betts Castle was from a political family, a socialist, and was active in the ILP. In the Labour Party she positioned  
herself in the left, and was a friend to both Foot and Bevan. Later in her political career, she advanced ahead of Foot to achieve  
a position in Wilson's cabinet in 1965.
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disrupt  its delicate balance. Foot was drawn to Bevan's analysis  of  the need for a  
socialist alternative to capitalism and became a close personal friend through much of 
their association together. Castle shared a long intellectual friendship with Foot which 
begun during their mutual reading of political philosophy and Fabian works such as 
Industrial  Democracy at  her  Bloomsbury  flat  in  the  1930s  (Morgan,  2007,  pp.42-43). 
Consequently, when considering Foot's political education, the contributions of these 
contemporary figures also should be considered at least as valuable as the key political  
philosophers and thinkers.
Lord Beaverbrook was politically Foot's antithesis.  Beaverbrook's Conservatism had 
rewarded him with a seat in a wartime Churchill cabinet and guiding the developing 
Conservative press to adopt anti-socialist positions. Hoggart and Leigh (1981) quote 
Foot saying “I loved him, not merely as a friend, but as a second father”  (Hoggart and 
Leigh,  1981,  p.70).  For  Foot,  Beaverbrook  presented  a  friendship  based  on  mutual 
respect and admiration rather than political ideology. There can be little ambiguity in 
Foot's expressions of affection towards Beaverbrook but  why would a liberal socialist 
such as him develop a clear, strong, and personal relationship with such an outspoken 
enemy of British socialism? 
Despite the differing political  ideologies, Foot respected Beaverbrook's openness of 
character, intellectualism, and willingness to converse with those who did not share his 
views. Being able to create a close friendship with an advocate of strong, contrasting 
conservative  opinions  demonstrates  Foot's  equal  ability  to  look  beyond  ideological 
boundaries.  Foot  saw  the  potential  for  discourse  and  debate,  rather  than  simply 
another  ideological  enemy.  It  must  also  be  remarked  upon  that  as  well  as  Foot  
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developing  a  controversial  friendship  with  Beaverbrook,  Beaverbrook too  broke the 
mould  of  ideological  alignments  by seeking  out  those who  could  guarantee him a 
debate of worth, as opposed to a sycophantic discourse with fellow Conservatives (Foot, 
1980, pp.79-84). Within Debts of Honour, Foot (1980) described Beaverbrook as a “wary, 
high spirited, erratic, cunning, calculating, passionate, sentimental, restless, impulsive”  
man for whom he had a great deal of respect and admiration (Foot, 1980, p.90). These 
characteristics made Beaverbrook a fascinating figure to Foot;  effectively,  a worthy 
political opponent with whom to challenge and engage. This view is strengthened by an 
essay for the Evening Standard in 1992 in which Foot characterised Beaverbrook as a 
man who “loved argument but hated sycophancy” and who loved to debate and argue 
about  the  topical  news  stories  of  the  day  (Foot,  2003,  pp.316-319).  This  rejection  of 
sycophancy led Beaverbrook to look for intelligent conversation with those other than 
his political peers. Consequently,  it  can be seen that both figures shared the same 
need to seek out those who could pose an effective challenge to their existing views.  
These qualities endeared Beaverbrook to Foot, and Foot to Beaverbrook. Both men 
enjoyed the company of independent,  open minded mavericks even if  their political  
views were polar opposites. Morgan (2007) remarks that Beaverbrook “delighted in 
Foot's  personality”,  and  that  Foot's  experiences  and  beliefs  gave  their  discussions 
passion to such an extent that differences of political views ceased to prevent the two 
from becoming firm friends (Morgan, 2007, p.67). 
It must also be remembered that Beaverbrook employed Foot to work for him on the 
Express and potentially had the authority to control his output. It is doubtful that Foot  
would  have  acted as  a  willing  puppet  of  Beaverbrook as  the  contradiction  in  their 
political ideologies remained. Beaverbrook was also in a position to deride or ridicule 
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socialism through his newspapers. This potential for ridicule did not prevent Foot from 
standing by his socialist principles; indeed, such ridicule also served to reinforce his 
views. The oxymoron of their friendship transcended political boundaries and ideology, 
but  Foot  disregarded  the  fact  that  Beaverbrook's  papers  sought  to  hold  back 
Parliamentary socialism.
Another  of  Foot's  political  heroes,  H.G.  Wells  also  developed  a  friendship  with  
Beaverbrook,  which  Foot  discussed in  Wells'  biography,  describing both Wells and 
Beaverbrook as “friends and enemies”  (Foot, 1995, p.278). In addition to Wells, Bevan 
also  developed  an  intense  friendship  with  Beaverbrook,  which  Campbell  (1987) 
describes  as  being  “drawn  into  a  sinister  web”  of  talented  young  socialists  who 
engaged in Beaverbrooks dinner discussions of political intrigue  (Campbell, 1987, p.64). 
Beaverbrook enjoyed the company of his political opponents so he had an opportunity 
to  expand  his  knowledge  and  foster  an  understanding  of  their  beliefs  within  an 
amicable  setting.  Although  this  appeared  surprising  to  those  socialists  and 
Conservatives who had not been invited to take part, it enabled Foot to develop their  
very  genuine  and  open  friendship.  Both  men  were  able  to  enjoy  each  other's 
intellectual discourse free of any mutual suspicion of either politically benefiting from 
their relationship. 
So  keen  to  keep  intellectual  discourse  alive13,  when  Tribune,  a  mouthpiece  of 
opposition  to  the  capitalism  which  Beaverbrook  supported  became  financially 
pressured,  he  stepped  in  to  provide  financial  assistance.  In  1951  Tribune lost  Sir 
Stafford  Cripps as  a patron,  prompting Foot  to  turn  to  Beaverbrook for  help.  Foot 
13 It can also be argued that Beaverbrook's support for Tribune kept the Labour Party divided given it could be accused of having  
the effect of being a mechanism for keeping Labour divisions alive.
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became a material  beneficiary when Beaverbrook provided £3,000 to keep  Tribune 
operating, which Taylor (1972) notes was charged to the Daily Express account. The 
general manager of the Daily Express, E. J. Robertson was not pleased with this move 
and protested directly to Beaverbrook. 
When Robertson objected, Beaverbrook replied 'where should we get our recruits 
without Tribune? (Taylor, 1972, p.598).
Given Beaverbrook admired the journalism of  Tribune  to such an extent of recruiting 
from the publication, had it disappeared from the political debate then the quality of his 
own newspapers  potentially  stood to  suffer.  Left  without  a  challenge,  the  capitalist  
press would become over confident. Taylor (1972) argues that this is a key moment 
when the friendship between Foot and Beaverbrook flourished at its greatest, with Foot 
renting  a  cottage  from  Beaverbrook  at  Cherkley,  remaining  a  close  neighbour  of 
Beaverbrook until his death (Taylor, 1972, p.598).
Friends of Foot found the close friendship to be incomprehensible and at odds with his 
well  known and respected democratic, liberal socialism. Foot remarks that Brendan 
Bracken had shouted “look at you, swilling Max's champagne and calling yourself a 
socialist” at a timid and subservient Bevan  (Foot, 1980, p.77). However, given this was 
reported by Randolph Churchill  in a newspaper article,  Foot  calls into question the 
validity of such a remark  (ibid). Given Bevan's volatile temperament, Foot argues it is 
highly unlikely to be an accurate description of the argument as Bevan would not be 
inclined to allow anyone to shout insults or discredit  his passionate socialism  (ibid). 
However,  the  sentiment  of  Churchill's  comment  demonstrates  the  argument  used 
against  socialists  who  became,  in  their  eyes,  too  friendly  with  Beaverbrook.  Foot, 
aware of the contentious nature of the friendship, says that many of his friends found 
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the friendship "absurd, inexplicable, discreditable,  scandalous" and even "evil"  (Foot, 
1980, p.79).
Put  simply,  Foot  loved  Beaverbrook  after  years  of  friendship.  Foot  attributes  his 
relationship with Beaverbrook's willingness to listen. 
He listened. He took in everything said to him, everything he overheard and on 
this level of personal exchange there was no cant, no personal pretension, no 
side, no snobbery. (Foot, 1980, p.80). 
These qualities were built into their friendship, which ensured an active interest and 
intellectual  fulfilment  remained  between  the  two  figures.  Beaverbrook  thirsted  for 
information, and he was driven by a desperate urge to get to the core of debates. Such  
an individual appealed to Foot regardless of the political differences of opinion because 
of the open nature of their discussions. Theirs was a genuine friendship, based on 
frank  discourses  ordinarily  associated  with  that  of  a  father  to  son.  Yet  it  must  be 
remembered that other figures within the Labour Party,  especially on the left,  found 
Foot's friendship with Beaverbrook inexplicable, although he undoubtedly attempted to 
influence the media tycoon towards his ideas.
Another  of  Foot's  contemporary  inspirations  was  Aneurin  Bevan.  Despite  Bevan's 
volatile  character,  potential  for  egotism and  tendency to  splinter  the  Labour  Party,  
Bevan was admired by Foot for the principles he fought for.
Aneurin Bevan was unique. There was no one else even remotely like him. As a 
man,  a  speaker  and  political  leader  he  always  acted  in  a  style  completely 
individual to himself. (Foot, 2003, p.253). 
Foot  opened  Bevan's  obituary  in  Tribune  in  1960  with  the  above  quotation.  As  it 
demonstrates, Foot had an almost reverential  respect for Bevan because he was a 
man who allowed his principles and passions to act as a guide to his politics.  For  
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Bevan, his passion made politics a mechanism to aid the deprived. Foot continues the 
obituary saying that Bevan “wanted a Labour Party seriously determined to change 
society to its foundations and a Britain sufficiently independent and sceptical of all the 
clichés of the Cold War” so that global peace and cooperation could be promoted (Foot, 
2003, p.255). Foot believed Bevan was a man of no small ambitions and that the Labour 
Party had a unique duty and role to promote ethical political reform in opposition to the 
excesses of western capitalism and eastern communism.
As part of his book In Place of Fear, Bevan wrote that boldness in words and in political 
deeds are vital. 
Boldness in words must be matched by boldness in deeds or the result will be 
universal  malaise,  a  debilitation  of  the  public  will,  and  a  deep  lassitude 
spreading throughout  all  the organs of  public  administration.  Audacity is  the 
mood that should prevail among Socialists as they apply the full armament of 
democratic values to the problems of the times (Bevan, 1961, p.52).
This  boldness within politics should, he argued, take the form of  principled collective 
actions designed to prevent individual suffering. Politics was not about maintaining the 
status quo, but rather about remoulding the nation towards an ethical, socialised nation 
where equality would be the new and accepted norm. Bevan also argued strongly that 
no civilised society can tolerate the sufferings of its people, given such tolerance would 
undermine its civility. It would become paradoxic for any nation to tolerate squalor and 
ignorance at the expense of prosperity and equality. For Bevan, a key step towards 
achieving a civilised society is the delivery of universal healthcare at its heart because 
the health of a nation determines the living conditions of its citizens. To this end, Bevan 
moved to establish a nationalised healthcare system.
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In terms of practical politics, Bevan fought this principled position as a member of the 
Attlee  cabinet.  His  failure  to  convince  social  democrats  such  as  Hugh  Dalton  or 
Gaitskell of the principle of equality did not mask Bevan's strong desire to stick to his  
beliefs, an action which many on the left admired. Foot was such an admirer. For Foot, 
this made Bevan a political hero. The opening words of Foot's first biography of Bevan 
are quoted from Hazlitt, which read 
It  is  hard for any one to be an honest politician who is not  born and bred a  
dissenter. (Foot, 1975, p.13). 
For Foot, challenging and attacking the conservative and orthodox view is a central  
aspect of any socialist politician, and Bevan embodied this trait. As Foot quoted from 
Hazlitt concerning political dissent 
...no patriotism, no public spirit, not reared in that inclement sky and harsh soil, in 
'the 'hortus siccus of dissent', will generally last: it will either bend in the storm or 
droop in the sunshine. (Foot, 1975, p.13). 
Bevan's background nurtured his dissenting attitude towards the established order. He 
was a son of the Welsh mining town of Tredegar, where he endured the very harsh 
living conditions characterised by Hazlitt. His father, David died of a preventable illness 
which gave him a sense of determination that health care in Britain was unjust and 
inadequately provided. Whilst working at the colliery, he became a trades union activist 
where he embraced socialism, and became a Labour supporter. 
Bevan's passion to do that which he believed to be correct with determination is a key 
characteristic which drew Foot to Bevan. With Bevan and Beaverbrook, Foot had two 
very strong willed personalities in his daily life. Both Bevan and Beaverbrook believed 
strongly  in  different  principles.  Bevan's  strength  of  character  and  dedication  to  his  
principled socialism endeared him to Foot.
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Foot also was influenced by a large number of women during his political career. The 
love of his life, Jill Craigie supported Foot throughout, yet this did not preclude him from 
having other female friends. A key individual was Barbara Castle. Both she and Foot 
shared a close friendship through much of their mutual political careers. Castle became 
infatuated by Foot's political analysis and philosophical intellect (Morgan, 2007, p.58). For 
both, it was a form of love at first sight. Yet the relationship appeared to cool over the 
ensuing decades  with  her  devising  the  critical  phrase  “the  collective  Foot  type”  to  
describe his romantic rationalism. He argued in retort that her diaries should be treated 
“with strict circumspection” because as a general rule diaries “purport to tell all” yet are 
incapable of conveying the whole truth as they are, by design, from one perspective 
(Morgan, 2007, p.493; Foot, 1986, p.55). Foot's dislike of diarists is clear, arguing that the 
diarist  can put their interpretation of events to the reader as an accurate record of 
debatable  events,  leaving  those  discussed  to  dispute  their  validity.  Diaries  are 
presented  as  transcripts  of  events,  thus  appearing  to  be  a  detailed  and  accurate 
record. It is for this reason that Foot did not keep a diary, given its reliability can fall  
under scrutiny.
In her autobiography, Castle comments that both she and Foot read together, however 
she recalls whilst he read the political analysis of Das Kapital, she was immersed in the 
Dickensian classic Martin Chuzzlewit; significant because although both read together, 
they had not read the same literary works (Castle, 1993, p.79). Whilst significant, it should 
be remembered that during these reading sessions Castle introduced Foot to Marx as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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On matters of government, Castle comments that it was Foot's “rigid principles” which 
compelled him to refuse “office in Wilson's first government because he found it too 
right-wing” (Castle, 1993, p.78). She, however did join the government, thereby separating 
their definition of the role of Labour socialists; Foot remained outside to critique the  
government, Castle joined it in order to aid the government implement its policies. Foot 
remained outside of the government so that he could retain his independence from 
collective  cabinet  responsibility.  This  cooling,  however,  does  not  mask  the  evident 
length of their friendship, which started when they met at the Socialist League14. Castle, 
like Foot also drew from historical influences. Foot admired the civil war leader and first 
Lord Protector of the English Republican Commonwealth, Oliver Cromwell and Castle 
admired the Victorian artist,  author  and socialist,  William Morris  (Castle,  1993,  p.179). 
Historical republican figures gave their socialism roots in the long struggle against the 
inequalities, power and privilege of the dominant Conservative establishment. 
More significant to Foot was his life partner and wife, Jill Craigie. She was a writer, film 
maker and feminist who was an active participant of Foot's political life. They were both 
socialists, advocates and friends of Bevan. However,  they did not always agree on 
significant aspects of political thought. Her feminism, for example conflicted with her 
husband's.  This  conflict  extended to  a critique of  a key political  influence on Foot.  
Craigie is quoted by Rollyson (2005) saying:
Wells was a kind of feminist.  The feminists today hold it  strongly against him 
because he was opposed to the women's voice. The reason for that was that he 
had little faith in parliamentary democracy. At the time he didn't think it mattered 
all that much. And I regard this as a black mark against him. Michael, I am sure, 
will find excuses. (Rollyson, 2005, p.345).
14 The Socialist League was created in opposition to the ILP disengaging with the Labour Party. It mainly sought to oppose fascist  
ideals in British politics. It was proscribed by the Labour Party after engaging with the Communist Party and Popular Front,  
which led to its dissolution. 
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As she predicted, Foot launched a defence of Wells, arguing that he “learned from his 
lovers all  the time”,  and that this deference to women vindicated him as a feminist  
(Rollyson, 2005, p.346). As a strong feminist, however Craigie was not inclined to allow her 
husband to defend such views without fierce debate (BBC, 1997).
Aesthetics  and  art  were  hallmarks  of  her  socialism because  she  appreciated  their  
power to convey messages to the masses and their ability to convey both simplicity and 
complexity. Indeed, Foot's commitment to making Plymouth one of the most beautiful  
cities in the country drew her to his interpretation of how post war reconstruction can be 
an opportunity to beautify the nation (BBC, 1997). She believed that Foot subscribed to 
her belief that socialism should embrace the aesthetics. To Be A Woman deconstructs 
the arguments used supporting the subjugation of women in twentieth century Britain 
and anticipates arguments deployed by later feminists. Craigie was such an influence 
upon  Foot  that  she  influenced  his  decision  to  stand  for  the  leadership  in  1980. 
Hattersley confirms the effect Craigie had upon Foot saying "I think that Jill Foot was 
responsible for a very large part for Michael's candidature"  (BBC, 1995). Evans (2010) 
also remarked in an interview that Craigie had "expressed her pleasure" at influencing 
Foot to stand in the leadership election (Evans, 2010). There can be little doubt, therefore 
that she was a significant influence upon Foot including his decision to stand for the 
Labour leadership.
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By drawing ideas respectively from an eclectic range of political and social philosophers 
Foot  found  support  and  inspiration  for  his  liberal  socialist  outlook.  From Hazlitt,  Foot  
confirmed his liberal romanticism which had been established by his father prior to his 
formal education. Hazlitt  helped to shape the continued development of Foot's political  
philosophy during the early years  of  his socialist  conversion from the Liberal  Party by 
emphasising the case against  conservatism and privilege.  Hazlitt  “wrote  about  political 
ideas and political history, about immediate controversies of the age, about the motives of  
politicians,  about  political  parties  and  the  conduct  within  parties,  about  the  resolute 
capacity  of  those  who  hold  power”  (Foot,  1981,  p.30).  During  Foot's  political  career,  he 
sought to emulate this style of critique against both Tories and some within his own party 
in order to ensure an effective scrutiny of those who held political power. Foot came to see  
himself as the heir to Hazlitt's political romanticism which he adapted in the modern age.
Cobbett was “a man of genius in the use of the pen but gifted too in his knowledge of the  
new phenomenon of popular politics”  (Foot, 1988, p.265). Foot deeply respected Cobbett's 
ability to anticipate the inequities and inhumanities which would result from the ideas which 
Malthus advocated. Foot was able to link in his mind the oppositional arguments advanced 
by Cobbett towards the Conservatives with the issues he faced throughout his own career. 
For example, the growth of neo-liberalism within the Conservative Party over the course of 
his  time  on  the  Labour  front  benches  demonstrated  the  link  between  the  arguments 
advocated by Cobbett and those which Foot challenged. 
From Marx came the influence of the economic case against capitalism. Granted Foot was 
not an economist nor a revolutionary, but this did not prevent him from understanding and  
drawing from the strong critique Marx provided of capitalism in Das Kapital. Foot's liberal 
65
socialism  took  “some  minor  sprinklings  from  Marx  for  seasoning”,  which  helped  to 
underscore his left-wing critique of capitalist exploitation  (Morgan, 2007, p.480). From Marx, 
Foot drew a conceptual understanding of the exploitative effects of economic liberalism, 
although this did not extend to embracing fully all the consequences Marx predicted would 
occur. Rather Foot preferred the reformist approach as advocated by Hazlitt and Cobbett 
with just a 'minor sprinkling' from Marx.
Swift provided Foot with a critique of imperialism which endeared him to those seeking 
Parliamentary reform. Indeed, Foot argues that “across the gulf of time and politics, there  
is a kinship between their spirits, and the common strand runs through Gulliver's Travels.” 
(Foot, 1981, p.208).  Foot used throughout his life the arguments conveyed by Swift as his 
case against war and in favour of peacemaking. Foot was not a pacifist, but he did oppose 
the imperialist wars such as those against Ireland which Swift eloquently opposed.
From H.G Wells, Foot was able to draw a clear intellectual identification of the symptoms 
of  industrial  capitalism  and  also  a  case  for  political  and  social  reform.  Although  the 
methods of eugenics had fallen out of favour during Foot's career, he identified Wells as a 
pioneer of social reform given his willingness to engage with the debates which others 
appeared to shy away from  (Foot,  1995,  p.61).  Foot argues that Wells correctly identified 
many of the negative effects capitalism had upon the working-class, and so believed that  
through social reform these effects may be reversed, leading to a more politically active 
class that favoured socialism. 
It can be clearly seen that Foot drew from his philosophical influences a strand of reform 
that  opposed  both  capitalism  and  its  political  ally,  the  Conservative  Party.  His 
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contemporaries, such as Bevan and Castle, underpinned the more socialist weight in his  
outlook  whilst  he  gravitated  to  more  predominately  romantic,  liberal  and  reformist 
influences  which  he  learned  from  an  earlier  philosophical  tradition.  All  those  who 




Foot's political life was drawn in part from the influences and experiences which had been 
described  in  this  chapter.  They  are  key  to  understanding  how  his  political  career 
developed,  which  culminated in him securing the leadership of the Labour Party.  The 
reformists, the critics, the romantics and the unlikely Tory each had their roles in Foot's 
multiple, historic philosophical inspirations. They moulded his liberal socialism, distaste for 
privilege  and  injustice,  his  belief  in  Parliamentary  democracy  as  an  alternative  to 
revolution,  his  analysis  of  western  capitalism and  his  feminism.  The rationale  for  this 
consideration  of  Foot's  political  influences  is  their  contributory  affect  upon  Foot,  in 
separating him from the other Parliamentary candidates for the Labour leadership. Had 
they been  absent  from Foot's  political  life,  then  his  political  career  would  have  been 
diminished. 
Hazlitt and Cobbett are key to understanding his liberalism, whilst Marx provided Foot with  
a solid critique of capitalism. This critique of capitalism gave him a zeal for political and 
social  reform  towards  which  he  dedicated  his  life.  Swift  was  embraced  by  left-wing 
commentators and romantics such as Foot as his support  for Ireland brought him into 
conflict with the Conservative establishment. Wells' socialism was founded on a basis for 
equality, whilst Foot shared with him a rejection of the caution of Fabianism. These key 
philosophers and thinkers shaped Foot's philosophical education. They brought out Foot's 
intellectualism throughout his life which enabled him to develop a distinctive appeal to 
many Labour MP's and Party members whilst some of them may not have understood 
their relevance, they took at face value the importance of his learning.
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As well  as  the key philosophers,  Foot  was  also inspired  by those who he came into 
contact with throughout his life. Lord Beaverbrook was treated as a second father, in spite 
of his Conservatism. This paternal role developed as a result of their mutual trust and 
respect for each others values and opinions. This was met with dismay by some of Foot's  
fellow socialists,  unlike another  inspiration,  Bevan.  Foot  treated Bevan as a hero and 
aspired to an similar style of inspirational oratory because Bevan adhered to the principles 
he believed in. 
The women in Foot's life also motivated him. Castle and Craigie were the key women who 
shared  his  appreciation  for  liberal  socialism.  Castle  and  Foot's  friendship  may  have 
appeared to cool as the decades passed, however the early stages of their association 
was a partnership which appreciated works of literature and political analysis. The love of  
Foot's life was, however Jill Craigie, the socialist film producer.  
Foot's political education was a life-long journey through numerous philosophers, political 
thinkers and politicians drawn from various locations on the political spectrum. Yet each 
individual thinker or influence possessed elements which he absorbed into his political 
understanding. He can be criticised for a readiness to disregard anomalies, a tendency to 
hero  worship  and,  until  his  participation  in  government,  for  a  romanticism that  Castle 
perceived. Some might argue he was unduly eclectic in his intellectualism though others  
would regard this as evidence of his 'hinterland'15.
The spirit of rebellion and of challenge to the established orthodoxies demonstrated by 
Foot's inspirational influences suited his liberal socialism and his own political personality.  
Consequently,  it  must be concluded that Foot was philosophically grounded within  the 
15 The use of the term hinterland was popularised by Healey to describe political figures with interests which go beyond politics.
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liberal  tradition  of  intellectual  thought.  The  view  that  some  of  his  influences  were 
incompatible  must  yield  to  the  interpretation  that  he  established  a  consistency in  the 
manner  through  which  he  drew  from  them.  They  supported  his  anti-establishment 
rebelliousness, his liberal ideals, his rejection of injustice and his determination to uphold 
Parliamentary democracy16.  These values appealed to  a  significant  number  of  Labour 
MP's in 1976 for Foot to become the favoured candidate of the left, whilst in 1980 they 
were sufficient for him to secure his election as leader. 




Michael Foot's Political Background
3.0: Introduction.
Foot  became a  credible  candidate  for  the  Labour  Party  leadership  as  a  result  of  the 
political events in which he became engaged after 1935. During the period from 1935 to 
his first challenge for the Party leadership in 1976 his ideology evolved from being a liberal 
to a liberal socialist,  enabling him to present himself as a credible leader drawn from the 
inside left tendency in the Labour Party.
Foot's political career developed following a period of uncertainty about how to apply his 
talents. He left Oxford with a good degree and a keen interest in politics, yet he did not 
have a clear idea about how to apply his talents. Instead, he travelled around Europe, Asia 
and the United States, seeking learning and inspiration from the cultures he encountered. 
In the United States he delivered a series of political  lectures on behalf of  the Oxford 
Union.
Upon his return to the United Kingdom, he found employment in Liverpool, where he was 
presented  with  the  realities  of  the  destitution  that  excessive  decades  of  industrialised 
capitalism reaped upon the working classes. This encounter compelled him to cease his 
long standing support for the party of his father in order to join the growing Labour Party. 
His conversion to Labour underpinned a growing belief that only socialism possessed the 
solutions  to  the  deprivation  he  encountered  in  Liverpool.  At  a  rally  in  1981,  Foot  
remembered  that  it  was  the  "prevailing  deprivation"  which  he  saw in  Liverpool  which  
"persuaded him to become a politician" (Heren, 23 July 1981, p.4).
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Once  a  member  of  the  Labour  Party,  Foot  immediately  attempted  to  secure  a 
Parliamentary  seat.  He  failed  to  gain  election  in  1935  because  Transport  House  had 
accepted his offer to stand in the safe Conservative seat of Monmouth. The outbreak of 
war  prevented him standing again in 1940,  forcing him to  wait  until  the 1945 general  
election,  at  which  time  he  fought  a  successful  campaign  in  Plymouth  Devonport,  
subsequently holding the seat until his defeat in 1955. 
He spent his time out of Parliament developing his reputation by embracing Tribune and 
taking part in television debates. Tribune was a left-wing magazine which strove to provide 
a constructive critique of official Labour Party policies.  Tribune  promoted the belief that 
"the British Labour Party can be made a most powerful instrument for achieving socialism 
at home and peace abroad", and that to achieve this, a critique was necessary  (Tribune, 
1977, p.7). It acted as a significant mouthpiece for democratic socialists to advance their  
arguments and promote their ideology amongst their readership. 
Foot returned to Parliament in 1960 as the MP for Ebbw Vale, the former seat of his friend  
and  mentor,  Bevan.  Back  in  Parliament,  he  fought  against  Gaitskell's  support  for  the 
Conservative governments attitude to the USSR and Wilson's17 approach to the Vietnam 
War from the back benches whilst seeking to protect the relationship between the Labour 
Party and the trade unions. However, his early joy at the return of a Labour government in 
1964 turned to disappointment by 1970, blaming the Labour leader for wasting the years of 
power. Between 1970 and 1974, Foot's career advanced towards joining the Labour front 
bench. He campaigned and lost against Roy Jenkins for the deputy leadership in 1970, 
enabling him to gauge his level of support and to determine the broader support for the  
17 Harold Wilson was the former Bevanite who moved towards  the  political  centre during the 1950s.  Upon Gaitskell's  death,  he 
became the leader of the Labour Party, whereby he fought and won four of the five subsequent general elections for the Party.
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inside left within the PLP for a potential future leadership election. This evolution towards 
Foot’s ultimately successful campaign for the Labour leadership in 1980 demonstrates his 
enduring loyalty to the Party and his consistency in articulating the causes to which he was 
committed. 
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3.1: Michael Foot and the Labour Party.
Foot’s political evolution towards becoming a credible leadership contender began almost 
immediately upon joining the Party. Although not immediately apparent, by developing a 
loyal  profile,  a  willingness to  campaign for  causes he believed in,  as well  as arguing 
against those who supported unrestrained capitalism, Foot’s pedigree within the Party and 
broader movement became evident. He played active and significant roles within both the 
wartime and the first postwar Parliament. Although not a government minister, he was 
involved in the intellectual debates Labour faced during the key period between 1940 and 
1960. Foot attacked Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax for their appeasement policies 
towards Hitler; he also helped in the establishment of the 1941 Committee that aimed to 
win the war for a socially reformed Britain, and, as the editor for the  Evening Standard, 
fought  to  retain  threatened  press  freedoms.  Following  on  from  Foot's  election  to 
Parliament he assisted in the development of the Keep Left group. He used his oratory to 
oppose Russian communism and American capitalism, thereby demonstrating to both the 
Party and electorate his resistance to those ideologies. After 1955, Foot also consolidated 
his  unilateralist  views  through  his  role  in  the  founding  of  the  Campaign  for  Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND). This demonstrates Foot's reputation as a key advocate for the inside 
left of the Labour movement (Foot, 1999, pp.68-69).
Foot's relationship with the Labour Party had its genesis in the early years of his life. Upon 
leaving Oxford he chose to sample various cultures around the world, visiting Palestine, 
Beirut, Athens, Belgrade, Budapest, and the United States  (Jones, 1994, pp32-34; Hoggart & 
Leigh, 1981, p.52). During his lectures in the United States he attacked the policies of Hitler, 
promoted nationalisation as a potential  economic tool, and opposed the use of military 
training in schools (Jones, 1994, p.34). These positions demonstrate Foot's alignment with a 
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left-wing  position  within  the  Labour  Party.  Foot  also  spoke  out  against  American 
isolationism whilst  speaking broadly in favour of  Roosevelt's  New Deal,  seeing it  as a 
progressive alternative to Republican laissez-faire  (Morgan,  2007, p.35).  This aligned Foot 
with socialist intellectuals such as Harold Laski (Foot, 2003, pp.237-243).
On Foot's return from the United States his friend, John Cripps, the son of the left-wing  
figure  Stafford  Cripps  found employment  for  him at  the  Blue  Funnel  Line  of  the  Holt 
company as the personal assistant to the company director, Leonard Cripps (Chavda, 2001). 
In Liverpool Foot saw for himself poverty on a scale he had previously never witnessed 
ensuring  it  made  a  lasting  impression  on  his  young  mind.  He  found  that  his  work 
colleagues lacked substantial intellectual capacity and regarded the routine administrative 
work mundane and to be as “dull as dishwater”  (Jones,  1994, p.36). His later readings of 
Marx had spoken about the dehumanisation of labour, and in Liverpool he had been faced 
with the living embodiments of the exploited. Foot believed with the decline of the Liberal 
Party, only the Labour Party would be in a position to oppose the policies which allowed 
the inhabitants of Liverpool to be exploited in such a manner. Consequently, he broke with  
the party of his Liberal family, and joined the Labour Party. This is a key moment in Foot's  
political development, as it divorced him from the politics of his family, bringing him into his  
new  family  of  socialists.  It  would  subsequently  be  a  dysfunctional  relationship  with 
arguments emerging about the means of achieving a socialist end.
Foot's reputation was enhanced in 1940 when he co-authored a short book detailing the 
events  which  he  argued  contributed  towards  Britain's  lack  of  preparation  prior  to  the 
Second World War. Entitled  Guilty Men  it  had the effect of positively expanding Foot's 
public and Party exposure. Both were significant given the work effectively introduced Foot  
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to the Party and that he immediately began by challenging the Conservative establishment 
with a strong critique against their unwillingness to prepare Britain for the war they were 
fighting and, potentially, losing. This position distanced him from the pacifism which had 
been  associated  with  the  deposed  leader,  Lansbury  and  associated  him  with  more 
mainstream positions.
Foot blamed the capitalist instincts of business for Britain's failure to prepare for war. He 
argued that the Treasury was hesitant to divert investment into war preparations because 
they simply did not want to "disorganise industry by turning the whole country into an arms 
factory" (Foot, 1940, p.113). As Hitler was using Jewish slavery in order to advance Germany 
towards a state of total  war  over Europe, Britain merely played the games of old and 
argued for a stronger economy. In so doing, Britain was ill prepared for war, and the guilty 
men were those who placed economic prosperity ahead of the survival of the state in the 
face of the Nazi threat (ibid). 
Through Guilty Men, which built his reputation in the Labour Party at an early stage, Foot 
"caught a public mood, and amplified it to a legend" (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.80). The public 
was  angry,  and  Foot  tapped  into  that  anger,  thereby  laying  the  foundations  for  the 
advancement of a new generation of political leaders. The book gave Foot a clear sense of 
patriotism whilst demonstrating his strong opposition to Nazism. Yet, Foot was very much 
aware of the need to prepare for peacetime and endeavoured to ensure the post First 
World War social failures did not repeat themselves. By putting forward the analysis of 
how the 'Guilty Men' led Britain to the edge of destruction, Foot was also able to build a 
reputation within the Labour Party. This enabled his profile both with the public and within  
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the Party to begin in principled opposition to those he believed left Britain at the mercy of 
Nazi Germany.
In addition to Guilty Men, Foot's reputation was enhanced within the Party when he joined 
the 1941 Committee. For Foot, the committee aimed to ensure the government maintained 
its controls over the economy whilst ensuring that the workers were protected from private 
exploitation. These positions demonstrate that Foot's political  evolution was developing 
him towards a clear left-wing position. To further its objectives, the committee issued a 
postwar plan which included the maintenance of workers councils, a commitment to full  
employment, and full state education. Foot’s association with the committee demonstrates 
that he was looking to preserve the enlarged wartime economy in peacetime along with 
the  added  social  benefits  which  had  been  denied  to  the  population  by  prewar  
governments. 
In  the  subsequent  postwar  years,  Foot  developed  an  almost  nostalgic  view  of  the 
mobilisation for war undertaken in Britain because it demonstrated that socialisation of the 
economy operated effectively under extreme conditions  (Foot, 1984, p.47). He argued that 
wartime socialism had brought the people, industry and the functions of the state together 
in the common cause of national survival. It was clear to Foot, therefore, that Britain could 
operate  as  an  effective,  collective  country  and  so  should  remain  together  in  order  to  
combat social injustice, inequality and poverty.  By placing himself in favour of continued 
collectivisation in the postwar period, Foot advanced the case for peacetime economic 
socialism which appealed to those who were and later became associated with the inside 
left. As a result of his wartime activities, Foot sought to become a Labour Parliamentary 
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representative by standing for a seat at the bomb damaged city of Plymouth. It would be  
prudent, therefore to consider briefly Foot's attempts to become an MP.
In the context of his publishing Guilty Men and his involvement in campaigning for press 
freedoms and  peacetime socialism,  Foot  was  well  positioned  to  stand  for  election  to 
Parliament in 1945. He stood in the seat of Plymouth Devonport despite high expectations 
that he would fail,  owing to the sitting candidate, Hore-Belisha defending a majority of 
11,096  (The  Times,  4  July  1945,  p.8).  The Times  (1945)  did  concede,  however,  that  the 
Conservative candidate was not having a good election. Foot strongly argued that through 
socialism Plymouth had the potential  to become a beautiful  city that would be able to 
attract the envy of the nation  (BBC, 1997). He was also able to capitalise on accusations 
that Hore-Belisha had failed to give the Army the resources they needed in 1940 and had 
refused full  compensation for injured service personnel  (Morgan,  2007,  p.106).  It  is  worth 
noting that his distance from the pacifism of figures like Lansbury was valuable given the 
role of the Navy in defeating Nazism. Devonport was, after all a Naval town. 
Against the expectations of critics, Foot secured the seat with a majority of 2,013 after a 
14 per cent swing from Hore-Belisha (Morgan, 2007, p.107). In Parliament he was able to take 
forward his liberal socialism within the PLP, and to exploit the opportunities to argue from 
the national platform this forum granted him. It also led to his acquiring political allies on 
the inside left of the Party.
Foot  joined  with  Donald  Bruce,  Richard  Crossman  and  Ian  Mikardo  to  become  the 
'ringleaders'  of  a  group  of  MP's  who  became  disgruntled  by  the  diminishing  socialist 
impetus of the Attlee government after 1947. They stood against the government's drive 
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towards  Morrisonian  consolidation  of  Labour's  achievements  on state  ownership.  Foot 
favoured extending the  influence of  the  state  into  greater  economic  fields  as  outlined 
during his involvement with the  1941 Committee.  Any alternative would become a step 
backwards from achieving socialism in Britain and a betrayal of the promises made during 
the wartime Parliament.
To express their opposition to this retreat he and his colleagues published a pamphlet 
entitled Keep Left  (Schneer, 1988, pp.60-61).  Keep Left  also became the name for a broadly 
intellectual group of left leaning idealists within the PLP. This group morphed and mutated 
through the following decades to become the Bevanites and, ultimately the foundations of  
the inside left of the PLP. Foot worked with Mikardo to write the sections entitled "What We 
Are Up Against", "The Job At Home", and "Twenty Things To Do" whilst Crossman wrote  
the foreign policy chapter entitled "The Job Abroad" (ibid; Foot, et al, 1947). 
Foot and Mikardo argued that "we are living today in the midst of a coal crisis, a food 
crisis, a raw materials crisis, a manpower crisis, a trade crisis, a dollar crisis and more 
besides"  (Foot,  et  al,  1947,  p.3).  There could be little doubt as to  the precarious state of 
Britain's economy. 
Foot's remedy was for the economy to be reinvigorated by the pillars of industry, such as 
fuel,  power,  transport  and central  banking  (Foot,  et  al,  1947,  p.11).  In order to revive the 
economy, Foot argued that
this nationalisation programme has been carried out  vigorously,  and needs to be 
continued to embrace every industry which has a hold over our national economy or 
which cannot be made efficient in private hands (ibid).
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By bringing the vital  industries for  national  survival  into  state hands,  Foot  argued this  
guarantees vital services would be provided and unemployment would be reduced. It must  
be remembered, however that Foot's call for a nationalisation programme was curtailed by 
his caveat that industries must be nationalised which "cannot be made efficient in private 
hands" (ibid). This reluctance to nationalise profitable companies was also evident in his 
opposition  to  an  outside  left  proposal  in  1973  to  nationalise  25  of  Britain's  largest 
manufacturers18 (Rosen, 2005, p.311). Foot's oppositional stance was likely to advance his 
position amongst centrist and social democratic MP's, thereby enhancing his credibility as 
a minister and leadership contender. However, this opposition would also have the effect 
of divorcing him further from those associated with the outside left.
Foot  and  Keep Left  also  argued  that  greater  economic  prosperity  could  be  achieved 
through strengthened connections with the Commonwealth and European nations, cuts to 
imports of luxury items and the recruitment of more skilled foreign workers to kick start the 
foundries. In foreign policy, Foot argued that Britain should demobilise the armed forces to 
enhance the workforce, cut the British Empire, work more closely with Europe and the 
Commonwealth, reduce dependency on the United States' economic dominance, develop 
a European community,  British withdrawal  from Greece,  Palestine and Egypt,  develop 
African  nations  ahead  of  British  withdrawal,  work  towards  Indian  independence  and 
support the new United Nations in order to prevent American or Soviet domination of the 
world  (Foot,  et al,  1947, pp.45-47). This was a comprehensive set of proposals which were 
designed to develop a confident, progressively socialist Britain, free of the trappings of 
Imperialism whilst moving towards internationalism and economic independence. 
18 "Benn enthusiastically promoted their recommendations. Harold Lever, back in the shadow cabinet since November 1972, regarded 
it as 'a naive dream... of an omni-competent, all-seeing government, which can then act to inform, instruct, guide and persuade the 
hundred thousand different entrepreneurial components of private industry into one harmonious equivalent of the Russian Gosplan'" 
(Rosen, 2005, p.311).
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By enhancing Britain's relations with Europe and the Commonwealth, Foot and the Keep 
Left group were arguing for a third power bloc to prevent a bi-polarisation of influence 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The future, they argued, was not merely  
between American capitalism or Russian communism. Rather, the third option was for a 
democratic socialist Europe. By embracing Europe, Britain had the potential to help create 
a  power  bloc  of  socialist  nations  that  would  trade  closer  together  with  other  nations, 
thereby ensuring Britain's economic independence from the United States and safety from 
the Soviet Union.
Foot's later opposition towards Europe emerged because the Common Market was "an 
insecure  alliance  of  some Western  European  governments  who  were  more  ardent  in 
defence of their national interests than in pioneering a Community of Europe" (Holland, 1975, 
p.316). The Common Market was  not  the vision Foot had for Europe.  The elitism of the 
Common Market appeared to separate member states from broader international trade. 
Foot's commitment to internationalism saves him from the attack of changing his view 
since he wanted Britain  to  trade with  European and non-European nations alike.  The 
exclusivity  of  the  Common Market  made  this  difficult.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the 
European community which he advocated was of a different character to the Common 
Market that subsequently emerged. These different views and visions of Europe did not 
damage Foot because it was Europe rather than his position which changed.
By Labour's ejection from office in 1951, Foot was at the forefront of the debates within the 
Party.  Given that the position of the Morrisonian traditionalists was the consolidation of 
existing achievements and the social democrats who sought closer ties with the foreign 
and economic policies of the United States, Foot’s position was firmly in opposition to 
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both. Following the Party’s electoral defeat, Labour became embroiled in a bitter dispute  
between these various camps. However, the position adopted by the left and the social 
democrats  became the  bedrock  of  the  polarised  debate.  Foot  discovered  widespread 
support  among constituency activists  for his position. The brains trusts19 and the NEC 
elections demonstrates the intra-party appeal for the policies of Parliamentary left-wing 
socialism.
Foot’s public profile increased between 1951 and 1963 when he took on the mantle of 
responsibility for the operations of Tribune and became an active participant in television 
debates for both the BBC and Independent Television. Whilst the Labour Party embroiled  
itself in the Gaitskell-Bevan conflict during much of this period, Foot’s public reputation 
grew. This brought him into controversies within the Party and beyond, but in general the 
publicity enhanced his reputation.
Foot's television experience enabled him to expose his views to some in a more direct 
fashion  than  his  earlier  writings.  For  the  BBC,  Foot  regularly  appeared  on  a  political 
discussion forum entitled  In The News.  He engaged in debates with the historian A.J.P 
Taylor, the Conservative MP Robert Boothby and Independent MP William Brown (Hoggart 
&  Leigh,  1981,  p.103).  Both  Foot  and  Boothby  were  considered  mavericks within  their 
respective parties, much to the mutual embarrassment of the Labour and the Conservative 
leaderships. Foot was becoming a highly visible thorn in the side of the social democratic  
Labour  leadership,  asserting  his  views  rather  than  theirs.  Realising  this,  the  BBC 
circulated a memo to the executives of In The News saying
Foot‘s continued appearance has made the Labour Party feel that the solid core of  
the  party  is  overshadowed.  Similarly  the  Conservative  side  the  continued 
19 The brains trust were left wing MPs such as Foot,  Bevan and Wilson who toured constituencies attempting to persuade Party  
members of their positions on key policy areas such as economic and defence policy (Coates, 1975, p.191). 
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appearance of Boothby has not been acceptable to all Conservatives (sic) (Election 
Demon, 2009).
Such was the programme's popularity that Foot became something of a political celebrity,  
developing catchphrases such as "that's absolute tripe, and you know it"  (Hoggart & Leigh, 
1981,  p.104).  It  would,  however  be short  lived on the BBC, the team were  reunited on 
Independent Television in 1955 for a current affairs programme Free Speech, where their 
debates continued unabated. 
For Foot, appearing on television was a chance for him to engage fiercely with his political  
opponents,  to  put  his  views  and  messages  across,  and  to  contribute  to  the  broader 
debates within British politics. It  was a productive vehicle for enhancing his reputation, 
which in turn enhanced his position on the inside left, earning him the respect of many of  
his fellow MP's.  Through engaging in these regular debates,  Foot  became a  de facto 
intellectual  face  of  the  Labour  Party.  His  debating  style,  views  and  clear  intellect 
throughout his career enabled Labour voters and supporters to believe that the Party was 
comprised of intelligent figures upon who they could trust (Watkins, 2010).
Foot “took up the editorial baton” of Tribune in 1955 and “remained there until his election 
to Parliament for Ebbw Vale five years later”  (Morgan, 2007, p.164; p.166). Whilst there he 
worked with Jennie Lee and a fellow left-wing MP Bill Mallalieu as coeditor and he was 
able to use his position to state his views on issues such as on freedom of speech within 
the Party.  Writing in  the Times,  prior to the 1955 general election the  Tribune editorial 
board wrote a collective letter arguing that 
a real understanding of freedom means a willingness to tolerate, not only the views 
of  the  majority  or  those  who  have  won  considerable  favour,  but  the  irritating, 
defiant,  even ill-expressed and outrageous opinions of the minorities which may 
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still  contain the essential grains of wisdom as small as a seed of mustard (The 
Times, 15 April 1954, p.8).
This was mainly directed towards those within the Party who sought to manipulate Party 
policy away from what Foot saw as its socialist aspirations. For Foot in the 1950s it was 
the Tribune intellectuals who were advancing the argument for socialism in Britain (Morgan, 
2007, p.167). 
Foot also assisted in the foundation and growth of the CND movement. The early CND 
was a gathering of like-minded figures seeking to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear 
weapons  and  their  commitment  to  unilateralism.  Given  the  Labour  Party  had  all  but 
officially  abandoned  the  cause,  supporters  of  unilateralism  retreated  to  the  CND, 
becoming a focal point of the opposition (Foot, 1999, pp.68-69). Foot saw the role of the CND 
as  a  vital  instrument  for  reminding  Labour  and  Conservative  politicians  about  the 
"ugliness" of weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure that the life of Labour politicians 
did not become too "cushy" (Foot, 1999, p.70). 
CND was  an issue which  saw an  end  to  the  Bevanites  as  a  cohesive  group.  "What 
happened in 1957 was that this growing element in the Party was suddenly and rudely 
deprived of the leader to whom it had hitherto looked up to. One immediate consequence 
was the foundation of the unilateralist Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (Campbell, 1987, 
p.340). Bevan's refusal to subscribe to the unilateralist cause had distanced him from those 
he had earlier inspired. "Nothing mattered, for the Bevanites certainly, but the feeling that 
they had been clubbed into insensibility" by Bevan's oppositional position (Foot, 1997, p.556). 
Bevan was  concerned about  relations with  Britain's  allies  both inside  and outside  the 
Commonwealth  (Foot,  1977,  p.122).  It  was,  for  Bevan  therefore  a  matter  of  broader 
international  relations rather  than whether  Britain  had the bomb or  not.  However,  this 
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disagreement  fractured  Foot  and  Bevan's  personal  relationship,  which  would  only  be 
reconciled shortly before Bevan's death in 1960.
The 1959 General Election was described by Foot as
...a mildly progressive Tweedledum for a mildly reactionary Tweedledee to entice 
the floating voter by the moderation and so called 'statesmanship' of the leadership 
(Foot, 1977, p.123).
The Labour Party,  Foot argued, was moderating its socialism to such a degree that its 
compatibility with the neutral, floating voter ensured that the Party “played into the hands 
of  Macmillan  and his  publicity  agents”  (ibid).  The Party  was  conceding the  ideological 
argument to the Conservatives. By doing so, the electorate was faced by a choice of either  
a moderate Labour Party or a moderate Conservative Party, generating a stagnation of 
democracy. After Labour lost the election, and Foot again lost in Plymouth Devonport, he 
remarked  that  Britain  had  chosen  five  more  years  of  “the  unjust  society,  the  casino 
society, the 'I'm alright Jack' society” whilst the Labour Party chose instead to engage in 
recrimination and disunity (ibid). By this point, the leadership of the PLP was proving to be 
a disappointment to Foot. He fell foul of the leadership of Gaitskell and in March 1961 was 
one of the five Labour MP's from whom the whip was withdrawn (The Times, 17 March 1961, 
p.14). Yet, despite this, the Labour Party remained the best hope for progressive policies 
(Morgan, 2007, p.216). This hope kept those aiming to reform Britain within the Party. 
Ebbw Vale was a Welsh working-class area with a proud history of class-consciousness 
and a good environment for Labour comrades to associate. When Bevan died, Foot was 
adopted in September 1960 to contest his seat at Ebbw Vale. Foot's election meetings 
were very well attended, with hundreds of people packing the various halls in which they 
occurred.  Ultimately,  the  election  result  was  a  resounding victory  for  Foot,  giving  him 
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20,528 votes with his nearest rival, a Conservative named Rhys-Williams, securing only 
3,799  (The  Times,  19  November  1960,  p.4).  After  the  announcement  of  the  result,  Foot 
reaffirmed his unilateralism saying
we have fought this campaign on a clear policy of socialism and demand for a new 
foreign policy which repudiates nuclear strategy altogether (ibid).
Foot would never fear a weak electoral base again. Plymouth Devonport had given him an 
unstable base upon which to conduct his Parliamentary activities. In sharp contrast, Ebbw 
Vale, by the virtue of his majority and the sentiment afforded to the memory of Bevan, 
granted him an extremely stable base upon which to operate. It is worth noting that this 
victory  would  be  the  last  to  be  witnessed  by  Foot's  father,  Isaac  who  died  shortly 
afterwards. 
Foot's  re-election  to  Parliament  in  1960  heralded  the  commencement  of  his  second 
Parliamentary career.  However, Gaitskell was less than tolerant towards Foot's debating 
style than Attlee had been. On a key Conservative vote on budgetary estimates for the 
armed  forces,  Gaitskell  used  the  party  whip  to  enforce  an  abstention  in  the  House. 
However,  Foot and several other like minded members voted  against the government, 
defying the whip, thus demonstrating their defiance towards the authority of the leadership.  
By withdrawing the whip,  Gaitskell  unwittingly  freed his  opponents  of  the  controls  the 
constitution  gave  him  over  the  rebels.  Foot's  return  to  Parliament  demonstrated  his 
independence of mind, showing a strong sense of purpose and willingness to stand up 
against the leadership on an issue close to his heart. This forceful characteristic showed 
that Foot was willing and able to sacrifice prestige for his principles. This position of left-
wing integrity enhanced his reputation in a way that was beneficial to him in the condition  
of the Labour Party between 1976 and 1980.
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At the Labour Conference in 1961, the conference voted to reject unilateralism. This had 
the  potential  to  disengage  unilateralists from the mainstream of  the  political  process, 
encouraging MP's sympathetic to that cause towards groups such as the CND, where they 
may be tempted to take direct action to express their views (Hinton, 1983, p185; Jones, 1994, 
p260). Foot's Parliamentarian beliefs ensured he fostered a certain ambivalence towards 
this option. However others associated mainly with the more outside left positions felt no 
such hesitation.  It  was  also  a  time when  Britain  would  be  compelled  by  international 
events to make a definitive association with the United States against the Soviet Union. By 
this  time,  any  hope  of  a  democratic,  socialist  Europe  emerging  that  would  stand 
confidently in opposition to both the United States and Soviet Union had fallen away into 
the  realms  of  political  fantasy.  This  distinguished  the  idea  of  socialist  European 
Community,  which  Foot  had  favoured  whilst  part  of  Keep  Left,  from  the  capitalist-
orientated Common Market which divided the Party. 
Harold Macmillan,  the  Conservative  Prime  Minister  reaffirmed  Britain's  continuing 
collaboration with the United States in the arms race against the Soviet Union  (Macmillan, 6 
March 1962, p.16). This alienated Britain from any third possible option with either Europe or 
the Commonwealth. On a visit to Washington, Gaitskell extended his support for the US 
position.  However,  Foot  argued  that  by  supporting  the  United  States,  Gaitskell  risked 
damaging the Labour Party by disregarding the wishes of his own party. His opposition to 
the position adopted by Gaitskell was the result of a continuing opposition against nuclear  
weapons.  He favoured complete  nuclear  disarmament  on  all  sides and supported  the 
existing ideology of neither the US or USSR power blocs. 
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This undoubtedly enhanced his position within the inside left.  He rejected a pro-Soviet 
position whilst remaining unenthusiastic about the American nuclear alliance. Foot's active 
discontent with  the leadership ceased abruptly,  however  when Gaitskell  died.  Gaitskell 
had succeeded in  solidifying  his  hold over  the Party leadership and in  his  tribute  for 
Tribune,  Foot  commented that  he  lacked  “imaginative  sympathy,  wisdom and power”, 
which is why “he often found himself in such deep hostility to the aspirations of many of  
those he hoped to lead” (Foot, 1977, p.131). 
Wilson's election as leader in February 1963  enabled Foot and his fellow rebels to feel 
confident enough to approach the Shadow Cabinet to request a restoration of the whip. 
After an initially frosty reception, the whip was subsequently restored  (The Times,  30 May 
1963, p.12). This reconnection with the broader PLP returned Foot to the inner fold of the 
Labour  Party,  enabling  him  to  continue  his  political  evolution. The  new  leadership 
undoubtedly provided Foot with a sense of renewal which, after the public arguments with  
Gaitskell, proved to be highly desirable. With the pinnacle of CND achieved, and the test  
ban treaty signed in Moscow, the arguments over nuclear disarmament had also began to 
fade from the mainstream public debate (Jones, 1994, p.270). Under Wilson, therefore a new 
era for Foot and the Labour Party appeared to have begun.
With the Conservative Party appearing out of touch with the selection of Sir Alec Douglas-
Home as leader, and the Labour Party advancing the case for science and technology in 
cooperation with socialism, Labour was returned to government in 1964. Wilson's rhetoric 
has enabled the Party to appear modern and progressive which carried with it an implicit  
desire to lay the divisions of the 1940s and 1950s finally to rest (Cronin, 2004, p.92). 
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With Labour back in government, some within the left faced a dilemma between voicing 
their opposition to aspects of Labour's programme or remaining loyal to the leadership.  
Foot believed there was a limit to which loyalty should be pursued, but described it as an  
“outrage” if the left destroyed the Labour government's ability to govern  (Hoggart  & Leigh, 
1981, p.151). He argued for the need to moderate left-wing opposition in order to safeguard  
against a catastrophic failure of Labour in power and the return of the Conservatives.
This position was quickly tested when a potentially contentious aspect of foreign policy 
emerged as Labour's attitude towards the Vietnam War. Foot opposed the Vietnam war 
(Hoggart  & Leigh,  1981,  p.154).  In talks with the United States President Lyndon  Johnson, 
Wilson was asked to send the Black Watch soldiers to Vietnam. Wilson literally remained 
silent.  By remaining silent,  he was able to retain a theoretical  commitment to Britain's 
partnership with the United States without committing any British troops to the war. Wilson 
endeavoured to keep Johnson on side because of the economic threat any splinter would  
pose  to  Britain.  When  frustrated,  Johnson  appeared  to  be  contemplating  the  use  of  
nuclear weapons in the war zone. Concerned by this, Wilson flew to Washington where 
Johnson told him 
...if you want to help us in Vietnam send us some men... now, if you don't feel like  
doing that, go on with your Malaysian problems (Ziegler, 1993, p.222).
Such was the perceived hold of the left over the Labour Party that Johnson blamed them 
for Wilson being unable to commit British troops to Vietnam. However, the left were not 
pleased by Wilson's endorsement of Johnson's actions despite refusing to commit British 
forces. Speaking in the House of Commons, Foot argued that...
...the reason that I would not send troops to Vietnam is that I think it is a shameful 
war, a war which I believe is being fought for the wrong reasons and which can 
never be brought to a successful conclusion. Those, surely, are adequate reasons 
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for  not  sending  British  troops  there.  I  hope  that  it  will  be  understood  by  a  
Government in this country that they cannot send British troops to Vietnam, not 
only on the diplomatic technical grounds which my Right Hon Friend adduced but 
also  because  if  the  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Secretary,  in  response  to  an 
American request, were to attempt to send British troops to Vietnam they would 
tear  to  pieces  even  the  secure  majority  which  they  now  have  in  the  House 
(Hansard, 1966, p.610). 
Again Foot distanced himself  from the Labour Party leadership but not to the point  of 
disloyalty. This differentiated him from Richard Gott. Prior to the 1966 general election, the 
Vietnam war invaded domestic politics at a Hull by-election where Gott, an outside left  
socialist stood against the Labour Party entirely on the Vietnam issue (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, 
p.154). Gott, who was a young Guardian journalist standing with the support of the Radical  
Alliance, argued that he was standing solely in opposition to the Vietnam war and did not  
seek to debate on any other political matter (The Times, 5 January 1966, p.6). Foot was fiercely 
opposed to Gott's actions because of the damage upon the broader interests of the Labour 
Party. He said
Despite Vietnam, despite the immigration policy, despite many other deeds which 
have struck in electoral gullets, there is a widespread determination throughout the 
rank and file of the Party to do everything to win a fresh electoral victory, to do 
nothing to put it in jeopardy... if  the Labour Party turns away from power at this 
critical  moment,  or  if  it  tears  itself  to  pieces  for  the  convenience  of  the  Tory  
enemy...  we  will  be  condemned  for  generations  to  ridicule  and  ineffectiveness 
(Hoggard & Leigh, 1981, p.155). 
Despite the moral argument Gott and his supporters were making, Foot was not able to 
support  them politically  because his  loyalty  to  the  Labour  Party  transcended all  other 
issues. This loyalty stood firm against the likelihood of a return of the Conservatives if the 
actions of outside left undermined the Labour government (ibid). Labour went back to the 
polls  in  March 1966 and increased its  hold over  the government handsomely.  Labour  
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increased their number of seats to 363 over the Conservatives 253  (Dorey,  1995,  p.340). 
Foot's  undying  loyalty  to  the  Party  coupled  with  his  adherence  to  principle  further 
endeared him to the Party rank and file and increased his appeal to a substantial minority 
of MP's; his future electorate.
In  June 1967,  Foot  stood for  election to  the Party treasurership.  The Daily  Telegraph 
described Foot as an “artist” as opposed to a treasurer, and that his election to the position 
“would be tantamount to torture” (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.158). Yet Hoggart & Leigh (1981) 
argue that Foot stood in order to force an election for the position; had he not done so,  
then the Home Secretary, Callaghan would have secured the position uncontested. The 
irony of this position is that the case for a contested election supports Benn's arguments 
some years later when challenging Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981 as discussed 
in Chapter 6. In this context, however, Foot's actions had fewer divisive consequences and 
the  Party  could  afford  the  election  without  the  threat  of  divisive  internal  disunity.  In 
retrospect, it appears that Foot was subtly changing to one of advancing the inside left of  
the Party from inside the structures of power.
By the late 1960s the issue of reform of Labour's industrial  relations was high on the 
political agenda. In 1968, the former Bevanite Secretary of State for Employment, Barbara 
Castle sought in the White Paper,  In Place of Strife to redefine the role of trade unions. 
The White Paper sought to force unions to register with the government, to subject strike 
action to ballots, to inflict financial penalties upon unions and employers over issues of 
recognition, and institute conciliation pauses to enable negotiations between workers and 
employers to take place (Castle, 1984, p.561). Castle's White Paper was later revived by the 
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Heath administration as a basis for the Industrial Relations Act which Labour fought hard 
against before resuming office in 1974.  
The  White  Paper  was  attacked  fiercely  by  Jack  Jones  in  Tribune,  saying  that  the 
conciliation pauses and ballots were designed to delay action and prolong the frustration 
of the workers. Also, the deductions from the workers wages had the potential for further  
industrial dispute and the processes would prolong any resolution of disputes where speed 
was necessary (Jones, 1977, p.158). Foot wrote that
...Harold  Wilson  and  Co.  have  been  persuaded  that  the  way  to  establish 
themselves as big, brave men and women capable of governing; the way to prove 
they have hair on their chest; the way to show they don't give a damn for anybody,  
except of course the New Mirror or the Daily Statesman and, last but by no means 
least, the public opinion polls, is to declare war on the trade unions... (Foot, 1977, 
p.159).
Foot's reaction to the growing dispute was to place the Party leadership in the firing line 
against the trade unions.
Within Parliament, the inside left dominated Tribune Group backed an amendment to the 
Bill “on the ground that it contains proposals for legislation which would destroy certain 
fundamental rights of a free trade union movement” (The Times, 28 February 1969, p.3). After 
several months of negative press and attempts to dilute the harsher aspects of the White  
Paper through negotiations between the government and the TUC, the White Paper was 
dropped from the programme of legislation. Callaghan, who came from a strong trade 
union background had argued against Castle within cabinet that the government of the day 
must maintain a working relationship with the unions (Wood, 19 June 1969, p.1). Foot's stance 
on this contentious proposal bound him closely to the trade unions, and given that he 
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came from a non-labour  as  well  as  non-Labour  background this  further  extended the 
constituency to which he appealed across the Party.
Foot was delighted when Labour was returned to power. But by 1970, his joy had turned to 
woe over the policies enacted by Wilson and the leadership. Labour's loss in 1970 was a 
dramatic blow to the Labour Party, for which Foot blamed the austerity economics pursued 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins and the role Castle's White Paper played 
(Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.150; p.161). Positive advances in social housing and education had 
been largely concealed by the contention and disunity which had been unfairly magnified 
by Vietnam and In Place of Strife.
Recognising the need for greater involvement, Foot stood for election to the Parliamentary 
front bench for the first time in 1970. This was a turning point in his career. He had been 
unable to stand for the previous Wilson shadow cabinets, given his situation regarding the 
suspension of the whip. His success this time was rewarded with a position as opposition 
spokesman for Fuel and Power, and his first front bench position  (Hoggart  & Leigh,  1981, 
p.163). He also put his name forward to the PLP to become the deputy leader of the Party.  
Although almost certain to fail, this was the first post defeat leadership election which had 
the potential to draw out members of the inside left and the social democratic right into  
direct debate regarding their period in office and the need for renewal. Foot's participation 
within the election can be interpreted as an attempt to determine the level of influence 
those who shared his views had within the PLP. He secured 67, the former agriculture  
minister and centrist  figure Fred Peart  secured 48 and the former Chancellor,  Jenkins 
secured  133  votes  (Wood,  9  July  1970,  p.1).  Foot  secured  more  votes  than  had  been 
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expected,  and  Peart's  respectable  result  can  be  attributed  to  his  opposition  towards 
Britain's membership of the Common Market.  
In opposition, Wilson argued against a 'postmortem' of the defeat, arguing that no corpse 
existed for such an analysis to take place on. His desire to avoid an examination of the 
reasons for defeat in 1970 did not prevent  Tribune from considering the reasons, with 
Wayland Young writing
We lost because we never took hold of the country... instead of boldly doing that  
which had to be done, we acted blandly, as if we did not yet have the power... we 
lost because we did not pay enough attention to little things which require great 
importance... we lost because we had already lost the active party workers... the 
Party  conference  knew what  words  it  wanted.  The  Government  would  not  say 
them... (Young, 1977, p.180).
Young  (1977)  blames the  government  for  lacking  the  confidence required  to  follow a 
socialist  programme,  for  alienating  the  rank and file  and for  disregarding the voice  of 
conference. These issues intensified during the 1970s, ultimately embroiling Foot during 
his period on the front bench and as leader. By refusing to engage with these views in 
1970, Wilson had put back a necessary evaluation of his government's failure to engage 
with  his own party's supporters.
The social  democratic right  of  the Party preferred to  concentrate on the successes of 
Wilson's  administration whilst  the inside left  focused on reaffirming Labour's traditional 
support  bases.  Both sections of the Party  aimed to reaffirm Party links with  the trade 
unions after the humiliating defeat of In Place of Strife. By turning back to the trade unions, 
Labour's argument that it had a strong connection with the workers and unions could be 
restated  (Cronin, 2004, pp.118-119). Foot would be able to utilise this structural connection 
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upon Labour's return to government regarding the NUM and the miners dispute in 1974,  
another step towards challenging for the leadership.
In the House of Commons, the Labour front bench benefited from Foot's articulate style to 
such  a  degree  that  Wilson  promoted  him  to  Shadow Leader  of  the  House  in  1971, 
enabling him to speak on a wide variety of issues  (Morgan, 2007, p.265). The issues Foot 
would  have  to  debate  included  the  Conservative  application  for  Common  Market 
membership and the passing of their Industrial Relations Act. Both these events would lay 
the foundations for the divisive intra party debates concerning Britain's relationship with 
the Common Market and Industrial Relations. Foot's gradual conversion to the mainstream 
of the party leadership can be best illustrated by a vote in May 1973 when he joined with 
Callaghan, Healey and Williams to vote down a proposal by left-wing MP's to nationalise 
“some twenty five of our largest manufacturers”  (Hoggart  & Leigh,  1981, p.164). Foot voted 
against the proposal because of the potential electoral consequences of such a policy.  
Hoggart & Leigh (1981) argue that the incident openly separated him from the outside left 
and made Foot's active participation in the next Labour Government a likely eventuality. 
This also signposts a significant shift in Foot's political activities. Whereas previously Foot 
had  been  able  to  rebel  from the  back  benches,  he  now had  to  consider  the  greater 
potential for electoral damage to Labour of his actions. This shift, however did not prevent 
him from opposing key policies of the next Labour government from within the cabinet in  
his role as Secretary of State for Employment.
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3.2: Conclusion.
Foot's  political  development  demonstrates  how  his  principles  retained  their  left-wing 
flavour whilst he evolved towards joining the front bench. From witnessing the squalor in 
Liverpool, to the publication of the Keep Left pamphlet, Foot's conversion to socialism was 
the beginning of a long political career characterised by protest, debate and spreading the 
arguments for progressive socialism. This endeared him to Keep Left group, the Bevanite 
tendency, and ultimately ensured he became a key figure within the inside left of the Party. 
In the country he also become a familiar figure as a result of his television work, enabling 
him to articulate his arguments to interested members of an electorate. Foot's time outside 
Parliament enabled him to remain in the public eye by participating in the development of  
the  CND and Party  through  Tribune.  By remaining  in  the  eye  of  party  activists,  Foot 
continually solidified his reputation as a figure of the left. He developed a reputation within 
the Party as an approachable individual capable of a tolerant interaction with much of the  
Party. These were qualities which Foot and the Party needed to call upon as the 1970s 
progressed.
Following  his  re-election  to  Parliament  in  1960,  symbolically  inheriting  Bevan's 
constituency, and as his biographer, Foot was able to lay claim to inheriting the mantle as 
a leader of the left. His safe seat liberated him from a concern with electoral rejection. Foot 
was able to  campaign for  his  beliefs  even if  this meant  sometimes voicing opposition 
towards a Labour government. For example, he protested Wilson's stance on Vietnam, yet 
would not support a dedicated antiwar outside left socialist. Foot remained loyal to Labour 
despite his criticisms, legitimising his inside left credentials. 
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Understanding Foot's political background is an important step towards comprehending 
his election as Party leader.  Foot's political  profile was rooted within an ethical  liberal 
socialism, which rejected the dogmatism of the outside left. In the 1970s, when the overall 
centre of ideological gravity in the Labour Party had shifted leftwards, disrupting the broad 
coalition of social  democratic right and inside left  ideological tensions, Foot's record of 
Party loyalty made him more acceptable to moderates of either ideological position and 
therefore an increasingly credible challenger for the leadership (Clark, 2010). 
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Political Consolidation of Michael Foot
4.0: Introduction.
Throughout the 1970s Foot undertook a journey from being a conscience driven opponent 
of the pragmatic policies favoured by the Party leadership to being an inside advocate on 
the  Labour  front  benches.  This  journey  enabled  Foot  to  gain  a  favourable  reputation 
amongst the PLP vital to becoming a potentially serious leadership contender. Prior to this 
moment, Foot had been free on the backbenches to say and campaign as his conscience 
dictated on issues such as disarmament and Vietnam. Yet he was not so constrained as to 
potentially risk the reputation or life of the Labour government; always critical when the 
moment demanded, yet unwilling to risk causing such political damage as to risk the return 
of the Conservatives. However, as a front bencher, Foot began a transformation which 
brought  him  face  to  face  with  the  difficult  realities  of  devising  and  implementing 
government policy. As part of the later Labour government, Foot would be called upon to 
devise legislation to replace unpopular Conservative legislation towards the trade unions. 
By 1974, Michael Foot was in a powerful position. His strong links with the Left 
made him a most important - if not the most important - link in the government's new 
Social Contract with the trade unions (Labour Weekly, 2 April 1976, p.6)
He would also be called upon to resolve industrial  disputes which had the potential  to 
threaten the stability of both the country and the government. Indeed, the decisions Foot  
took as Secretary of State for Employment had the potential to either save or damn the  
government, ensuring his importance in the cabinet was never disregarded. On the front  
bench,  his  political  character  morphed  from being  an  outside  critic  with  the  luxury  of 
conscience  to  being  a  key  player  in  the  decision  making  processes  of  the  Labour 
government. His time on the front bench also solidified his reputation as a potential left-
wing future leader of the Party. 
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This is not to say, however that Foot became an unprincipled pragmatist. He retained his  
opposition to the Common Market because he saw it as an undemocratic, capitalist only 
institution that served the interests of big business exclusively.  He campaigned against 
Britain's continued membership of the community during a referendum on the subject, and 
continued to oppose it even once the decision to remain within was known. This did not,  
however  prevent  him from being a  member  of  a  government  which  was  broadly pro-
Common Market. In government, he could effect change. Out of government, he could do 
little but return to his life as an outside campaigner. Given the key decisions which affect 
lives are made within government, he understood that his causes would be best served 
with him remaining a loyal and effective member of the cabinet.
By conducting  himself  as  a  successful  member  of  the  government,  Foot  was  able  to 
develop a competent  reputation strong enough to  enable him to  stand for  the Labour 
leadership when Wilson departed.  He was  a highly  credible  candidate because of  his 
competence  and  loyalty.  His  nearest  ideological  rival,  Benn  was  unable  to  argue  the 
similar characteristics. Foot's work as Secretary of State for Employment had ensured the 
survival of Labour's industrial policy,  enabling Labour to retain its hold on power.  As a 
result of this and his loyalty to Wilson, he was able to secure a highly respectable second 
place in the leadership election. By coming a respectable second place, Foot was able to 
command a degree of authority within the PLP. Realising this, Callaghan capitalised on 
this by making him Leader of the House, where Foot went on to pioneer Scottish and 
Welsh devolution legislation. At the time of Labour's return to opposition in 1979, Foot had 
consolidated  his  position  within  the  PLP  into  a  credible,  likable  contender  in  any 
subsequent  election  for  the  leadership  position.  Foot's  activities  within  the  House  of 
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Commons  under  both  Wilson  and  Callaghan  saw his  image  transformed  into  a  loyal 
Labour minister.
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4.1: The Political Context of the 1970s.
Foot, along with the Labour government inherited a portfolio of turmoil when Heath went to 
the country after four years of Conservative rule. During their time in office, the Heath 
government had failed to implement new right  economic ideals resulting in a dramatic 
spasm that unsettled the economy. Heath's retreat to the familiarity of Keynes discredited 
both him and the Conservative Party, forcing the returning Labour government to restore 
confidence  in  the  economy.  Foot's  first  position  in  government  was  to  swiftly  restore 
industrial relations by revising the Industrial Relations Act and ending the miners strike. 
These were challenging but vital areas. Heath's government influenced Foot's experiences 
as Secretary of State for Employment because it shaped the country Labour inherited. The 
IR Act, the miner's strike and Britain's membership of the Common Market were some of 
the issues that Foot would be called upon to administer or debate during the next Labour 
government.  
By Labour's mid term the economic situation had improved considerably and industrial  
relations significantly improved. Yet by the time of the 1979 general election, the economy 
and issues relating to industrial relations would once again be causing the government of  
the day problems, as evidenced by the culmination of further strikes. Labour's performance 
is often criticised for the legacy it passed on to the incoming Conservative government, yet 
Labour's  own  inheritance  was  extremely  challenging.  During  the  years  of  Labour's 
administration, the economy went through a period of recovery before the inevitable cycle  
of capitalism brought about economic decline.
Labour's Programme 1973 sought to bind the next Labour government to price controls, 
the development of the social contract, an increase in pension provision, renegotiation of 
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Britain's terms of entry to the Common Market, the restoration of free collective bargaining,  
the  repeal  of  the  Conservative's  Industrial  Relations  Act,  the  extension  of  industrial 
democracy,  the  National  Enterprise  Broad  to  control  individual  firms  and  extensive 
planning  agreements  with  companies  to  control  their  business  practices  (Thorpe,  2008, 
pp.189-190).  By  putting  forward  these  proposals,  Labour  were  able  to  contrast  Heath's 
inaction to their own decisive approach. They were able to sell themselves as a potential 
government with a clear purpose, able to clearly identify the aspects of Britain's economic 
failure and proposed plausible remedies to revitalise the economy. As shall be discussed 
later in this chapter, Foot took on the mantle of improving industrial relations by ending the 
miner's strike action, and by replacing the contentious Conservative IR Act. 
Labour's ability to bring the strikes to an amicable resolution was partly as a result of the 
closer  ties  between  the  Party  and the  TUC as evidenced by  the  TUC/Labour  Liaison 
Committee  (Fielding,  1995,  p.48).  This  was  an  avenue  closed  to  the  previous  Heath 
administration. By working together, Labour and the TUC were able to agree a framework 
for  the  social  contract,  whereby  the  unions  agreed  to  control  wages  in  exchange  for 
concessions  favouring  themselves.  Foot's  union  ally,  Jack  Jones  agreed  to  keep  pay 
increases to a minimum, enabling Labour to keep a lower inflation rate (ibid).  The private 
sector, however did not adhere to the social contract after 1977, forcing the government to  
impose  a  5  per  cent  pay  freeze,  disgruntling  the  public  sector  employees,  ultimately 
leading to strikes. Believing themselves to have been used by the government, the unions 
began  to  break  with  the  agreement  and  agree  much  larger  pay  deals  with  private 
companies. This had the consequence of pushing up inflation and undoing much of the 
governments earlier economic repair work. The public sector unions called for strike action 
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in 1978, resulting in the period of strike action characterised by Labour's opponents as the 
winter of discontent.  
Throughout  the  decade,  Britain's  economy  was  part  of  a  collective  of  economies 
throughout  Europe.  As a member of  the  Common Market,  many within  the  inside  left  
argued  that  closer  ties  would  constrain  Britain's  ability  to  govern  the  economy 
independently. Given economic policies such as import controls would be contrary to the 
spirit of closer ties with Britain's Common Market allies, figures on the inside left argued for  
Britain  to  remain  outside  the  Common  Market  or,  once  in,  for  Britain's  withdrawal.  
However,  the  social  democratic  right  argued  that  Britain's  economic  prosperity  was 
dependent upon  closer ties with the Common Market given, they argued, the Common 
Market enhanced Britain's trade potential with other European nations. By breaking down 
national barriers, free trade would ensure greater profitability for multinational corporations. 
Therefore, when considering Labour's economic policy,  it is also necessary to consider 
Labour's relationship with the Common Market.
On 1st January 1973, the United Kingdom joined the Common Market (Clark, 1 January 1973, 
p.1). During the negotiations for entry, a debate in the House of Commons took place in 
which Wilson had announced that the next  Labour government would re-negotiate the 
terms agreed by Heath or leave the Common Market (Lloyd, 1993, p.430). On the day British 
membership commenced, Wilson argued the terms agreed by Heath would have harsh, 
negative consequences for agriculture that would leave the British electorate with a high 
financial  penalty.  Wilson also  strongly  argued that  the  European Parliament  would  be 
highly damaging to British sovereignty and the authority of Parliament, saying
when the British  Parliament  has  been stripped by the Government's  European 
Communities Act of so many of its powers, we think it is meaningless to go to an 
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almost functionless assembly and pretend that we should then be exercising any 
form of Parliamentary control (Clark, 1 January 1973, p.1).
The loss of  sovereignty and authority  of  Parliament  were  significant  aspects of  Foot's 
objection  to  Britain  joining  the  Common Market.  Labour  Weekly leaves  little  room for 
ambiguity in Foot's position, saying 
he believed that everyone, every institution, every ex-Prime Minister,  every Other 
Place (that's the House of Lords), and every outside Commission (he meant the 
European one) should bow to the supremacy of the Commons (Langdon, 16 April 
1976, p.3).
Ironically,  Wilson's  argument  would  be  used  some  years  later  by  those  campaigning 
against his counter-recommendation to remain within the Common Market. The idea of a 
referendum on the issue was first discussed in 1972 after the French held a referendum on 
the subject of a larger Common Market, which in effect provided the French electorate with 
an opportunity to veto Britain's membership  (Lloyd, 1993, p.431). Labour's irritation with the 
terms  which  Heath  had  agreed  to  bring  Britain  into  the  Common  Market  became an 
ongoing and highly divisive issue for the incoming Labour government.  
Prior to returning to government, Wilson had been able to keep the debates surrounding 
Britain's membership of the Common Market at bay by promising to renegotiate the terms 
of entry before submitting them to the electorate for their approval or rejection through a 
referendum. In order to retain party unity, Wilson had used his skills as leader to prevent  
the issue becoming a premature divisive debate that had the potential to split the Party 
whilst in opposition  (Ziegler,  1993, pp.381-383). By distorting the need to debate the issue, 
Wilson  was  able  to  present  a  united  Labour  Party  to  the  electorate  as  a  competent 
potential  government over  that  of  Heath's.  However,  given he had promised a debate 
during the next  Labour government,  he had merely postponed the debate,  rather than 
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resolved  it.  In  the  February  1974  Labour  manifesto,  the  commitment  to  holding  a 
referendum held little ambiguity:
Britain is a European nation, and a Labour Britain would always seek a wider co-
operation between the European peoples. But a profound political mistake made by 
the Heath Government was to accept the terms of entry to the Common Market,  
and to take us in without the consent of the British people. (Labour Party, 1974).
The commitment to a consultation of the British electorate was subsequently re-stated in  
the October 1974 Labour manifesto:
The British people were not given a chance to say whether or not they agreed to the 
terms accepted by the Tory Government. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals 
have refused to endorse the rights of our people to make their own decision. Only 
the Labour Party is committed to the right of the men and women of this country to 
make this unique decision. (Labour Party, 1974).
Wilson could no longer keep the issue of the Common Market off the immediate political 
agenda. The commitment to a consultation was too widely publicised and unavoidable 
regardless of the potential for a divisive split. Wilson's skills had worked well for him in  
opposition but in government he had little choice than to open Pandora's Box and allow 
the divisions to be exposed for all, including the electorate, to see. His suspension of the 
convention of cabinet collective responsibility enabled him to prevent the resignation of 
those who may not have been able to keep to the government's preferred policy, thereby 
portraying a united front on the other aspects of policy. This enabled both the supporters 
and opponents of Common Market membership to openly attack the policy position of their 
colleagues vis-à-vis the Common Market with little risk of repercussions. This also enabled 
the debate to cut across traditional party lines, ensuring the issue did not become simply a  
party political debate between the main parties. 
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Wilson kept to his word regarding the re-negotiations of Heath's terms of entry and the 
Foreign  Secretary,  Callaghan  completed  the  re-negotiations  for  Britain's  continued 
membership  on  11th March  1975  in  Dublin;  they  were  then  swiftly  passed  through 
Parliament  with  Conservative  support  (Jones,  1994,  pp.374-375).  Wilson's  reliance  on 
Conservative support illustrates the lack of support for Britain's membership from his own 
backbenches.  The  new  terms  of  entry  included  greater  trading  freedoms  with 
Commonwealth  nations  and  greater  financial  benefits  for  Britain's  budget  payments 
(Morgan, 2007, p.326). With these changes in place, Wilson argued that the best option would 
be for Britain to continue as a member of the Common Market and so recommended a Yes 
vote to the electorate on 5th June 1975, but he still had to face a Special Conference in 
April whereby a large number of attendees voted for withdrawal  (Hatfield, 29 April 1975, p.1). 
Despite  the  government  being  defeated  at  the  conference,  the  commitment  to  a 
referendum ensured  that  the  final  decision  rested  with  the  electorate  rather  than  the 
Labour movement. It is likely that the Labour Party conference had an influence on the 
mindset  of  the  rank  and  file  membership  of  the  Labour  Party,  however  the  broader 
electorate would be less likely to support the position of the increasingly unpopular unions. 
It was in this context in which the campaigning during the referendum began.
Opposition to the Common Market was fragmented in its organisation. By spreading itself  
across organisations such as the 'National Referendum Campaign' (NRC), the 'Common 
Market  Safeguards  Campaign',  the  'British  Businessmen for  World  Markets',  the  'Anti-
Common  Market  League',  and  the  'National  Council  of  Anti-Common  Market 
Organisations', Benn remarked that the eclectic group were “an awful rag-bag” and that his  
preference was simply “to get the Labour Party to come out against Europe”  (Benn, 1989, 
pp.285-286). By fragmenting its supporter organisational structures, the No campaign lacked 
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a single avenue in which to express opposition to the Common Market. However, despite 
this, the NRC had extensive pedigree which aimed to mirror the “Britain In Europe” (BIE) 
group in terms of importance (Jones, 1994, p.379). Jones (1994) remarks that the amount of 
money spent by the two main groups (BIE and NRC) in their respective campaigns was  
vastly different.  The BIE group spent £1,481,000 whilst  the NRC spent £133,000  (ibid). 
This indicates that the pro-Common Market campaigners had greater opportunity to put 
the Yes perspective to the electorate in both time and scope given their ability to afford 
more extensive media coverage. This ability to pay for more publicity does not, however,  
negate the argument of the opponent, rather it merely drowns it. It is also worth noting that 
the  financial  donations  to  BIE  came  mainly  from big  businesses  such  as  Marks  and 
Spencer,  Imperial  Chemicals Industries,  Shell,  Vickers  and  Keen and Nettleford  (Jones, 
1994, p.380). Given a raison d'être of the Common Market is the freeing up of trade, then 
continued membership would be primarily beneficial to such corporate enterprises. 
The Yes campaign was also supported by the press, including the Daily Mirror, and many 
of the broadsheets as well as The Express, despite a tradition of isolationism that derived 
from Beaverbrook's desire for an independent Britain (Jones, 1994, p.379). Before the day of 
the poll, an information pack was sent to each household in the United Kingdom containing 
three  reports  pertaining  to  Britain's  relationship  with  the  Common  Market  (ibid).  The 
government, the BIE and the National Referendum campaigns each had an opportunity to 
convey  their  arguments  for  and  again  membership  to  the  electorate.  Put  simply,  the 
electorate  were  subjected  to  the  case  for  continued  membership  twice,  with  the  No 
campaign only having one opportunity. Wilson pushed the case for continued membership 
arguing he had secured “big and significant improvements” on the terms agreed by Heath 
(Wilson, 1 May 1975, p.4). He continued by arguing that the “better terms can give Britain a 
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new deal  in  Europe.  A  deal  that  can  help  us,  help  the  commonwealth  and  help  the 
community” (ibid). By drawing the benefits of the commonwealth into his new deal, Wilson 
was aiming to argue that a No result would undermine prosperity for all. The government 
article continues by quoting members of the commonwealth, such as the Australian Prime 
Minister, Gough Whitlam who said 
I do not want to give any impression that the present Australian government sees 
any advantage for Australia, for Europe or the rest of the world in Britain leaving the 
community (Whitlam, 1 May 1975, p.4).
The inclusion of the view of the Australian Prime Minister serves the Yes campaign by 
closing down the argument of that internationalism would be better served with Britain out  
of the Common Market. By using Whitlam's views, the Yes campaign can emphasise the 
broader benefits to Britain, and that the issues raised by the No campaigners are not a 
significant  basis  for  withdrawal.  The  government  continued  by  arguing  that  if  the  No 
campaign  were  to  be  successful,  then  Britain  would  enter  a  period  of  increased 
uncertainty, higher unemployment and higher inflation (Wilson, 1 May 1975, p.4). Wilson firmly 
argued that the Common Market had significant economic benefits to Britain. Also at a 
Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica, the Jamaican Prime Minister told the conference 
that Britain's continuation as a member of the Common Market would, in fact, be beneficial  
to  the  Commonwealth  as  a  collective  (Ziegler,  1993,  p.432).  By  engaging  with  influential 
Commonwealth figures, Wilson was able to convey the message that the anti-Common 
Market campaigners were incorrect to argue Britain in the Common Market would have a 
negative  effect  on  Commonwealth  nations.  Also,  the  leading social  democrat,  Jenkins 
argued a possible scenario of Britain's withdrawal would see the United Kingdom “joining 
the Soviet bloc”  (Benn, 1989, p.383). By making such arguments, the pro-Common Market 
campaigners were portraying Britain's future outside of the Common Market with a highly 
fearful outlook.
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With Wilson's arguments about higher unemployment and higher inflation still in the minds 
of the electorate, on 5th June 1975, the electorate chose to remain within the Common 
Market with 67 per cent agreeing with the position suggested by Wilson whilst 33 per cent 
opposed Britain's continued membership (BBC News, 1975; Jones, 1994, p.375). The result was 
a clear victory for the Yes campaign and the arguments it had put forward. It was also a 
victory for many of the opponents of the inside left including Jenkins who said 
It puts the uncertainty behind us. It  commits Britain to Europe; it commits us to 
playing an active, constructive and enthusiastic role in it. (BBC News, 1975).
The victory for the Yes campaigners, however would not lay the issue to rest. Foot, Benn, 
Castle, Peter Shore, John Silkin and Eric Varley are not prone to allowing a decision they 
believe to have been made on a false understanding of the issues to remain unchallenged 
(Jones, 1994, p376). Benn argued in his diary that approximately seventeen million people 
had voted to stay in, whilst eight million had voted to leave (Benn, 1989, p.387). Benn (1989) 
also notes that although the No campaign had lost, the result was still positive for the anti-
Common Market campaigners because they lacked similar media support to that of the 
Yes group, little coordinated organisation given the number of opposing groups, and the 
support of antagonistic figures such as Powell had the potential to alienate rather than 
attract supporters. 
The outcome of the referendum can be accounted for by considering four characteristic 
issues concerning Britain in 1975. Firstly,  partisan alignment  ensured that many Labour 
voters adhered to the recommendation of the Party leaderships with an assumption that 
they knew best. Generational Labour and Conservative voters were bound to their Party  
through loyalty to their political philosophy, and so are disinclined to deviate regardless of  
the  non-partisan,  cross-ideological  nature  of  the  issue  (Heywood,  2002,  p.242).  Secondly, 
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given  at  the  time  of  the  referendum Britain  was  already  a  committed  member  of  the 
Common Market,  the  innate  conservatism of  the  electorate  would  be resistant  to  any 
change without significant cause. At the time of the referendum, Britain had already been a 
member of the Common Market for two years, and it had become the new  status quo. 
Thirdly, the Yes campaign had drawn the electorate's attention to the threat of economic 
consequences which had the potential  to deprive them of their employment.  Given the 
industrial relations situation of the previous years, economic instability was a continuing 
concern in the mindset of the electorate and the arguments regarding Britain's relationship 
with the Common Market may threaten that prosperity. Fourthly, the Yes campaign had 
been given the opportunity to make a strong case with the aid of the media, government 
and big business. This had ensured that their positive representation of Common Market 
membership  became  the  dominant  recollection  within  the  majority  of  the  electorates 
decisions prior to polling. In this sense, the electorate had indeed been manipulated into 
voting to remain within the Common Market because the No campaign lacked comparable 
media exposure. Britain did not have an equal debate on the issue, thus leaving the result 
open to  accusations of  unfairness.  And finally  the electorate had become increasingly 
familiar with Europe through travelling to European destinations and so had developed 
closer cultural ties with the continent. This ensured that fear of Europeans was much less 
than had been the case in the previous decades. 
Subsequently to Britain choosing to remain a member of the Common Market it began to 
be the odd nation out. Shortly after the referendum, Britain refused to finalise a date for 
community-wide elections and refused to allow France to be the sole representative at a  
north-south conference in Paris (Ziegler, 1993, p.433). Britain was uneasy with its relationship 
with the Common Market, and refused to allow it to operate as a single trading bloc of 
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nations. Instead, Britain retained an independence which belied the collective capitalism of 
the rest of the community.  Britain developed an approach to the Common Market that 
appeared  to  assume  an  'us  and  them'  attitude  that  promoted  the  interests  of  Britain 
independently over those of the broader collective of nations.  
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4.2: Michael Foot as the Secretary of State for Employment.
As a government minister, Foot took charge of a significant government portfolio at the 
Department of Employment where he would engage with industrial relations as a matter of 
course. He found himself working with Albert Booth as the Minister of State and with both  
Harold Walker and John Fraser as under secretaries  (Jones,  1994,  p.353).  His ministerial 
team were all from the left, which inevitably reduced the potential for ideological division 
over the policies Foot sought to pursue. Some press coverage was also broadly supportive 
of Wilson's decision to bring Foot into the cabinet, saying “one appointment, that of Foot, 
Secretary of State for Employment, is brilliant”  (Hutchinson, 3 April 1976, p.14). A developing 
fashion within British politics was the migration of an idea from France concerning political  
advisers;  whilst  a  selection of  Foot's  cabinet  colleagues decided to  take advantage of 
appointing a political  advisor, Foot did not.  He did not feel the need to make such an 
appointment, which is significant when key figures such as Benn and Castle appointed 
political advisers (Jones, 1994, p.352). However, Foot did enlist the assistance of Professor 
Bill  Wedderburn  from  the  London  School  of  Economics  (LSE),  who  possessed  an 
extensive knowledge of labour law, who came from the Marxist left,  and was a former 
member of the CND. Foot did seek to gain the advisory support of Wedderburn, however  
his commitments to the TUC and desire to retain his positions at the LSE prevented him 
from joining Foot at the department (Jones, 1994, p.353; Morgan, 2007, p.287). 
Foot's first task in his new role would be to bring the miner's strike, which had effectively  
brought  Heath's  government  down,  to  a  successful  resolution.  Prior  to  becoming  the 
Secretary of State for Employment, Foot had informed The Times that 
the miners will certainly need to be paid more. There is no compassionate, civilised 
person  in  this  country  who  begrudges  the  miners  more  than  £40  per  week, 
provided their case is honestly put (Hamilton, 15 February 1974, p.5).
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Foot continued to say that the Labour Government could end “this ridiculous three-day 
week” in a matter of days (ibid). As Employment Secretary, it would be his responsibility to 
find  the  resolution  required  to  end  the  miner's  strike  and  combat  its  secondary 
consequences. On 6th March 1974, pay negotiations were authorised by Foot to examine 
the miner's pay claim for an increase from the existing £8.21 to £12.71 per week (Routledge, 
6  March  1974,  p.1).  Foot  was  clearly  determined  to  put  this  issue  at  the  heart  of  his 
departmental activities as a matter of urgency. The Conservatives were critical of Foot's 
actions,  arguing that  he was  giving the miners a blank cheque because he ultimately  
agreed on a pay settlement which brought a coalface worker up to £45 per week; this was 
a good wage for the time, yet it could hardly be considered a blank cheque (Jones, 1994, 
p.354).  Foot  also  assured  the  National  Union  of  Miners  (NUM)  that  free  collective 
bargaining was to be restored, effectively bringing the strike to a conclusion (Morgan, 2007, 
p.298).
The  increase  in  wages,  however  would  have  economic  consequences  such  as 
exacerbating existing inflationary pressures. Jones (1994) observed that the increases in 
inflationary  pressures  could  be  traced  back  to  Heath's  policy  of  'threshold  payments',  
which automatically increased workers' wages on a monthly basis when inflation passed 7 
per cent (Jones, 1994, p.354). The incomes policy was divided into three stages. The first and 
second  stages  of  wage  increases  were  introduced  without  inflationary  complications 
however the third stage became problematic in its implementation (Gamble, 1988, p.77). The 
third stage of wage increases fuelled inflation with each subsequent increase. The failure 
of  the  Conservative  incomes  policy  can  be  illustrated  by  the  industrial  unrest  most 
profoundly  expressed  by  the  miners.  Ultimately,  Foot's  assumption  of  the  Ministerial 
position within the Department placed these issues firmly within his portfolio.
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Labour's election victory in February 1974 left the Party with a majority so small which 
ensured a repeat election would be close at hand. In opposition, the Conservatives sought 
to undermine the fragile Labour government by pushing for a vote of no confidence. In a  
speech to the House of Commons, Foot argued that because “the truly wealthy have been 
inclined to threaten sanctions or preach sermons to people who have to fight every day of 
their  lives  to  keep  their  heads  above  the  inflationary  flood”,  the  Conservatives  must 
reconsider  their  endeavours  of  undermining  the  new Labour  government  (Rosen,  2005, 
pp.326-327). The power behind Foot's oratory shamed the Heath opposition into withdrawing 
their no confidence motion. Benn (1989) remarked in his diary that Foot's speech was 
“brilliant”,  however  given  the  minority  nature  of  the  government,  any  attempts  by  the 
government  to  act  would  be  “a  cork  tossed  on  the  sea  of  unsettled  industrial  power 
relations” (Benn, 1989, p.122). The lack of a workable majority ensured that the government 
would need to return to the country for a more substantial mandate.
Despite the earlier successful  resolution of the miners'  strike, the Labour government's 
precarious  situation  acted  as  a  Sword  of  Damocles  which  threatened  to  end  its  life. 
Unpopular  pieces  of  Conservative  legislation,  which  appeared to  attack  Labour's  core 
support base, remained to be repealed. Wilson was very much aware of the potential time 
constraint on the lifespan of his government, saying 
...it was highly desirable that the legislations repealing the Industrial Relations Act  
should  have  reached  the  Statute  Book  before  a  general  election  took  place 
(Morgan, 2007, p.300). 
This gave Foot a degree of urgency in his legislation. In his time at the Department, Foot 
was able to pass six major Bills through Parliament (Morgan, 2007, p.297). One of the most 
significant Bills was the Trade Union and Labour Relations Bill; Foot preferred the name 
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Workers Rights Bill,  however this was amended on the advice of the TUC to the less 
provocative name. TULRA was designed to subvert the anti-trade union legislation of the 
Heath administration,  whilst  guaranteeing the rights of  unions to recruit,  organise, and 
participate  in  collective  bargaining  and  strike  (Jones,  1994,  pp.359-360).  The  Industrial 
Relations Act had introduced the National Industrial Relations Court, the Commission on 
Industrial Relation and the Registry of Union and Employers Associations  (Morgan, 2007, 
p.300).  These  measures  had  the  result  of  undermining  worker's  confidence  and  rights 
which  they had secured since the early development of  the Labour movement.  Foot's 
TULRA was published on the eve of May Day in 1974, which opens with the phrase “the 
Industrial Relations Act 1972 is hereby repealed” (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.174). Yet the TUC 
did not secure all the provisions it demanded, such as stronger legal rights for picketers 
and an end to conscientious objections to joining a union  (Morgan,  2007,  p.300).  Despite 
these  omissions,  the  legislation  succeeded  in  reversing  a  controversial  piece  of 
Conservative legislation that had undermined Heath's industrial relations. With the miner's 
strike resolved, and TULRA in place, the way was clear for the Labour Party to face the 
electorate with greater confidence.
The October  1974 Labour  manifesto,  entitled  Britain  Will  Win With Labour contains  a 
section written by Foot (Jones, 1994, p.361). The passage concerns the Social Contract and 
how he sees industrial relations developing in Labour's second term of office. 
At the heart of this manifesto and our programme to save the nation lies the Social 
Contract between the Labour Government and the trade unions, an idea derided by 
our  enemies,  but  certain  to  become  widely  accepted  by  those  who  genuinely 
believe  in  government  by consent  -  that  is,  in  the democratic  process itself  as 
opposed to the authoritarian and bureaucratic system of wage control imposed by 
the Heath Government and removed by Labour. The Social Contract is no mere 
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paper agreement  approved by politicians and trade unions.  It  is  not  concerned 
solely or even primarily with wages. It covers the whole range of national policies. It 
is the agreed basis upon which the Labour Party and the trade unions define their 
common purpose. Labour describes the firm and detailed commitments which will  
be fulfilled in the field of social policy, in the fairer sharing of the nation's wealth, in 
the determination to restore and sustain full employment. The unions in response 
confirm how they will  seek to exercise the newly restored right of free collective 
bargaining.  Naturally  the  trade  unions  see  their  clearest  loyalty  to  their  own 
members. But the Social Contract is their free acknowledgement that they have 
other loyalties - to the members of other unions too, to pensioners, to the lower-
paid, to invalids, to the community as a whole. It is these wide-ranging hopes and 
obligations which the General Council of the TUC described in its declaration of 
June 26 and which were overwhelmingly approved by the Congress on September 
4. This is the Social Contract which can re-establish faith in the working of Britain's 
democracy in the years ahead (Foot, 1974).
Foot  was  clearly  committed  to  the  Social  Contract  (a  term  used  to  describe  the 
cooperation of  mutual  interests between the state and unions).  The aspirations of  the 
contract was the propagation of improvements to state pensions, broader state benefits, 
price  controls  and  council  housing  subsidies  and  rents  (Jones,  1994,  p.355).  The  Social 
Contract sought to involve the unions in creating a fairer society which revolved around the 
betterment of the collective, rather than the individual. In order to achieve a cooperative 
state of industrial relations, the Social Contract sought to bring the state into working with  
the unions. By advocating the contract and putting it forward in the Labour manifesto, the 
Party was seeking the support of the electorate for the expansion of the role of  trade 
unionism at the centre of the nation. 
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Foot was a central national figure in Labour's election campaign, which included making 
speeches and strengthening the case for socialism in Britain. A Times journalist described 
him as “the living embodiment of Labour's conscience” who had struck a fair deal with the 
miners, returned Britain to a full working week within days, and provided railway workers,  
teachers and nurses with increases in their wages (Hamilton, 8 October 1974, p.4). These were 
the socially responsible policies the electorate expected from a Labour government, and 
Foot was able to claim them as his own. For Foot, the election was a positive experience; 
he was able to capitalise on the achievements of his department whilst utilising the press 
platform to convey his political ideology, and securing an increase in his share of the vote  
to 74.1 per cent (Morgan, 2007, pp.302-303). 
As a counterbalance to Foot's election and Labour's Social Contract, Heath sought to push 
forward for a Government of National Unity of all the key parties. He wanted “to take the 
politics out of politics” (Butler & Kavanagh, 1975, p.45). Heath added that
I have no doubt that the real hope of the British people in this situation is that a 
national coalition government, involving all the parties, should be formed, and the 
party  differences  could  be  put  aside  until  the  crisis  is  mastered  (Jones,  1994, 
p.362).
Whilst  Labour  was  proposing  to  reconstruct  society  around  their  Social  Contract,  the 
Conservatives  appeared to  be offering cooperation.  Evans & Taylor  (1996)  argue that 
Heath's  desire  appealed  to  those  who  wanted  to  stop  Labour  through  any  means 
necessary, however he was undermined by the formation of the Centre for Policy Studies 
by Thatcher and Keith Joseph (Evans & Taylor, 1996, p.203). It should also be remembered 
that the Labour Party would be highly disinclined to join a coalition government to combat  
economic problems given that the memory of Ramsay MacDonald's defection remained a 
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bitter  piece of Labour history.  Despite this dissension in his ranks, Heath was able to 
secure more votes than Wilson, taking 37.9 per cent of the vote whilst Labour took 37.1 
per cent (ibid). This was a disappointing result for Labour, who increased their number of  
MP's to 319, with a majority of only three whilst the Tories lost many of their 22 seats to  
Scottish or Welsh nationalists (Jones, 1994, p.363). This disappointing majority would ensure 
that Labour's second term would be fraught with difficulties. 
Following the election,  Foot returned to the Department  for Employment where he set 
about creating the Advisory and Conciliation Service in conjunction with Jack Jones of the 
TUC (Morgan, 2007, p.303). The Service, which became known as ACAS was an independent 
body that investigated cases of unfair dismissal, equal pay rights, guaranteed maternity 
leave,  and also  sought  to  mediate  in  industrial  disputes  (Jones,  1994,  p.367).  This  body 
endured the years of turmoil ahead and is a significant aspect of Foot's legacy to the state  
of British industrial relations.
However, Foot became embroiled in a dispute concerning some aspects of his proposed 
legislation which appeared controversial to those not wishing to engage with unions. This 
dispute characterised much of his remaining time as Secretary of State for Employment; 
Foot himself found the dispute to be unnecessary and counter-productive to the broader 
aims and objectives of his legislation (Jones, 1994, p.370). Despite his views, it would be a 
dispute which brought him into conflict  with  the press. The Employment Protection Bill 
aspired to improve free collective bargaining through state intervention by guaranteeing 
the  rights  of  workers.  Key  to  the  legislation  was  the  right  of  the  worker  to  union 
membership,  a  recognition  procedure  to  ensure  employers  negotiated  with  unions, 
employers would have to disclose relevant company information to union representatives,  
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reinstatement rights in ACAS judged to have been unfairly dismissed and the outlawing of  
deductions from wages for shop floor behaviour  (Morgan, 2007, p.305). The legislation also 
included provision for the introduction of the closed shop. Prior to 1971, the closed shop 
had existed but was removed by the Conservatives'  Industrial  Relations Act. Foot was 
seeking  to  restore  it  on  similar  grounds,  where  a  closed  shop  existed  in  cooperation 
between the employer and the trade union (Jones, 1994, p.370).  
On this issue, Foot came in for a great deal of criticism. George Gale, the former editor of  
the Spectator and Daily Mirror wrote an extensive letter for The Times where he attacked 
Foot for appearing to  miss the point  concerning the potential  the closed shop had for  
undermining press freedoms. He suggested that 
...the situation before the Industrial Relations Act was unsatisfactory, for the NUJ 
had by then secured closed shops in certain newspapers and agency offices and 
had used its industrial power to restrict editorial freedom (Gale, 4 January 1975, 
p.13).
Gale argued that by reverting to the previous pre-Industrial Relations Act status quo, Foot 
was restoring an inadequate situation for the freedom of the press.  Gale continued to 
argue that  although the closed shop may be applicable in  other  industries,  it  was not  
justifiable in the communications industry. This was because decisions on news content 
and printable materials must be the preserve of the news editors and not  any special 
interest or political body (ibid). The debate became unduly polarised between pro- and anti-
closed shop positions. Foot was not an absolutist libertarian, yet he argued that the threat  
of media control was extremely remote. The closed shop aimed to provide workers such 
as  journalists  with  representation  within  their  work  environment,  yet  because  of  the 
polarisation of the debate it instead became about the single issue of press freedoms.
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The Council  of  the  Guild  of  British  Newspaper  Editors  sent  an  open letter  to  Wilson, 
attacking the implementation of the closed shop in the communications industry. Their key 
argument is expressed below: 
It remains the view of the council that the closed shop provisions of this Bill as they 
apply to editorial departments of newspapers represent a surrender to trade union 
militancy and sectional interests against the public interest. They would imperil the 
the  free  expression  of  opinion  and  the  provision  of  an  unfettered  service  of  
information to readers (The Times, 8 January 1975, p.3).
The concerns expressed by the council confirm their belief that the optional closed shop 
would prove to be highly damaging to the freedom of the press.  The Times also argued 
that “unions such as the National Union of Journalists could force their members to publish 
only what is written by NUJ members” (ibid).  It must be remembered that the fears of the 
editors were based upon possibilities if the NUJ asked journalists to join, and if they chose 
to  publish  materials  only  produced  by  NUJ  members,  and  if  the  NUJ  made  editorial 
decisions  based  on  political  ideology. Within  the  Labour  Party,  Foot  was  also  facing 
pressure from the social democrats within the Manifesto Group who argued that this move 
also threatened the freedom of the individual and their right to free speech because it 
threatened to place a legal obligation to become a member of a closed shop trades union  
(New Statesman,  2 April  1976,  p.423; Clark,  22 January 1975, p.3;  Morgan, 2007, p.310; Jones,  1994, 
p.375). 
Other critics of the Bill included his brother Dingle Foot, Isaiah Berlin, Hugh Trevor-Roper,  
C.V Wedgwood, Arthur Koestler, J. B Priestley, his wife Jacquetta Hawkes and Rebecca 
West (Morgan, 2007, p.309; p.311). These were the cross-party intellectual cream coming out 
to  voice  objections  to  Foot's  Bill.  To  illustrate  the  extent  of  the  attacks  from his  own 
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ideological position, both Foot and West shared similar “literary gods”20 of socialism (Foot, 
1980,  p.92).  As discussed earlier,  H.G Wells had a deep penetrating effect  upon Foot's 
socialism. Foot could ideologically disregard the objections of members of the Manifesto 
Group, given their version of socialism always differed from his. Foot's disregard for the 
objections made by those who subscribed to an approximation of his own understanding of 
socialism can only be explained by his belief that the Bill was a genuine, necessary step  
towards expanding social justice and the development of industrial democracy. 
In a letter to The Times, Foot defended his position by arguing that those who objected to 
the legislation had entirely misrepresented the purpose and potential effects of the Bill,  
arguing that the Bill did not propose to introduce, encourage or enforce closed shops upon 
any industry. He argued that the Bill sought “to remove the outlawry of the closed shop, 
which  the  Industrial  Relations  Act  sought  vainly  to  impose”  and  that  the  legislation 
concerning union membership seeks to be flexible (Foot, 24 December 1974, p.11). There was 
no compulsory aspect to the legislation. Within the same letter, Foot continued to argue 
that in certain white-collar industries, union membership would increase as a result of the  
legislation because of the low percentage of current union membership. Foot concluded 
his letter arguing that the objections “derived from an mistaken understanding of our Bill”  
(ibid). This mistaken understanding provided Foot with a highly contentious debate with the 
print  media;  given  the  nature  of  the  communications  industry,  it  is  unlikely  to  have 
benefited Foot's public position. The communications industry has by its very nature a 
wide  audience,  and so  was  able  to  communicate their  opposition to  Foot's  legislation 
directly to the electorate. However, Foot was seeking to revert to a previous long-standing 
arrangement between industry and unions. Foot later argued that the unions were much 
less guilty of manipulating members output than Rupert Murdoch, the owner of The Sun, 
20 Shaw, Bennett, Galsworthy, Wells.
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and  subsequently The  Times  who  Foot  argues  “has  contributed  to  so  much  to  the 
debasement of moral standards in Fleet Street” (Jones, 1994, p.371). Foot also attacked the 
newspaper editors in the House of Commons on 12 March 1975 saying “if they had fought  
for the freedom of others with one-tenth of the ardour with which they have fought for their 
own, we should have a world that is much more free than it is at present”  (Jones, 1994, 
p.371). Clearly Foot was not in a forgiving mood. 
The  controversy  surrounding  the  Bill  enmeshed  Foot  in  a  debate  which  he  saw  as 
meaningless  and  distracting.  However,  the  Bill  did  serve  to  redress  many  of  the 
imbalances to industrial relations which had been created by the Industrial Relations Act  
(Morgan, 2007, p.313). That said, ultimately the communications industry would be granted 
concessions by the government. They included the ability for employers and unions to 
determine the classes of employees who could be excluded from union membership. In 
the House of Commons, Albert Booth assured members that the government did not want  
to force union membership on any individual,  and that any closed shop arrangements 
would be flexible. The Employment Protection Bill  was granted its Royal  Assent on 25 
March 1976  (Morgan,  2007,  p.312).  In  a  speech to the Foreign Press Association shortly 
afterwards, Foot stated that the opposition to his proposal to improve representation of the 
workers had been “a farrago of fiction, falsehood and hysteria” (Jones, 1994, p.392).
Running parallel to the debate concerning press freedoms was the issue of inflation, which 
was proving to be highly problematic for the government. In December 1974, The Times 
was reporting that wage inflation was in a state of sharp acceleration as a result of a 
weekly pay increase of £1.20  (Westlake, 19 December 1974, p.17). The economy was facing 
“threats  to  sterling,  and  possible  cuts  of  £1,000  million  in  public  expenditure,  with 
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unemployment rising to two million as a result”  (Morgan, 2007, p.316). During 1974, prices 
increased by 17 per cent whilst wages increased by 22 per cent the following year, the 
inflation rate rose further to a peak of 27 per cent  (Pugh,  2004,  p.339).  Facing such dire 
economic circumstances, immediate action would need to be taken in order to prevent 
hyper inflation.  However, the unions had petitioned the cabinet for import controls and 
other  means  of  protecting  the  British  worker,  yet  these  were  rejected  by  the  cabinet 
(Hoggart  &  Leigh,  1981,  p.178).  Given  Britain's  membership  of  the  Common  Market,  the 
government  was  constrained  by  the  action  it  could  take.  An  incomes  policy  was  the 
preferred option, which Foot insisted must be on a voluntary basis (Morgan, 2007,  p.317). 
Right-wing MP's, such as the Secretary of State for Education and Science, Reg Prentice 
argued  that  the  unions  had  the  choice  of  either  allowing  their  members  to  face  high 
unemployment or support the government's attempts to control inflation by cutting wages 
(Clark,  1  March  1975,  p.2).  Prentice  continued  to  argue that  inflation  had  to  become the 
government's  main  economic  concern,  and  that  the  unions  must  capitulate  to  that 
necessity. Prentice had, by making his proposals, stepped on Foot's toes by exceeding his 
portfolio (Smith, 7 March 1975, p.14).
Jack  Jones  proposed  a  £6  a  week  flat-rate  increase;  this  voluntary  concession  was 
proposed as a means of aiding the government pull back from the edge of the precipice.  
On 22nd July 1975, Wilson proposed making the £6 flat rate a legal requirement, which 
would make it illegal for any employer to reward a higher pay increase (Morgan, 2007, p.317). 
The proposal was being drafted into a reserve Bill should the White Paper entitled  The 
Attack on Inflation  fail. The purpose of the White Paper was to put forward a case for a 
voluntary wage freeze. It opens saying
...a sharp reduction in the rate of inflation is an over-riding priority for millions of our 
fellow  citizens,  particularly  the  house  wives  and  pensioners.  It  is  also  a  pre-
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condition for the reduction of unemployment and the increase of investment which 
the government, the TUC and CBI all want to see (The Times, 12 July 1975, p.4).
The White Paper continues to argue that the rate of inflation has been the highest in the 
1970s than in any other decade, and that its acceleration had to be curbed. It was to be 
curbed  by  controlling  local  authority  borrowing,  controls  over  private  sector  pay 
settlements, applications for state assistance to be contextualised against the needs of the 
broader  economy,  price  controls,  improvements  to  consumer  information,  allocating 
resources in the economy where growth is most likely to stimulate stability, improvements 
in training, and an expansion of banking credit (ibid). The White Paper was an attempt to 
stimulate the economy against the backdrop of a growing global recession. If the White 
Paper failed, then Wilson would put forward his reserve Bill which included the £6 wage 
increase  as  a  legal  requirement;  Foot  conceded  that  this  would  be  a  reversion  to  a 
statutory pay policy, which he suggested would be a resigning issue  (Morgan, 2007, p317). 
Indeed, Foot added that he would have great difficulties in pushing a reserve powers Bill  
through Parliament (Noyes, 23 July 1975, p.1). In Parliament, Healey discussed how the Act 
would be used against those who violated the voluntary limit by advising the members that 
“the £6 was an upper limit”  and that  an Order-in-Council  would be applied against  an 
individual or employer  who exceeded this amount  (Healey,  22 July  1975,  p.10).  The White 
Paper passed through the House of Commons without the reserve Bill with 262 votes to 
54; the Conservatives largely abstained from the vote because they felt it lacked the scope 
required to combat inflation (Noyes, 23 July 1975, p.1).
Ultimately, Healey would oversee higher unemployment, a tolerance for greater taxation 
and cuts of approximately £3 billion of public spending  (Pugh, 2004, p.339). The apparent 
acceptance of unemployment as a price worth paying in order to combat the inflation rate 
was a key concession made to the Treasury. The Treasury was in the process of divorcing 
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itself  from  its  tenuous  relationship  with  Keynesian  economics,  whilst  simultaneously 
beginning  its  focus  upon  the  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement.  Such  flirtations 
ultimately laid the foundations for the adoption of monetarism as the new status quo for 
economic  governance  (Cronin,  2004,  p.169).  The  gradual  conversion  from  Keynesian 
economics to monetarism became a key development in Britain's economic evolution. 
Morgan (2007) observes that despite Foot's threat to resign over the issue of statutory 
wage increases, “he was felt  by colleagues to be far more loyal”  in respect of  cabinet 
responsibility than some other members of the cabinet  (Morgan, 2007, p.319). This loyalty 
undoubtedly  endeared  him  to  many  of  his  cabinet  colleagues  and  the  broader  PLP, 
including  social  democrats.  By  the  beginning  of  his  final  year  at  the  Department  of 
Employment, Foot was able to enjoy the relative tranquillity of success. He had achieved a 
great deal within the Department. The moment of peace was not to last, however. On 16 th 
March 1976 Wilson resigned in order to enjoy the retirement he promised himself when he 
reached 60 years of age (Jones, 1994, p.393). Wilson's departure made a leadership election 
an inevitability,  which would  guarantee political  theatre.  The election would disconnect 
Foot  from the Department  of  Employment,  bringing his  time as Secretary of  State for  
Employment  to  an  end.  During  his  time  as  Secretary  of  State  for  Employment,  Foot 
pushed through legislation relating to trade union recognition as well as overseeing the 
development of the employment conciliation board, and he had stood by the Employment  
Protection Bill. Also during his time at the Department for Employment, he had assisted 
with  the  general  election  of  October  1974 and stood by the  developing  governmental 
record.  In  government,  Foot  had undoubtedly  become a  loyalist.  He was  loyal  to  the 
government to which he was a member. However, he was still evidently loyal to the unions 
and to his political principles. He did not waver from them for political gain; indeed, when 
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he believed passionately  in  the restoration of  the pre-1971 Industrial  Relations closed 
shops, he stood his ground. Foot endeavoured to apply his liberal values that had been  
confirmed and expanded through his  political  education  onto  the  policies  he following 
within  government.  His  opposition  to  the  Industrial  Relations  Act  and  its  subsequent 
replacement and resolution of the miners' strike became crusades for social justice against 
Toryism. His ability to effectively tackle and subdue two key areas of Conservative failure 
demonstrates his governing success at the Department for Employment.
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4.3: Michael Foot and the 1976 Labour Leadership Election.
As Secretary of State for Employment, Foot was in a respectable position to campaign 
legitimately for the leadership of the Party when Wilson unexpectedly resigned. Labour 
Weekly noted that "the legacy which Harold Wilson most wants to leave at Number 10 
Downing Street is a new Prime Minister who will take control of the existing Government 
economic  strategy",  which  would  be  most  manifest  by  the  emergence  of  "a  strong 
candidate from the political centre of the Party" (Langdon, 19 March 1976, p.1). Ultimately, his 
social  democratic  rival,  Callaghan  secured  the  leadership.  However,  the  campaign 
improved Foot's profile as the  most likely figure from the left of the Party to secure the 
leadership  at  some  future  point. Indeed,  New  Statesman  argued  that  "Michael  must 
stand... in order to demonstrate the strength of the left"  (New Statesman, 2 April 1976, p.420). 
Initially, the PLP had a broad selection of candidates from which to select their new leader.  
Whilst  representation  of  the  left  was  splintered  between  Foot  and  Benn,  the  social 
democratic right was fractured between Callaghan, Crosland, Jenkins and Healey (Rosen, 
2005, p.346). Foot's main competitor for the votes of broadly left-leaning MP's was Benn, 
however Benn, anticipating the probability of defeat, remarked that he would withdraw after 
the  first  ballot  in  order  to  support  Foot  (Benn,  1989,  p.538).  The  New  Statesman  also 
predicted that this was not to be Benn's hour of success (New Statesman, 19 March 1976, p.1).
Foot was a credible candidate in the contest because he had proven himself to be an 
effective and, most importantly a loyal member of the Wilson government, demonstrating 
competence  at  resolving  the  miners'  strike  and  reforming  the  Industrial  Relations  Act 
(Morgan,  2007,  p.329).  He  also  had  more  appeal  to  the  centrist  and  social  democratic 
members of the PLP than Benn. Yet Benn's participation in the election was not to achieve 
victory, but rather to test his support within the PLP  (Benn, 1989, p.544). Consequently, in the 
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later ballots, the left would be able to congregate around a unifying single figure. The lack  
of a comparable left-wing fracturing on the scale of the right explains why Foot performed 
extremely well in the first ballot.
As a loyal Labour front bencher, Foot had proven to the backbenches that he could lead 
them. However, he lamented his lack of comparable time on the front bench. When asked 
by Benn if he regretted being absent from the 1964-70 Labour government, Foot replied  
“Yes, in a way I do” (Benn, 1989, p.542). This comment carries with it an implication that Foot 
regretted not being able to  participate further in the decision making processes of the 
previous Labour  cabinets  and  that  his  earlier  input  at  cabinet  level  may have  guided 
Labour policies in alternative directions. From the outside, Foot was able to campaign on 
the issues to which he had an attachment. By being on the inside, however Foot became 
confronted with the decision making process and so would have been able to affect and 
influence policy direction in a much more direct manner. On a more personal note, Foot's 
absence also deprived him of more time to solidify his ministerial reputation amongst some 
of the MP's he was now seeking to support him. This comment also shores up the shift in  
Foot's political character from being a likable rebel to a criticised loyalist. 
As previously mentioned, the first  ballot  produced a highly respectable result  for  Foot. 
However, given that the results of his opposing candidates was due to fracturing of their 
support across their support base, it is necessary to briefly consider why they performed 
as they did in the first ballot (Stark, 1996, p.119).
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________________________________________________________________________
Candidate Support in the 1976 Leadership Election
First Ballot Second Ballot Third Ballot
Michael Foot 90 133 137
James Callaghan 84 141 176
Roy Jenkins 56
Tony Benn 37
Denis Healey 30     38
Anthony Crosland 17    
Abstentions       1     
N=           314 313 313
Source: (Stark, 1996, p4)
________________________________________________________________________
Crosland secured the lowest figure in the first ballot because of his relatively low campaign 
profile and because he “lacked credibility having never held one of the three major offices 
of state”  (Jeffreys,  1999,  pp.193-194).  Also,  his attitude to ideological  allies who supported 
Callaghan was also questionable. When Hattersley told Crosland of his intention to support 
another candidate, Crosland told him simply to “fuck off”  (Jeffreys, 1999, p.191). It is hard to 
imagine Foot reacting in such a fashion. Crosland possessed a personal style and manner 
which did not have the potential to sit well with a future party leader. Crosland's attitude 
and level of alienation from his colleagues explains his low result, and why those who may 
have supported him ideologically gravitated towards either Callaghan or Healey. 
Jenkins  had  lost  the  support  of  many  within  the  PLP  because  of  his  stance  on  the 
Common Market, which had led to his resignation as deputy leader some years before, 
prompted  by  Labour's  commitment  to  a  referendum on  Common  Market  membership 
(Campbell,  1983, p.143). Those who supported him did so because of his record as Home 
Secretary and Chancellor, whilst those who opposed him did so because he was unlikely 
to be a unifying candidate (Campbell, 1983, p.177). Also, the pro-Common Market MP's could 
still express their modest support for the Common Market by supporting a more moderate 
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candidate when contrasted to  Jenkins active  and passionate support  for  the Common 
Market. 
It  can be assumed that the majority of Crosland and Jenkins' votes gravitated towards  
Callaghan following their departure from the process. In contrast to Crosland and Jenkins, 
Healey remained within the contest. In paraphrasing the rationale from Barbara Castle, 
Healey says  it  was because “I  was a pugilist,  not  a  patrician”  (Healey,  1989,  p.447).  His 
determination to fight on when others knew their time was up won him only an extra eight  
votes. This lack of success demonstrates the futility of this endeavour to be leader, whilst  
also demonstrating that his participation was as a mere irritation to the process rather than 
a threat to any of the primary candidates. Healey's continued participation also ensured 
that a third ballot would be inevitable. It could also be argued that Healey's failure to make 
substantial  penetrations  into  the  social  democratic  vote  in  early  ballots  acted  as  a 
forewarning for the 1980 leadership campaign. Healey is not the first choice amongst his  
social  democratic  peers,  and  so  was  overshadowed by  the  candidatures  of  the  other 
figures. In contrast, Foot's performance strengthened his claim to make be the credible 
candidate of the inside left.
Despite  Foot  gaining  a  major  personal  boost  following  the  publication  of  positive 
unemployment figures showing a fall for the first time in two years, on the second ballot, 
Foot fell into second place whilst the right re-coalesced around Callaghan (Labour Weekly, 26 
March 1976, p.1). Foot secured the majority of Benn's votes, thereby increasing his number 
from 90 to 133, however  Callaghan increased his vote from the departed Jenkins and 
Crosland, pushing him into the lead (Morgan, 1997, p.473). Following the ballot, Healey was 
withdrawn to enable to a contest between the two remaining candidates.
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As Callaghan pushed ahead, John Silkin, Foot's campaign manager argued to The Times 
that
...the ballot remains absolutely wide open... the question is what happens to the 38 
Healey votes. They are really Healey votes and not block votes at all  (Wood, 31 
March 1976, p.1).
Whilst speaking to Labour Weekly, Silkin continued saying Foot "would hope to capture 26 
which would be two more than they would need to win. The reason was they were 'Healey 
Votes, not block votes' and they had been cast by 'rather individual, sturdily independent  
characters'"  (Langdon, 2 April  1976, p.1). Consequently, Foot had just cause to feel broadly 
optimistic as both he and Callaghan entered the third and final ballot. 
Ultimately, however the Healey votes gravitated towards Callaghan, depriving Foot of the 
leadership.  However,  Foot's  admirable  performance had granted him greater  authority 
within the cabinet and Party  (Morgan, 2007, p.330). Foot had been able to demonstrate to 
both his supporters and opponents that he had a sizeable support base within the PLP, 
and that despite being unable to defeat Callaghan, he was a force which could not be 
disregarded. This was a fact that Callaghan appreciated during the subsequent reshuffle,  
who appointed Foot the Leader of the House. Foot's position within the Party continued to 
excel  by  his  participation  within  the  contest,  whilst  simultaneously  undermining  the 
credibility of Healey, Jenkins and Crosland as future leaders.
In order to determine Foot's support base within the Party, it is necessary to consider the 
make up of  those who comprised the electorate in  the leadership election.  Traditional 
assumptions of those who have provided an analysis of the 1976 leadership election have 
tended to rest upon Kellner's (1976) assumption of easily identifiable left- and right-wing 
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positions. The Kellner notion assumed that if an MP was anti-common market, then s/he 
was automatically left-wing, however this is not the case (Meredith, 2008, pp.9-12). Kinnock, 
also disagrees with this simplistic definition saying 
...some people are very left-wing and pro-European. Others were on the right and 
very CND. And many in both cases so as to make the line a bloody zig-zag! (Hayter,  
2005, p.6).
Kinnock's  belief  that  the  PLP  is  a  mixture  of  ideological  tendencies  remains  under-
researched. As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis,  Heppell's  approach has been 
applied to a snapshot of the PLP in 1976 in order to provide a mono-causal assessment of 
the leadership election. Heppell, Crines & Nicholls (2010) have presented an argument 
which assumes the primacy of ideology as a factor in MP's voting behaviour. Whilst it is  
true  that  ideology  is  a  significant  factor,  to  argue  that  it  can  be  utilised  as  the  sole  
assessment method of the leadership election is to assume that MP's consider ideology 
above any other factors.  This thesis extends the argument presented by Heppell  et al 
(2010)  to  include other  potential  causes.  Heppell's  research framework  has also been 
significantly updated and advanced in order to present arguments and conclusions beyond 
ideology  whilst  retaining  the  core  ideological  framework  of  Heppell's  approach.  For 
example, the approach as utilised throughout Heppell's research into the role of ideology 
within the Conservative Party has relied upon three core areas of concern. These were 
economic policy,  social  attitudes,  and attitude towards  the Common Market.  This  was 
slightly amended by Heppell  for the paper concerning ideological alignments within the 
PLP by removing social attitudes and substituting it with attitude towards defence policy.  
This minor amendment, however was insufficient to distinguish it from Heppell's approach 
utilised within the Conservative Party. As Chapter One argues, Heppell  et al (2010) set 
about the iconoclastic task of breaking down long-standing terms such as left and right in 
order to substitute them with their own terminology that collapsed a number of ideological  
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tendencies into simplistic overarching positions. Their terminology does not consider the 
difficulties of simplistically pigeon-holing Labour MP's into easily established boxes. For 
example,  they  disregard  the  differences  between  inside  and  outside  left,  and  the 
differences between social democratic and centrist MP's. The research undertaken for this 
thesis  discovered  that  any  attempt  to  neatly  allocate  all  MP's  with  a  simplistic  label  
produces deeply debatable and contestable results given an MP's position on the left /  
right  divide  can  be  subverted  by  external  sources  such  as  pressure  from  local 
constituencies and/or individual majorities or extra-Parliamentary affiliations. Heppell et al 
(2010) were only able to achieve this by breaking down the entire structure of the PLP into 
either expansionist or consolidator; terms which in themselves are deeply contentious and 
controversial. The way this thesis circumnavigated this significant hurdle was to remove 
the economic field from Heppell's approach and replace it with membership of either the 
Manifesto or Tribune Parliamentary groups. Even this can not be assumed to reveal that  
an MP is left  or right-wing based on membership. Indeed, Benn was not a member of 
either group, yet his credentials as a left-wing MP are well documented. Consequently, the 
benefit of utilising these two groups is that it provides a broad illustration of the depth of 
support for the agendas of either group within the PLP, which can be characterised as 
either inside left or social democratic in tone. This does not, however assume that each 
MP  subscribes  to  every  aspect  of  group  membership,  nor  that  lack  of  membership 
automatically demonstrates a position. However, as stated above, it demonstrates broad 
sympathy with the groups overall positions, and provides a more meaningful assessment 
of left / right positions within the PLP than undertaken by Heppell et al (2010).  
Retained from Heppell's article are the positions on the Common Market and the Defence 
Policy. These were retained because of their strong relevance to Foot's political ideals on 
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these policies which tended to flow against that of the social democratic PLP leadership,  
and therefore provides potential insight into how many supporters of the Common Market  
and  how  many  multilateralists  voted  for  Foot.  Such  findings  would  demonstrate  a 
penetration into ideological ground that belonged to Foot's opponent. Inversely, it would be 
of interest to discover the number of opponents of the Common Market and how many 
unilateralists voted for Callaghan. 
Heppell's approach has been extended by including non-ideological factors. This thesis 
investigates as to  whether  an MP's region,  an MP's majority,  trade union affiliation or  
length of service affected their voting behaviour. By combining these with the ideological  
issues, it will be possible to determine whether factors beyond ideology were significant or 
influential. In order to construct the following typologies within this thesis (both for 1976 
and 1980), it has been necessary to undertake a prolonged period of extensive research of 
each MP's position. This significant problem was overcome by investigating broadsheet 
newspaper archives, such as  The Times,  The Sunday Times, The Guardian, The Daily  
Telegraph and  The Observer.  These  provided  a  considerable  amount  of  information 
relating to each MP's voting behaviour, voting intentions, and positions on key policy areas  
such as attitudes to the Common Market and defence. These were supplemented by a 
secondary  examination  of  Norton  (1980),  who  discusses  dissension  in  Parliament  by 
providing evidenced voting records. In addition to these two primary sources, secondary 
sources  such  as  diaries,  biographies,  autobiographies,  Party  documents,  Dods 
Parliamentary Companions, and private papers held in the Labour History Museum were 
also utilised. Following on from this extensive period of research, it became possible to 
construct the following databases as accurately as possible. 
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This thesis will firstly present the results of the databases. The first database shows each 
MP and their positions on the key areas stipulated above. The second database shows 
which MP voted for which candidate for the leadership in the decisive ballot. Following on 
from these databases, an analysis of the leadership election is undertaken. The analysis  
compares the two databases before extrapolating key indications of voting behaviour. By 
conducting this undertaking, it becomes possible to determine both the ideological and 
non-ideological factors which affected the vote. This process is later repeated for the 1980 
leadership election. 
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Composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party Membership 1976
Region
L: London S: South of England N: North of England
WM: West Midlands EM: East Midlands
Sc: Scotland W: Wales
Ideological Classifications
Ind: Independent Man: Manifesto Group Tri: Tribune Group
Uni: Unilateralist Mult: Multilateralist
Pro: Pro Common Market Anti: Anti Common Market.
Name A S R Constituency Maj. Union Grp Nuc. EEC Yrs
Abse, Leo 59 M W Monmothshire 18695 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 18
Allaun, Frank 63 M N Salford East 7836 NUJ Tri. Uni. Anti. 21
Anderson, Donald 37 M W Swansea East 20721 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Archer, Peter 50 M WM Warley West 14857 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Armstrong, Ernest 61 M N Durham North West 18756 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Ashley, Jack 54 M WM Stoke on Trent South 16495 NUGMW Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Ashton, Joseph 43 M EM Notts. Bassetlaw 12169 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 8
Atkinson, Norman 53 M L Haringey 9216 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Atkins, Ronald 63 M N Preston North 1784 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Bagier, Gordon 52 M N Sunderland South 13030 NUR Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Barnett, Joel 53 M N Heywood & Royton 7899 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Barnett, Guy 48 M L Greenwich 9906 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 5
Bates, Alfred 32 M N Bebington & Ellesmere 6491 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 2
Bean, Robert 41 M S Rochester & Chatham 2418 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Benn, Tony 51 M S Bristol South East 9373 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 13
Bennett, Andrew 37 M N Stockport North 1824 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Bidwell, Sydney 59 M L Ealing South 9983 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Bishop, Edward 56 M EM Notts. Newark 5771 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Blenkinsop, Arthur 65 M N South Shields 14825 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Boardman, Harold 69 M N Leigh 14635 USDAW Ind. Uni. Anti. 31
Booth, Albert 48 M N Barrow-in-Furness 7354 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Boothroyd, Betty 47 F WM West Bromwich 14799 None Man. Multi. Pro. 3
Bottomley, Arthur 69 M N Teeside 13807 NUPE Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Boydon, Harold 66 M N Bishop Auckland 11095 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 17
Bradley, Thomas 50 M EM Leicester East 3811 TSSA Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Bray, Jeremy 46 M Sc Motherwell & Wishaw 4962 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Broughton, Alfred 74 M N Batley & Morley 8248 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 27
Brown, Hugh 57 M Sc Glasgow Provan 9974 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Brown, Robert 55 M N Newcastle-upon-Tyne West 15074 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Brown, Ronald 54 M L Hackney South & Shoreditch 13295 AUEW Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Buchan, Norman 54 M Sc Renfrewshire West 5300 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
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Buchanan, Richard 64 M Sc Glasgow Springburn 8395 NUR Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Butler, Joyce 66 F L Haringey Wood Green 8211 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 21
Callaghan, L. James 64 M W Cardiff South East 10718 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 31
Callaghan, James 49 M N Middleton & Prestwich 3714 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Campbell, Ian 50 M Sc Dunbartonshire West 1814 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Canavan, Dennis 34 M Sc West Stirlingshire 367 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Cant, Robert 61 M WM Stoke on Trent Central 14653 None Man. Uni. Pro. 10
Carmichael, Neil 55 M Sc Glasgow Kelvingrove 4119 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 15
Carter-Jones, Lewis 56 M N Eccles 9266 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Carter, Raymond 41 M WM Birmingham Northfield 10597 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Cartwright, John 43 M L Greenwich Woolwich East 12425 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Castle, Barbara 65 F N Blackburn 7652 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 21
Cocks, Michael 47 M S Bristol South 14984 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Clemitson, Ivor 45 M S Luton East 3677 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Cohen, Stanley 49 M N Leeds South East 11016 TSSA Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Coleman, Donald 51 M W Glamorganshire 17723 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Colquhoun, Maureen 48 F EM Northampton North 1538 NUGMW Tri. Multi. Pro. 2
Concannon, John 46 M EM Nottinghamshire Mansfield 17279 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 10
Conlan, Bernard 53 M N Gateshead East 17599 AEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Cook, Robin 30 M Sc Edinburgh Central 3953 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Corbett, Robin 43 M S Hemel Hempstead 485 NUJ Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Cox, Thomas 46 M L Wandsworth Tooting 7855 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Craigen, Jim 38 M Sc Glasgow Maryhill 9418 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Crawshaw, Richard 59 M N Liverpool Toxteth 7250 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Cronin, John 60 M EM Leicestershire Loughborough 2348 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Crosland, Anthony 58 M N Grimsby 6982 None Man. Multi. Pro. 17
Cryer, Robert 42 M N Rotherham 3081 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Cunningham, G 45 M L Islington Sth & Finsbury 9593 None Man. Multi. Anti. 6
Cunningham, J 37 M N Whitehaven 9933 GMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Dalyell, Tam 44 M Sc West Lothian 2690 None Man. Uni. Pro. 14
Davidson, Arthur 48 M N Accrington 6220 GMWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Davies, Bryan 37 M L Enfield North 4793 NATFHE Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Davies, Denzil 38 M W Llanelli 22301 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Davies, Ifor 66 M W Gower 16204 APEX Ind. Multi. Pro. 17
Davis, Stanley 48 M L Hackney Central 12853 None Man. Multi. Anti. 6
Deakins, Eric 44 M L Waltham Forest 10664 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Dean, Joseph 53 M N Leeds West 7607 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
De Freitas, G 63 M EM Northamptonshire Kettering 11170 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Dell, Edmund 55 M N Birkenhead 9484 ASTMS Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Dempsey, James 59 M Sc Coatbridge & Airdrie 10568 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 31
Doig, Peter 65 M Sc Dundee West 2802 TGWU Ind. Multi. Pro. 13
Dormand, John 57 M N Durham Easington 20937 NUT Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Douglas-Mann, B 49 M L Merton Mitcham & Morden 6191 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Duffy, Patrick 56 M N Sheffield Attercliffe 21558 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
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Dunn, James 50 M N Liverpool Kirkdale 9481 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Dunnett, Jack 54 M EM Nottingham East 5596 NUGMW Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Dunwoody, Gwenth 46 F N Crewe 7255 NUR Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Eadie, Alexander 55 M Sc Midlothian 4084 NUM Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Edge, Geoffrey 33 M WM Aldridge Brownhills 2519 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Edwards, Robert 70 M WM Wolverhampton South East 11698 TGWU Ind. Uni. Pro. 2
Ellis, John 46 M N Brigg & Scunthorpe 6742 TGWU Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Ellis, Robert 52 M W Denbighshire Wrexham 16366 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 6
English, Michael 46 M EM Nottingham West 9265 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Ennals, David 54 M N Norwich North 9204 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Evans, Alfred 62 M W Glamorganshire Caerphilly 13709 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 8
Evans, Ioan 49 M W Aberdare 16064 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Evans, John 46 M N Newton 16472 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Ewing, Harry 45 M Sc Stirling Falkirk & Grangemouth 1766 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 5
Faulds, Andrew 53 M WM Warley East 8177 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Fernyhough, Ernest 68 M N Jarrow 15851 NUDAW Ind. Uni. Anti. 29
Fitch, Alan 61 M N Wigan 18827 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Flannery, Martin 58 M N Sheffield Hillsborough 12308 NUT Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Fletcher, Edward 65 M N Darlington 3714 AEU Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Fletcher, Leopold 55 M EM Derbyshire Ilkeston 15858 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Foot, Michael 63 M W Gwent Ebbw Vale 18059 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Ford, Benjamin 51 M N Bradford North 8589 AEU Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Forrester, John 52 M WM Stoke-on-Trent North 15072 NUT Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Fowler, Gerald 41 M WM Shropshire Wrekin 6838 None Man. Uni. Anti. 2
Fraser, John 42 M L Lambeth Norwood 4771 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Freeson, Reginald 50 M L Brent East 8927 NUJ Ind. Multi. Anti. 12
Galpern, Myer 73 M Sc Glasgow Shettleston 6349 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Garrett, John 45 M N Norwich South 3405 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Garrett, William 56 M N Wallsend 21269 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
George, Bruce 34 M N Wallsall South 4662 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Gilbert, John 49 M WM Dudley East 12191 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Ginsburg, David 55 M N Dewsbury 6901 None Man. Multi. Pro. 17
Golding, John 45 M WM Newcastle under Lyme 7370 POEU Man. Multi. Pro. 7
Gould, Bryan 37 M S Southampton Test 530 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Gourlay, Harry 60 M Sc Kirkaldy 6101 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 17
Graham, Edward 51 M L Enfield Edmonton 6828 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Grant, George 52 M N Northumberland Morpeth 14687 NUM Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Grant, John 44 M L Islington Central 9393 ETU Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Grocott, Bruce 36 M WM Lichfield & Tamworth 331 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Hamilton, James 58 M Sc Lanarkshire Bothwell 10948 CEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Hamilton, William 59 M Sc Fife Central 7986 None Man. Multi. Pro. 26
Hardy, Peter 45 M N West Riding Rother Valley 32777 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Harper, Joseph 62 M N Pontefract & Castleford 23242 NUM Ind. Multi. Pro. 14
Harrison, Walter 55 M N Wakefield 12806 ETU Man. Multi. Anti. 12
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Hart, Judith 52 F Sc Lanark 698 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 17
Hattersley, Roy 44 M WM Birmingham Sparkbrook 8521 ASTMS Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Hatton, Frank 55 M N Manchester Moss Side 4111 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 3
Hayman, Helene 27 F S Welwyn & Hatfield 520 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Healey, Denis 59 M N Leeds East 12311 None Man. Multi. Pro. 24
Heffer, Eric 54 M N Liverpool Walton 9862 ASW Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Hooley, Frank 53 M N Sheffield Heeley 9406 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Horam, John 37 M N Gateshead West 9427 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Howell, Denis 53 M WM Birmingham Small Heath 14055 APEX Man. Multi. Pro. 15
Hoyell, Douglas 46 M N Nelson & Colne 669 ASTMS Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Huckfield, Leslie 34 M WM Nuneaton 17761 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 9
Hughes, Cledwyn 60 M W Anglesey 5972 None Man. Multi. Pro. 25
Hughes, Robert 44 M Sc Aberdeen North 9621 AEF Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Hughes, Roy 51 M W Newport 13816 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Hughes, William 44 M N Durham 18116 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Hunter, Adam 68 M Sc Dunfermline Burghs 5291 NUM Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Irvine, Arthur 67 M N Liverpool Edge Hill 6171 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 29
Irving, Sydney 58 M S Kent Dartford 4665 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Jackson, George 55 M N Brighouse & Spenborough 2177 NUJ Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Jackson, Margaret 33 F EM Lincoln 984 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Janner, Grenville 48 M EM Leicester West 9960 NUJ Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Jay, Douglas 69 M L Wandsworth Battersea Nth 11142 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 30
Jeger, Lena May 61 F L Camden Holborn St Pancras S 5441 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Jenkins, Hugh 68 M L Wandsworth Putney 2775 NUBE Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Jenkins, Roy 56 M WM Birmingham Stetchford 11923 None Man. Multi. Pro. 28
John, Brynmor 42 M W Glamorganshire Pontypridd 18774 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Johnson, James 68 M N Kingston Upon Hull West 10121 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Johnson, Walter 59 M EM Derby South 9332 TSSA Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Jones, Daniel 68 M N Burnley 11876 AUEW Ind. Multi. Pro. 17
Jones, Barry 38 M W Flintshire East Flint 9586 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Jones, Alec 52 M W Rhondda 34481 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 9
Judd, Frank 41 M S Portsmouth 1345 GMWU Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Kaufman, Gerald 46 M N Manchester Ardwick 6783 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Kelley, Richard 72 M N West Riding Don Valley 27420 NUM Ind. Multi. Anti. 17
Kerr, Russell 55 M L Hounslow, Feltham & Heston 9147 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Kilroy-Silk, Robert 34 M N Ormskirk 8851 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Kinnock, Neil 34 M W Monmouthshire Bedwellty 22862 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Lambie, David 51 M Sc Ayrshire Central 9555 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Lamborn, Harry 61 M L Southwark Peckham 18827 USDAW Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Lamond, James 48 M N Oldham East 8137 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Latham, Arthur 46 M L Westminster (Paddington) 2311 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 7
Leadbitter, Ted 57 M N Hartlepool 7894 NUPE Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Lee, John 49 M WM Birmingham Handsworth 3896 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Lestor, Joan 46 F S Eton & Slough 7663 GMWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
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Lever, Harold 62 M N Manchester Central 10611 None Man. Multi. Pro. 31
Lewis, Arthur 59 M L Newham North West 13381 NUGMW Ind. Uni. Anti. 31
Lewis, Ronald 67 M N Carlisle 6254 NUR Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Lipton, Marcus 76 M L Lambeth Central 8677 None Tri. Multi. Anti. 31
Litterick, Tom 47 M WM Birmingham Selly Oak 326 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Lomas, Kenneth 54 M N Huddersfield West 1364 NUPE Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Loyden, Edward 53 M N Liverpool Garton 3300 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti 2
Luard, Evan 50 M S Oxford 1036 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 10
Lyon, Alexander 45 M N York 3689 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 10
Lyons, Edward 50 M N Bradford West 4941 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Mabon, Dickson 51 M Sc Greenock & Port Glasgow 11955 None Man. Multi. Pro. 21
McCartney, Hugh 56 M Sc Dunbartonshire Central 4385 NGWU Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
McDonald, Oonagh 38 F S Thurrock 4839 ASTMS Tri. Uni. Anti. 0
McElhone, Frank 47 M Sc Glasgow Queens Park 8914 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 7
MacFarguhar, Rod 46 M EM Belper 5684 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
McGuire, Michael 50 M N Lancashire Ince 23530 NUM Man. Multi. Pro. 12
McNamara, Kevin J 42 M N Kingston upon Hull Central 9821 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Mackintosh, John 47 M Sc Berwick & East Lothian 2740 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Mackenzie, James 49 M Sc Lanarkshire Rutherglen 7356 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Maclennan, Robert 40 M Sc Caithness & Sutherland 2560 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
McMillan, Thomas 57 M Sc Glasgow Central 6441 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Madden, Max 35 M N Sowerby 646 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Magee, Bryan 46 M L Waltham Forest Leyton 11513 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Mahon, Simon 62 M N Bootle 16890 TGWU Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Mallalieu, Bill 68 M N Huddersfield East 8414 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 31
Marks, Kenneth 56 M N Manchester Gorton 8864 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 9
Marquand, David 42 M EM Ashfield Nottingham 22915 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Marshall, Edmund 36 M N Goole 14097 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 5
Marshall, James 35 M EM Leicester South 1133 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Mason, Roy 52 M N Barnsley 24812 None Man. Multi. Pro. 23
Maynard, Joan 55 F N Sheffield Brightside 7926 NUAAW Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Meacher, Michael 37 M N Oldham West 8037 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Mellish, Robert 63 M L Bermondsey Southwark 18581 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 30
Mendelson, John 59 M N Penistone 15135 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 17
Mikardo, Ian 68 M L Twr Hamlets, Bethnal Gn, Bow 15949 ASTMS Tri. Uni. Anti. 31
Millan, Bruce 49 M Sc Glasgow Craigton 8781 None Man. Multi. Pro. 17
Miller, Maurice 56 M Sc East Kilbride 2704 MPU Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Miller, Millie 53 F L Redbridge Ilford North 778 None Tri. Multi. Anti. 2
Mitchell, Richard 49 M S Southampton Itchen 7795 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 5
Molloy, William 58 M L Ealing North 2922 TGWU Ind. Uni Anti. 12
Moonman, Eric 47 M S Basildon 10551 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Morris, Alfred 48 M N Manchester Wythenshawe 14179 NUGMW Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Morris, Charles 50 M N Manchester Openshaw 8513 UPOW Ind. Multi. Anti. 13
Morris, John 45 M W Mid & West Glamorgan 21752 None Man. Multi. Pro. 17
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Moyle, Roland 48 M L Lewisham East 8952 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Mulley, Frederick 58 M N Sheffield Park 23964 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 26
Murray, Ronald 54 M Sc Edinburgh Leith 3445 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 6
Newens, Arthur 46 M L Harrow 13451 NUT Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Noble, Michael 41 M N Rossendale 203 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 2
Oakes, Gordon 45 M N Lancashire Widnes 16871 None Man. Multi. Pro. 5
O'Halloran, Michael 48 M L Islington North 6818 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 7
Ogden, Eric 53 M N Liverpool West Derby 12519 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Orbach. Maurice 74 M N Stockport South 4220 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Orme, Stanley 53 M N Salford West 8572 AEU Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Ovenden, John 34 M S Gravesend 2305 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 2
Owen, David 38 M S Plymouth Devonport 2259 ASTMS Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Padley, Walter 60 M W Mid-Glamorgan Ogmore 22204 USDAW Ind. Multi. Pro. 26
Palmer, Arthur 64 M S Bristol North East 8591 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Park, George 62 M WM Coventry North East 15969 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Parker, John 70 M L Dagenham Barking 21994 None Man. Multi. Pro. 41
Parry, Robert 43 M N Liverpool Scotland Exchange 12920 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Pavitt, Laurence 62 M L Brent South 11053 MPU Ind. Uni. Anti. 17
Pendry, Tom 42 M N Stalybridge & Hyde 9757 NUPE Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Perry, Ernest 66 M L Wandsworth Battersea South 2851 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Phipps, Colin 42 M WM Dudley 8525 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Prentice, Reginald 53 M L Newham North East 13541 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 19
Prescott, John 38 M N Kingston Upon Hull 23793 NUS Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Price, Christopher 44 M L Lewisham West 5529 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Price, William 42 M WM Warwickshire Rugby 5204 NUJ Ind. Multi. Anti. 10
Radice, Giles 40 M N Durham Chester le Street 24278 GMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 3
Rees, Merlyn 56 M N Leeds South 15265 None Man. Multi. Pro. 13
Richardson, Jo 53 F L Barking 16290 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Roberts, Albert 68 M N Normanton West Riding 14633 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 25
Roberts, Gwilym 48 M WM Cannock 12222 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Robinson, Geoffrey 37 M WM Coventry 3694 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 0
Roderick, Caerwyn 49 M W Brecon & Radnor 3012 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 6
Rodgers, George 51 M N Chorley 2713 None Tri. Multi. Anti. 2
Rodgers, William 48 M N Teeside Stockton 14474 None Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Rooker, Jeffrey 35 M WM Birmingham Perry Bar 3204 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Roper, John 41 M N Farnworth, Lancashire 14695 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Rose, Paul 41 M N Manchester Blackley 7119 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Ross, William 65 M Sc Ayrshire & Bute, Kilmarnock 7529 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 2
Rowlands, Edward 36 M W Merthyr-Tydfil 16805 None Man. Multi. Pro. 4
Ryman, John 45 M N Blyth 78 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Sandelson, Neville 53 M L Hillingdon, Hayes, Harlington 9420 None Man. Multi. Pro. 5
Sedgemore, Brian 39 M S Luton West 6439 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Selby, Harry 63 M Sc Glasgow Govan 1952 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
Shaw, Arnold 67 M L Redbridge, Ilford South 1749 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 2
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Sheldon, Robert 53 M N Ashton Under Lyne 10727 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Shore, Peter 52 M L Twr Hamlets, Stepney, Poplar 20976 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Short, Edward 64 M N Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central 8114 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 25
Short, Renee 57 M WM Wolverhampton North East 14653 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Silkin, John 53 M L Lewisham Deptford 13034 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 13
Silkin, Samuel 58 M L Southwark Dulwich 7459 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Silverman, Julius 71 M WM Birmingham Erdington 8777 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 21
Skinner, Dennis 44 M EM Bolsover 21066 NUM Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Small, William 67 M Sc Glasgow Garscadden 7626 AEU Ind. Multi. Pro. 17
Smith, John 38 M Sc Lanarkshire North 8341 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Snape, Peter 34 M WM West Bromwich East 7529 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Spearing, Nigel 46 M L Newham South 17721 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Spriggs, Leslie 66 M N St Helens 22066 NUR Ind. Uni. Anti. 18
Stallard, Albert 55 M L Camden, St Pancras North 7553 AUEW Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Stewart, Michael 70 M L Hammersmith Fultham 5321 None Man. Multi. Pro. 31
Stoddart, David 50 M S Swindon 10270 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Stott, Roger 33 M N Lancashire Westhoughton 13575 POEU Man. Uni. Anti. 3
Strang, Gavin 33 M Sc Edinburgh East 8456 None Tri. Uni. Pro. 6
Strauss, George 75 M L Lambeth Vauxhall 9766 None Man. Multi. Pro. 26
Summerskill, Shirley 45 F N Halifax 4178 MPU Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Swain, Thomas 65 M N Derbyshire North East 10237 NUM Tri. Multi. Anti. 17
Taylor, Ann 29 F N Bolton West 906 None Man. Uni. Anti. 2
Thomas, George 67 M W Cardiff West 6672 NUT Ind. Multi Pro. 31
Thomas, Jeffrey 43 M W Monmouth Abertillery 18355 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Thomas, Mike 32 M N Newcastle-upon-Tyne East 6249 USDAW Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Thomas, Ronald 47 M S Bristol North West 633 None Tri. Multi. Pro. 2
Thorne, Stanley 58 M N Preston South 3749 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Tierney, Sydney 53 M WM Birmingham Yardley 4170 None Tri. Multi. Anti. 2
Tinn, James 54 M N Teeside Redcar 10430 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Tomlinson, John 37 M WM Meriden 8966 AUEW Ind, Multi. Pro. 2
Tomney, Frank 68 M L Hammersmith North 8122 OGMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 26
Torney, Thomas 61 M N Bradford South 8255 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Tuck, Raphael 66 M S Watford 3957 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Urwin, Thomas 64 M N Durham Houghton le Spring 20401 AUBTW Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Varley, Eric 44 M EM Chesterfield 17560 NUM Man. Multi. Anti. 12
Wainwright, Edwin 68 M N Dearne Valley West Riding 27269 NUM Man. Multi. Pro. 17
Walden, Brian 44 M WM Birmingham Ladywood 9739 NUGMW Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Walker, Harold 49 M N Doncaster 7430 AEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 12
Walker, Terry 41 M S Kingswood 2566 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Ward, Michael 45 M S Peterborough 1848 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Watkins, David 51 M N Durham Consett 19446 AEUW Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Watkinson, John 35 M S Gloucester West 409 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Weetch, Kenneth 43 M S Ipswich 1733 None Man. Multi. Anti. 2
Weitzman, David 78 M L Hackney N & Stoke Newington 13295 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 31
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Wellbeloved, James 50 M L Bexley, Erith & Crayford 8467 None Man. Multi. Pro. 11
White, Frank 37 M N Bury & Radcliffe 442 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
White, James 54 M Sc Glasgow Pollok 7091 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Whitehead, Phillip 39 M N Derby North 4193 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Whitlock, William 58 M EM Nottingham North 6841 USDAW Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Willey, Fred 66 M N Sunderland North 15671 None Man. Multi. Pro. 26
Williams, Alan 46 M W Swansea West 4836 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 12
Williams, Alan Lee 46 M L Havering Hornchurch 6801 None Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Williams, Shirley 46 F S Hertford & Stevenage 9046 None Man. Multi. Pro. 12
Williams, William 61 M N Warrington 12261 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 15
Wilson, Alexander 59 M Sc Lanarkshire Hamilton 3332 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 6
Wilson, Harold 60 M N Lancashire Huyton 16233 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 31
Wilson, William 63 M WM Coventry South East 12131 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Wise, Audrey 41 F WM Coventry South West 2118 USDAW Tri. Uni. Anti. 2
Woodall, Alec 58 M N Hemsworth 31572 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 2
Woof, Robert 65 M N Durham Blaydon 13466 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 20
Wrigglesworth, Ian 37 M N Teeside Thornaby 4648 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 2
Young, David 46 M L Ealing Acton 4065 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 2
(Heppell et al, 2010, pp.76-83).

































































































































































































































































































































What was the defining ideological composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party?
______________________________________________________________________________________
Left and right are concepts which are quantifiable only by maintaining an acceptance of 
their diverse and complex nature. They are not fixed, and do not bind politicians to follow 
one policy over another by adhering to a simplistic understanding of their ideology. It is  
evident that not all Labour MP's could be positioned because the reality was within the 
Labour Party there are the inside left, outside left, social democratic right and the centre.  
The existence of such a composition demonstrates the complex nature of the Party, and 
how any previous analysis  has had to  utilise  broader  terms such as  left  and right  to 
position individuals within ideological groups. The PLP is, however an eclectic mixture of  
views and positions, which must only be termed left  and right as broad descriptions. Left 
and  right  do  exist,  but  they  must  be  subdivided  into  inside  left,  outside  left,  social  
democratic right in order to appreciate the positions held by the members.  They can not 
easily be typecast or stereotyped into  simple definitions of left and right, despite the fact 
that such ideas play a vital role in defining the ideological make up of the PLP. To assume 
all factions within an overarching term hold the same views on key issues is a dramatic  
over simplification. Within Labour, the inside left and the outside left are brought together  
in their broad left-wing outlooks, but are separated by the means and ends to which they 
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aspire. For example, Benn was of the outside left whilst Foot was of the inside left. Both 
were left-wing, but they held different views on the role of Parliament and democracy. This 
demonstrates the inadequacies of the umbrella term. The broad nature of the PLP is such 
that the left is comprised of varying views and levels of intensity towards core ideological  
doctrine that can not automatically be transferred from member to member.  
The Independents represent the centre ground of the PLP, however a caveat must be 
considered. Independent MP's are considered so because they are independent of either 
the  Tribune or  Manifesto  Group.  However,  some did  not  join  either  group for  fear  of  
alienating  their  constituency  members  despite  being  broadly  sympathetic  with  either 
groups ideals. They may remain either left or right, whilst also being independent. This 
again  demonstrates  the  complex  nature  of  the  PLP  and  also  why  Heppell's  existing 
approach may only provide meaningful results when applied upon the Thatcherite era of 
the Conservative Party.
The following is broken down into various sub-sections, with each section presenting a 
relevant  question and answer relating to the data. Afterwards,  an analysis  of  the data 
contextualises the information prior to presenting a discussion. After  the questions, an 
analysis of the result is undertaken.
______________________________________________________________________________________
What were the group distributions for each candidate?
______________________________________________________________________________________
Manifesto Group Tribune Group Independents
Foot 5 60 62
Callaghan 89 5 54
______________________________________________________________________________________
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The Manifesto Group and the Tribune Group both represented polar opposites of political 
thought within the Labour Party. The Manifesto Group was a young group which argued 
for closer ties with the Common Market, a static relationship with the trade unions, and a 
move away from the policies of the left. The Tribune Group, however was an older group 
which presented a voice of the inside left within Parliament. Related to but distinct from the 
Tribune  publication,  the  Tribune  Group  were  MP's  of  the  legitimate  left,  which  had 
prevailed throughout much of Labour’s post war history. The Independents were MP's of 
no specific group alignment, and so tended to act as the broad centre ground. The caveat 
must be remembered that figures such as Benn were independent, yet held firm outside 
left positions. Despite this, the majority of MP's who did not belong to either the Tribune or  
Manifesto Groups were independent because they did not subscribe in a firmly dedicated 
fashion to either philosophy.
It was not surprising that the bulk of the Manifesto Group MP's voted for Callaghan, whilst  
the bulk of Tribune Group MP's voted for Foot.  Yet  it  is those who deviated from this  
assumption  who  are  significant.  From  the  data  presented,  there  prevails  a  moderate 
penetration of 5 Manifesto Group MP's voting for Foot whilst 5 Tribune Group MP's voted 
for Callaghan. The so called ideological defectors broke from their assumed candidate and 
voted instead for the opposing candidate. Some MP's behaved in this fashion in order to  
safeguard Labour's  electoral  potential  against  the Conservatives,  their  personal  career 
objectives, or personal taste. Brian Walden, a Manifesto Group member voted for Foot yet  
argued  against  the  left.  His  vote  for  Foot,  therefore  can  not  be  seen  as  a  positive 
endorsement,  yet  it  illustrates  the  complex  nature  of  voting  behaviour.  Callaghan’s 
subsequent majority was sufficient as to render the consequences of such actions limited.
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The dominant grouping within Foot’s vote were the Independents, who at 62 provided the 
bulk of Foot’s support base. However, the bulk of Callaghan’s support base came from the 
Manifesto Group, suggesting that Callaghan appealed more to his fellow thinkers whilst  
Foot appealed slightly more to the centre ground. However, Foot’s Tribune Group support 
was  only  2  votes  short  of  the  dominant  Independents  category.  This  enables  the 
conclusion that Foot’s result drew more support from the centre than Callaghan.
In terms of groupings, the power within the PLP rested with  the Independents.  With a 
combined known vote of 116, the Independents were in a position to grant the leadership 
to either Foot or Callaghan. Their fluidic nature, however ensures that both the left and 
right of the PLP must remain moderate in order to appeal to these king makers. Should the 
left or right exceed the comfort zone of the centre ground, then they risk losing the support  
of this vital group and with it control of the PLP. 
______________________________________________________________________________________






The debate within the Labour Party concerning unilateralism and multilateralism had less 
relevance in 1976 as the Cold War had shifted from the minds of the electorate since its 
heyday in the 1950s. However, for Foot the issue was still very much a significant aspect  
of his political agenda. For him, it was a matter of ethical principle that Britain must not 
possess  nuclear  weapons.  Because  of  this  significance,  it  is  an  issue  worthy  of 
consideration in assessing his vote. For the PLP also, the subject had waned in relevance 
as an electoral issue because of the cooling of the Cold War. The potential for nuclear 
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holocaust had drifted from the minds of the electorate, shifting their focus more towards 
economic  issues  and  contemporary  issues  such  as  Britain's  role  within  the  Common 
Market. Foot, however had not shifted his position and remained a firm unilateralist. 
Callaghan is known to have secured 15 votes from unilateralists as well as his expected 
133 from multilateralists. It was also an issue upon which Foot was unlikely to expand his 
support base. Foot is known to have secured 118 votes from unilateralists and 9 votes 
from multilateralists. The unilateralists voting for Callaghan and multilateralists voting for 
Foot  suggests that  nuclear disarmament did  not  prevent  some MP's from voting for  a 
candidate that held contrary views to their own. This was because nuclear disarmament 
was not as significant a factor for the electorate or MP's as it was for Foot. Indeed, Foot 
held strong views on the subject having being a significant player in the CND movement, 
and  would  place  considerable  emphasis  on  the  issue  as  leader  even  at  the  risk  of  
confusing  his  colleagues  (Butler  &  Kavanagh,  1984,  p.96).  However,  the  depth  of  feeling 
towards the issue within the PLP and broader country possessed less relevance for a 
potential Party leader. Multilateralists felt at ease voting for Foot safe in the knowledge that 
defence pacts through NATO and relations with the Soviet Union were not the exclusive 
preserve of the Prime Minister. Conversely,  unilateralists voted for Callaghan accepting 
that other issues such as electoral appeal, the limited significance of nuclear disarmament 
when  compared  to  economic  policy  and  Callaghan's  experience  of  industrial  relations 
made him a credible electoral asset. 
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______________________________________________________________________________________
How was the Pro- and Anti-Common Market vote distributed for each candidate?
______________________________________________________________________________________




In the year before the leadership election campaign, Britain had voted to remain within the 
Common Market in a referendum. It was an outcome that Foot did not wish to see, yet it 
was the verdict of the electorate. As a potential Labour Prime Minister, Foot would find 
reversing that verdict problematic, thereby forcing him to accept it against his preference. 
Foot's  personal  views,  therefore  had  limited  impact  potential,  yet  given  the  scale  of 
opposition within the inside left to the Common Market, it remained something of an issue  
for many MP's despite the verdict of the electorate in 1975.
Foot attracted the support of 9 Common Market supporters, thereby suggesting that his 
opposition  was  not  sufficient  enough to  prevent  him expanding his  support  base.  Yet 
Callaghan was able to attract the support of 25 Common Market opponents. Callaghan 
was pro-Common Market, yet these opponents voted for a leader who opposed their view. 
This was because the Common Market issue had been debated thoroughly in the Party 
and  country  over  the  previous  year,  thereby making  Labour  appear  out  of  touch  if  it  
adopted an anti-Common Market policy after the referendum. It was also an issue which 
had become less significant because of the extensive debate the year before. Fearing the 
potential electoral consequences, the PLP selected a leader who would appeal electorally. 
______________________________________________________________________________________
An Evaluation of the Leadership Election Result
______________________________________________________________________________________
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Foot  was  a  literary  intellectual  rather  than  an  expert  of  economics.  As  the  former 
Chancellor, Callaghan, however had a great deal of economic experience along with his 
pedigree within the trade union movement. The difference of experience between each 
candidate can not be underestimated. Britain's economic position was in the heart of the 
PLP when selecting their leader, making Callaghan's penetrations into nuclear defence 
and Common Market areas possible. Foot's ethical arguments over the abolition of nuclear 
weapons did not prevent unilateralists from voting for the leader who would seek to mould 
the economy towards growth. Foot's opposition to the Common Market in order to build a 
socialist  international  community  also  did  not  prevent  anti-Common  Marketeers  from 
voting for his opponent, whilst those independent of either the Tribune or Manifesto Group 
also voted for the leader who they believed possessed the greater economic experience. 
Callaghan's economic credentials and experience made him the preferred leader. At this 
stage, the Party did not need a conciliatory leader. Foot lacked the economic experience 
required  to  become  Prime  Minister  at  a  time  of  growing  economic  crisis  which 
subsequently fully manifested itself  under Callaghan. Foot's intellectual weight is not in 
doubt, yet  this was not sufficient to make up for his comprehensive lack of knowledge 
relating  to  economics.  Callaghan's  position  with  the  trade unions had been enhanced 
following the defensive position he adopted against In Place of Strife. This demonstrated 
his personal commitment to the role of the unions, which continued to be powerful players 
within the Labour movement (Cronin, 2004, p.175). This appeal ensured that Callaghan was 
“the least challenging candidate of the centre-right” who would be “least likely to deviate 
from the path followed since 1974”  (ibid).  Foot's position had been strengthened by his 
performances in government, making him a credible challenger and subsequently became 
Callaghan's "effective deputy in the government" (Cole, 1995, p.146). To have evolved from 
being an outside critic of the government to 'deputy Prime Minister' in little over six years is 
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a significant achievement which few others have achieved.  He had also demonstrated 
loyalty to the Labour government. Hatfield (1976) notes in The Times that 
Michael Foot, although aligned with the left philosophically, will not be party to any 
manoeuvres  designed  to  make  life  uncomfortable  for  Mr.  Callaghan  or  the 
government (Hatfield, 24 September 1976, p.14). 
This indicates that Foot's loyalty to the leader would continue. Since joining the Labour  
front bench, Foot had undertaken a metamorphosis from being a thorn in the side of the 
Labour leader to now being a key ally in maintaining unity. In contrast during the same 
time period, Jenkins had undermined his once powerful position by resigning the deputy 
leadership and adopting a highly pro-Common Market position. Foot was now in a highly  
beneficial position which ensured he had a stronger voice in the government.
Whilst ideology doubtlessly played a role in the voting behaviour of some MP's, it should 
and must not be considered as the sole motivating factor in analysing the vote. Rather,  
other factors such as an MP's individual majority strength, trade union affiliation, length of 
service, and national distribution of constituencies may also be factors which potentially 
played a role. Consequently, it is necessary to consider these issue within this analysis as 
a means of building upon the ideological analysis.
________________________________________________________________________
1: What variations in MP's majorities were evident in the voting behaviour?
________________________________________________________________________
2,000 or less 2,001-5,999 6,000 -11,999 12,000+
Callaghan 9 23 67 49
Foot 16 28 44 39
________________________________________________________________________
Callaghan is known to have gained the support of 36 per cent whilst Foot is known to have  
gained the support of 64 per cent of MP's with a majority of 2,000 or less. This indicates 
that those MP's at most risk from losing their seats preferred a potential Foot leadership as  
152
opposed to a Callaghan leadership. Within the second field, Callaghan gained the support 
of  45 per  cent  whilst  Foot  gained the support  of  55 per  cent  of  MP's with  a majority 
between 2,001 and 5,999. These figures demonstrates Foot's support amongst MP's who 
can be characterised as being at a high-to-moderate risk of losing their seats.
In contrast, in the third field Callaghan gained the support of 60 per cent whilst Foot gained 
the support of 40 per cent of MP's with majorities between 6,000 and 11,999. These MP's 
can be characterised as being above a moderate risk of losing their seats. This switching 
suggests that MP's at an above moderate risk of losing their seats felt that Callaghan, 
rather  than  Foot  had  the  greater  potential  of  maintaining  Labour's  electoral  position. 
Factors for this shift may include the wishes of MP's at greater risk of losing their seats 
wishing to appeal to a candidate with a popular reputation amongst the rank and file of the 
Party.  This  would  show and demonstrate their  broad loyalty  to  the core ideals  of  the 
Labour  movement  and  so  maintain  their  vital  support  whilst  canvassing.  Those  at 
moderate risk may wish to appeal to a candidate with broader electoral appeal who may 
maximise Labour's position outside of the interests of the rank and file.  
In the fourth field, 55.5 per cent preferred Callaghan over the 44.5 per cent who preferred  
Foot, suggesting that those who can be characterised as being in safer seats voted for the  
candidate they believed would be most beneficial to the broader interests of Party unity or  
their personal career development, rather than for personal electoral gain. Given their safe  
electoral position, their vote is unlikely to have been constrained by issues regarding their  
majority. 
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These variations of vote distribution reveal that those at greater risk of losing their seats 
preferred a Foot leadership over that of Callaghan because of the need to rely on the 
support of Party activists, demonstrating Foot's support at rank and file level. 
________________________________________________________________________





Callaghan gained the support of 51.5 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 48.5 per 
cent of MP's with a trade union affiliation. Given Callaghan's reputation over his defence of 
the unions following the publication of Castle's In Place of Strife, it can be argued he would 
have expected to benefit from a stronger union vote than was in fact the case. However,  
given  Foot's  own  popularity  with  the  unions  following  his  successful  resolution  of  the 
miners' strike shortly after Labour secured office in 1974, and his willingness to engage 
with them, along with his the replacement of the IR Act with Labour's own legislation, both  
candidates have just cause to expect significant support from MP's with a union affiliation. 
As the results indicate, both candidates benefitted broadly from the support of such MP's, 
suggesting that both were potentially open to the suggestion that they had been endorsed 
by union MP's. It is more likely, however, that the unions were able to work effectively with  
either candidate, and so the election was determined by factors other than union affiliation; 
however, to suggest the union interest played no role would be an oversimplification given 
the figures reveal a broad endorsement of both candidates. 
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Callaghan attracted the support of 71.5 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 28.5 
per cent of longer serving MP's. In contrast, Foot attracted the support of 50.5 per cent 
whilst  Callaghan attracted the support of 49.5 per cent of shorter serving MP's. These 
figures reveal that Callaghan had a greater support base amongst longer serving MP's, 
whilst Foot's support base derived mainly from shorter serving MP's. The implication of 
these results reveal that newer MP's had a broad tendency away from the traditional social  
democratic leadership style of Callaghan and towards Foot's inside left liberal socialism. 
They also reveal that longer serving MP's, considering issues such as long service to both 
Party and state,  gravitated towards Callaghan. However, it must be noted that given the 
percentages gave Foot a narrow lead over Callaghan, it must be remembered that this can 
not be viewed as evidence of a general left-wing surge amongst new MP's, but rather as 
indicative of disinclination towards Callaghan amongst newer MP's.
________________________________________________________________________
















In Scotland, Callaghan gained the support of 39.5 per cent whilst Foot gained the support  
of 60.5 per cent of MP's.  This indicates that Foot gained a significant endorsement of  
Scottish MP's, which contrasts with Callaghan's Scottish result in terms of percentage. 
These figures separate Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom as being the only 
country which provided Foot with a majority of votes. Factors for this can include Foot's  
interest in Scottish affairs up to and including devolution. In Wales, Callaghan gained the 
support of 68 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 32 per cent of MP's. Given Wales'  
larger industrialised and trade union dominated sector than either Scotland or England, 
Callaghan  would  have  been  expected  to  gain  greater  support  from the  working-class 
heartlands. In England, Callaghan gained the support of 54.5 per cent whilst Foot gained 
the support of 45.5 per cent of MP's. This indicates that, although the numerical bulk of 
Callaghan's vote derived from England, in terms of percentage MP's representing English 
seats  did  not  give  him as  great  an  endorsement  as  those representing  Welsh  seats.  
Indeed, Callaghan's support from English MP's was less than that of Foot's support from 
Scottish MP's, thereby enabling the conclusion to be drawn that Callaghan derived the 
bulk of  his percentage support  from Wales, with reduced support  in England and little 
support  from Scotland. Given the bulk of MP's numerical value came from England, it 




8: How many MP's representing Northern, Southern, East Midlands, 
West Midlands or London seats voted for Callaghan or Foot?
________________________________________________________________________
Nth Sth EM WM L
Callaghan 54 (52.5%) 13 (54%) 13 (72%) 13 (46%) 27 (57.5%)
Foot 49 (47.5%) 11 (46%). 5   (27%) 15 (53%) 20 (42.5%)
________________________________________________________________________
Callaghan secured the majority of votes across England in each region with the exception 
of  the  West  Midlands.  Given  Labour's  traditional  northern  heartlands  provided  the 
numerical bulk of the vote, it was there where the election was to be won or lost. With the  
exception  of  the  West  Midlands,  the  prevailing  view  amongst  English  MP's  was  that 
Callaghan  would  appeal  more  to  the  electorate  than  Foot.  However  the  differences 
between each region in  the level  of  support  for  each candidate illustrates the varying 
degrees to which each would be most likely to appeal. For example, although Callaghan 
was the victor in most of the regions, the extent to which his popularity can be determined 
in each region can be seen by the size of his percentage over Foot. The south, therefore 
had greater support for Callaghan than in the north despite his victory over Foot in both 
regions. However, the sharp contrast between the East and West Midlands illustrates that 
Callaghan, by a significant margin, was felt to be the candidate most likely to appeal to the 
broader electorate in the East rather than in the West Midlands. However, in the West 
Midlands, Foot's endorsement is not as significant as Callaghan's in the East. Callaghan's 
support in London also indicates a degree of support from MP's representing city areas,  
along with his ability to identify with the unions. In this sense, Callaghan's experience on  
economic matters would be of greater benefit to an MP's re-election over that of Foot. It is 
important, therefore to remember that although Callaghan gained the greater support of 
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most regions in England, the extent to which that support was wholesale varies between 
regions21.
When considering his election as leader, Callaghan remarked that "at no time did I have  
real doubts that I would be elected, and this determined my public attitudes during the 
three successive ballots that were necessary" (Callaghan, 1987, p.392). When considering his 
experience, his confidence is unsurprising. "Callaghan was the centrist figure, sceptical of 
the enthusiasms of the left and social democratic right, close to the unions both in style  
and substance, and with more experience of high office than any of his rivals" (Thorpe, 2008, 
p.195).  This  confidence,  combined  with  his  moderate  views,  and  political  experience 
ensured  that  the  PLP  felt  most  comfortable  about  Callaghan's  electoral  appeal  (New 
Statesman, 9 April 1976, p.438). However, at the next Labour leadership election, the context 
and leadership skills required would be very different.
Electorally, however it was not over for Foot. In October 1976, the Labour Party debated 
whether to elect Foot unopposed to the position of Deputy Leader. By this point, he had 
been  appointed  Leader  of  House  and  had  assisted  Callaghan  in  composing  his  new 
cabinet  (Jones, 1994, p.396). The social democrat, Shirley Williams contested Foot for the 
Deputy Leadership however, Foot held onto the position  (The Times, 14 October 1976, p.15). 
This illustrates the growing discontent brewing amongst some social democrats towards 
the so-called advances made by the left which would lay the foundations for the disunity 
under Foot's leadership.
21 During the 1980 leadership election, the Labour opposition placed Party interests over those of the economy because of the vastly  
different circumstances faced at that time.
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4.4: Michael Foot and the Economic Strategies.
Keynesian  economic  theory  had  been  the  main  policy  position  of  the  Labour  Party 
throughout much of the post-war period (Donoughue, 1987, p.79). Simply put, it is a method of 
state involvement in economic policy, whilst allowing the private economy to continue. It 
also manipulates consumer demand in order to control unemployment. Effectively, this is 
what  was  known  as  the  mixed  economy.  However,  Labour's  commitment  to  full 
employment and high expenditure within a Keynesian economy resulted in higher inflation 
and taxation (Donoughue, 1987, p.80). For many within the Labour movement, this was a price 
worth paying for the advantages of higher employment.  However,  the economic theory 
became increasingly problematic as the 1970s progressed, forcing a debate on all sides of 
the political spectrum on whether the mixed economy could continue. Monetarism was in 
the ascendency on the right, whilst a socialist challenge was in the ascendency on the left. 
An Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) was developed by some on the left to counter 
Keynesianism because “British capitalism had failed the nation and that the moment was 
ripe  to  push  forward  government  control  and  public  investment”  (Cronin,  2004,  p.181). 
Ultimately, Foot joined with Benn, Silkin, Shore and Orme in supporting the AES, which 
was based around import controls, import deposits and currency manipulation (Donoughue, 
1987,  p.90).  The idea being that  through isolationism the government would  be able to  
manage the British economy through the global economic crisis. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promotes capitalism within the nations which seek 
financial assistance. It is ideologically bound to promote free market ideals over those of 
collectivism. Consequently, when Healey approached them for a loan in 1976, he would be 
bound to their ideological conditions regardless of how much money the government drew 
from the loan (Holland, 1984, p.244). Holland (1975) warned that increasing monopolies within 
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industry meant that fewer firms were controlling more of the economy (Holland, 1975, p.49). 
With  fewer  firms  came reduced  competition,  legitimising  a  larger  role  for  the  state  to 
monitor their activities. Economic competition was illusionary because of the inequalities 
between those participating in the competition. Holland (1975) argued that international 
trade was giving way to multi-national trade between the same companies  (Holland, 1975, 
p.62). The growth of these monopoly companies utilised transnational structures such as 
the Common Market to earn higher profits by increasing prices thereby increasing inflation. 
Holland argues that the Common Market's
prevailing ideology of liberal capitalist integration is contradicted by the new dominant 
mode  of  monopoly-multinational  capital  which  has  swept  Europe  faster  than 
Commission decrees against abuses of competition (Holland, 1975, p.317).
Holland is arguing that the Common Market acts as a platform for multinational companies 
to dominate international capital within the hands of a select group of companies, and that 
as an institution it is unable to control them. In this sense, the illusion of competition has 
given way to corporate domination. The idea that capitalism could be managed by the 
state was giving way as Keynesian theory gave way to an economic crisis. Keynesianism 
had failed to adequately manage this economic development, whilst  monetarism would 
actively promote it. Only socialism could adequately analyse the problem and provide an 
alternative to the corporate domination of monopoly-multinational capital. 
Foot was “brought up by Aneurin Bevan to be a socialist critic of Keynes” (Foot, 1984, p.184). 
As  discussed  in  a  previous  chapter,  Bevan  was  a  key  inspiration  of  Foot's  political 
philosophy, and this extended to Foot's understanding of economic theory. Foot was a 
critic  of  Keynesian  theory  because  as  it  acted  as  a  preventative  measure  against 
socialism.  Keynesianism  enabled  capitalism  to  continue  alongside  progressive  steps 
towards social policy, thereby negating the need for a socialist society. However with the 
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gradual  adoption  of  monetarist  policies,  Foot  argued  that  the  nation  was  risking  the 
moderate progresses achieved through Keynesian economics and that “we should have to 
recapture that precious ground”  (ibid). Foot continued to argue that co-operation with the 
key players of the mixed economy was a sensible action for the government to undertake. 
The IMF “seriously impaired” independent  economic and social  progress and that “the 
period 1977-79 was still a vastly more successful period than the period of, say, 1970-72”  
(Foot, 1984, p.185). Through co-operation, the social contract, and retaining the limited gains 
won through Keynesianism Foot was arguing the economy would operate more effectively 
than if the ideas of the IMF or monetarism were implemented.
The key economic symptoms which Britain was experiencing included interest rates at 15 
per cent deterioration of the pound on the markets, and high inflation (Cronin, 2004, p.180). 
The crisis, Donoughue (1987) argued, was because
the  PSBR was  above  forecast  and  money growth  was running  well  above  the 
Treasury's  12 percent  target  – monetarism already secretly  ruled and we were 
failing the basic monetarist test (Donoughue, 1987, p.93).
The solutions which  Callaghan would  endeavour  to  pursue brought  controversy to the 
Labour movement; he argued that
Britain has for too long lived on borrowed time, borrowed money, borrowed ideas. 
For  too  long,  perhaps  since  the  war,  we  postponed  facing  up  to  fundamental 
choices and fundamental changes in our society and in our economy. The cosy 
world  we  were  told  would  go  on  forever,  where  full  employment  would  be 
guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor's pen, cutting taxes, deficit spending, that 
cosy world is gone. [It is wrong] to think that you could just spend your way out of a  
recession and increase unemployment by cutting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists and insofar as it 
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ever  did  exist,  it  worked  by  injecting  inflation  into  the  economy (Cronin,  2004,  
p.180).
With this announcement at the Labour conference, Callaghan broke free of the Keynesian 
economic theory which Labour had sought to pursue. Callaghan had divorced Labour from 
the Keynesianism22, freeing them up to debate about the future of economic policy (Pugh, 
2010, p.357).  By breaking free of the theories of the past, Callaghan enabled both the left 
and right to begin a debate over which policies to adopt, with  monetarist  and socialist 
theories in the ascendancy.
Foot  supported  the  AES  because  the  alternative  was  to  accept  £2bn  in  ideological 
spending cuts demanded by the IMF (Jones, 1994, p.407). In cabinet Foot argued that 
there was no economic case for the cuts. Far from reducing PSBR (Public Sector 
Borrowing  Requirement),  the  spending  cuts  would  mean higher  unemployment, 
which would in turn mean higher social security payments and lower tax revenues, 
this actually increasing the PSBR (Jones, 1994, p.408).
By demanding the cuts to public spending, Foot was arguing that the IMF would, in fact,  
worsen the economic situation by causing higher unemployment, leading to increases in 
welfare spending. Foot described the consequences of the cuts as “inconceivable” which 
would force the government to break with the deals it had made with the trade unions 
whilst also splintering the Party into various warring factions (Jones, 1994, p.408). Foot clearly 
believed that the ideological cuts would undermine Labour's raison d'être, which given the 
IMFs opposition to collectivism, it could be argued was the purpose of the condition. The 
demands were ultimately accepted by Healey, yet he would not draw on the full amount of  
the loan. 
22 This also solidified the Conservatives freedom from the consensus.
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Foot opted not to resign given the precarious state of the government in the House of 
Commons and with  it  the  threat  of  a  Conservative  government  had an election  been 
called.  Despite  their  differences of  opinion,  Foot  remained loyal  to  Callaghan and the 
government.  Foot  had  "been  leaning  over  backwards  to  support  the  Prime  Minister”  
because he did not wish to undermine the Labour Government (Smith, 8 December 1976, p.16). 
The preservation of the Labour Party in power guarded against another term of potential  
Conservative rule, which Foot believed legitimised his continued support. Foot's support 
for the AES did not extend to destroying the government over a disagreement concerning 
economic theory. 
Foot  argued  co-operation  through  the  social  contract  was  vital  in  order  to  avoid  the 
“immense problems” of industrial breakdown and economic decline (Foot, 1984, p.195). The 
issue of pay restraint came to haunt the government when they imposed a 5 per cent 
wages  policy  (Cronin,  2004,  p.189).  This  measure  was  designed  to  demonstrate  the 
government's strength over the trade unions, and demonstrate to the capitalists and the 
electorate  that  the  government  was  able  to  control  them.  This  was  not  the  kind  of  
relationship Foot had argued for. However, this would have been an effective message to 
non-Labour voters that Labour remained capable of controlling the unions. The unions 
accepted this as a piece of electioneering. However, given Callaghan chose to hold back 
the  election  until  the  following  year  the  trade unions  then  interpreted  the  policy  as  a 
genuine attempt to control them. As with In Place of Strife, the unions believed that Labour 
had again turned on them, and so this prompted a period of industrial unrest which came 
to characterise the final period of the Labour government as the winter of discontent.
163
On 22nd January 1979, a day of action intensified the symptoms of the strike on a single 
day during which schools, hospitals, ambulance drivers, dustmen, and grave diggers in 
Liverpool  ceased working  (Cronin,  2004,  p.192).  Callaghan's pre-election demonstration of 
strength over the unions had been proven an ineffective tool. The Conservative press were 
scathing of the government, running headlines such as “Target for Today: Sick Children”  
(Cronin,  2004,  p.193).  Shore  described  the  disintegration  of  industrial  relations  as  a 
“nightmare”,  arguing  that  by  bringing  down  the  Labour  government,  the  subsequent 
general election would produce a highly anti-union government (Shore, 1993, p.118). Shore 
(1993) also argued that Callaghan should have used civil resources such as the military to 
keep the country operating. Foot opposed the calling of a state of emergency or the use of  
the military, arguing in cabinet that the trade unions had a just cause of protest  (Morgan, 
2007, p.364). Ultimately, the period of industrial action petered out. The issues that the trade 
unions were fighting for were left largely unresolved whilst the Labour government was 
now left fighting for its life.
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4.5: Michael Foot as Leader of the House and Devolution Debate.
Foot's performance in the leadership election demonstrated the authority and respect he 
held within the PLP. Consequently,  Callaghan could not afford to ignore the  runner up. 
Foot's level of support during the election warranted recognition. Callaghan rewarded Foot 
with the position of Leader of the House and elevation to being the Lord President of the 
Privy Council (Jones, 1994, p.398). When combined with Foot's role as deputy of the Labour 
Party, he was effectively acting as a deputy Prime Minister. Yet the mood amongst some 
on the  left  was  that  Callaghan's  cabinet  had reduced  the  power  of  Foot's  ideological 
bedfellows. Castle (1980) noted in her diary that "I had a profound sense that the left has 
been weakened in this new cabinet" following Callaghan's dismissal of her  (Castle,  1980, 
p.727). However, given Castle's role in the development of In Place of Strife, Callaghan had 
little sympathy for its author (Conroy, 2006, p.91). In his new position, Foot remained loyal to 
Callaghan as the Labour Prime Minister, whilst courting criticism concerning his attitude 
towards India, Public Lending Rights, and the development of devolution to Scotland and 
Wales. 
Whilst the economic issues were being combated by Healey, both Michael and Jill Foot 
spent  some  time  in  India.  Foot  admired  India  and  its  Prime  Minister,  Indira  Gandhi 
considerably. Foot believed that she was the "inheritor of the Nehru ideal of a democratic 
and socialist India", and so he believed she, as a friend deserved his loyalty (Jones, 1994, 
p.406). Foot also wished for assistance from India in seeking out a peaceful solution within 
Rhodesia given India's  experience of  resolving disputes  (The  Times,  7  October  1976,  p.8). 
There can be little  doubt  that  Foot  held a personal  loyalty  towards India and that  he 
believed it had a role to play in the development of international peace and the advance of 
liberal democratic socialism. 
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Yet the Prime Minister Foot admired had be disqualified by the High Court in Allahabad for  
political corruption. She retorted by clinging to power, by declaring a state of emergency 
and arresting opponents including approximately 2,000 students without charge whilst her 
son  engaged  in  excessive  suppression  of  opposition  (Jones,  1994,  pp.401-402).  A 
campaigner, J. P. Narayan called for Foot's friend to be removed in the name of freedom 
(Levin, 6 April 1977, p.16). Freedom is a concept which Foot also argued strongly for, so to 
find  himself  on  the  receiving  end  of  such  demands  is  potentially  indicative  of  a 
miscalculation of support on his part. Needless to say, some within the PLP such as John 
Lee argued that Foot was wrong to support the tyrannical regime saying 
...the way Mrs Gandhi has petulantly reacted to every form of criticism suggests that 
power has gone to her head, or than she can not cope and, in a sense, that this is a  
kind of panic behaviour. I would like Mr Foot to realise that Mrs Gandhi has stifled the 
press in India. I think Mr Foot is wrong and he ought to remember that  (The Times, 
10 January 1977, p.4).
The curbs on freedom in India had also disturbed the Foreign Office, who advised Foot not 
to  discuss  the  unrest  with  the  Prime  Minister  whilst  in  India.  Foot  did,  and  he  later  
described her during his meeting with her as having 
...a  gentleness  and coolness  which  were  much more characteristic  than the fury 
which was sometimes alleged to take possession of her whole being (Jones, 1994, 
p.404). 
Despite views to the contrary, Foot took the view that the Prime Minister was a gentle ruler  
and so deserved his admiration and respect. 
Foot may well have been clinging to a notion that India's independence and that his anti-
colonialism were strengthened by supporting Gandhi. Writing in his work  Loyalists and 
Loners,  Foot quotes James Cameron saying "the political  world outside the word India 
equated almost automatically with the word Gandhi, which had gone almost into folklore" 
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(Foot, 1986, p.212). Foot was quoting Cameron talking about Mahatma, yet the view that the 
'Gandhi'  name alone carried  with  it  a  special  significance is  not  to  be  disregarded in 
considering Foot's support for the Indian Prime Minister.
During  a  speech  over  dinner,  Foot  rejected  the  notion  that  India  was  falling  into  
dictatorship (Jones, 1994, p.405). His visit was short enough for his gaze not to have noticed 
any illegal detentions or curbs of individual freedom. The secretary of the Socialist Party of 
India criticised Foot's support of the state of emergency; E. P. Thompson later commented 
on the "devastating news that Foot had endorsed Mrs Gandhi's regime", whilst opponents 
of the regime were desperately trying to understand why Foot supported the supposed drift 
towards dictatorship (Jones, 1994, pp.405-406). Put simply, supporters of Foot were mystified 
as to how he could endorse such a harsh regime. Foot's political development had always 
been in favour  of  a free,  liberal  state and yet  India appeared to becoming harsh and  
dictatorial. The answer is that Foot was loyal. Gandhi was a friend, and Foot stood by his 
friends regardless of the situations in which they found themselves. In this instance, his 
loyalty brought him into defending aspects of an indefensible state. 
Back in the United Kingdom, Foot's 'Public Lending Rights Bill'  endeavoured to provide 
authors with a financial bonus whenever their works are borrowed from a public library 
(Morgan, 2007, p.365). Effectively, it compensated authors for missed sales, given a reader 
would be more likely to borrow a book rather than purchase one, especially at a time of 
economic  downturn.  It  would  prove  financially  beneficial  for  the  authors,  although  the 
principle of free libraries would be curtailed. At the time, however, the literary world was 
suffering from a significant degeneration of income with authors needing a financial boost  
which such a scheme would provide. The Bill was presented to the House of Commons in 
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1976, but was voted out in November 1977 due to a lack of Labour MP's in the House to  
vote for the proposal (Jones, 1994, p.409).
However, Foot was passionate on the subject and was not willing to give in, consequently  
the Bill was reintroduced the following year. Jones (1994) quotes Brigid Brophy saying
Michael Foot, as Leader of the House, took command of the parliamentary events. 
He amassed an arsenal of procedural methods, most of which he never needed to 
use except as bargaining counters for containing, but not stifling and thus provoking, 
the filibuster (Jones, 1994, p.425).
The third reading of the Bill passed through into the House of Lords in March 1979. At a  
time of industrial crisis and the constitutional debate regarding devolved government to 
Scotland and Wales, Foot  was able to achieve a final  success before the downfall  of  
Callaghan's government. 
The Labour Party had a mixed history when concerned with devolved government. "There 
are divisions in both major parties on the subject, and the government is faced with the 
threat of revolts from two separate sections of its own backbenches"  (Langdon, 16 January 
1976, p.1). Older Labour figures such as Keir Hardie had argued that devolution enabled the 
Red Flag to be brought down to local level. Socialism would start at grass roots level, and 
if devolved, it would avoid the centralised bureaucratic route as discussed by Max Weber 
(Slattery, 1991, pp.306-307; Morgan, 1987, p.32). Socialists such as Hardie were devolutionists in 
so  much  as  the  reform  benefitted  the  continued  development  of  a  socialist  society. 
Municipal socialism would have direct connections with the working classes as opposed to 
centralised bureaucratic control. Yet decentralisation was opposed by socialists such as 
Bevan who believed devolution created an artificial sense of regionalised patriotism in the 
devolved nations. By remaining centralised, equality would be enhanced and socialism 
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could be cascaded to each part of the United Kingdom at the same time from the same 
location.  Foot  saw  devolution  as  "a  matter  of  principle"  which  was  "a  recognition  of 
Scottish and Welsh nationhood and an advance of democracy" (Jones, 1994, pp.411-412). For 
a report entitled 'The Question of Devolution', Foot stated that
Labour's prospects at the next election will also be greatly affected by the way in 
which  we tackle  the whole  question of  devolution.  No doubt  is  possible,  in  my 
judgement, that we must carry through what we have promised - a real far reaching 
devolution - and we must do it ungrudgingly and ingeniously (Foot, 1976). 
Foot was of the socialist school of thought which followed the view advocated by Hardie,  
arguing that devolved government was a benefit to the development of a socialist society. 
The mechanisms on which to proceed with devolution was a matter of some contention for 
Foot. Referendums had not been the lefts' preferred decision making process given their 
failure to deliver a No verdict in the Common Market referendum. Also, given the Labour 
Party  had  contested  the  1974  general  elections  with  a  commitment  to  devolved 
governments in the manifesto, there was technically no need for a referendum. 
The next Labour Government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. It 
will  also  consult  with  the  local  authorities  and  other  interested  parties  about  the 
democratisation of  those regional bodies which are at present non-accountable. A 
separate statement setting out more detailed proposals has already been published 
by the Labour Party and the Government's proposals are set out in the White Paper. 
Separate  manifestos  are  being  published  for  Scotland  and  Wales  (Labour  Party, 
1974).
Foot believed that Parliament should make the decision without consulting the electorate 
because of their electoral victory with the above within the Labour manifesto (Jones, 1994, 
p.412). However, obtaining a government majority would be highly problematic, given the 
divisions of pro and anti  devolutionists on both the Labour and Conservative benches.  
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Attempts had been made to gain the backing of the Liberals and other minority parties 
within the Commons to help ensure the Bill passed (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.193).
The preparation of the devolution Bill did not intellectually stimulate Foot because of the 
logistical  minutia,  however  this  was  compensated  for  by  Foot's  emotional  stimulation 
(Morgan,  2007,  p.355).  During  a  television  interview,  Foot  connected Scottish  and Welsh 
devolution to the failure to grant full independence to Ireland. He argued that "I don't want 
them to turn to violence, of course, but I think its quite likely" should devolution not be 
granted  to  Scotland  and  Wales  (Hoggart  &  Leigh,  1981,  p.193).  Despite  Foot's  view  that 
devolution was vital, some did not agree. A group called  Labour Against Assemblies in  
Edinburgh and Cardiff was formed which included figures such as Eric Moonman, Colin 
Phipps and Tam Dalyell. Dalyell argued that
...one of the objectives of this loose grouping is to give Michael Foot, Leader of the  
House, notice of the morass which the Devolution Bill will get into into the House of 
Commons as it is now composed (The Times, 2 August 1976, p.2).
Within the same article,  Phipps estimated that 32 Labour MP's would vote against the 
government when the Bill came up for its second reading. Opposition to devolution came 
in  even greater  destructive  fashion  when  George Cunningham moved an amendment 
stating that the Yes result must comprise of 40 per cent of the whole electorate  (Rosen, 
2005, pp.366-367). This enraged the nationalists in Scotland, given this figure amounted to 
approximately two thirds of  the electorate who would be required to vote Yes  despite 
securing a majority verdict (Jones, 1994, p.422). 
Foot also argued that the referenda should be advisory, rather than mandatory. He argued 
that "no substantive result in regard to the Act would follow automatically on the outcome 
of the referendum"  (Foot,  16 February 1977, p.12).  Given Foot's distaste for the concept of 
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referenda subverting the primacy of Parliament, it is not surprising that he should attempt  
to  turn around Cunningham's wrecking amendment  by making the referenda advisory. 
However, by doing so, he also undermined the raison d'être for the consultative process. 
The polls took place in March 1979. Against a backdrop of industrial unrest and a decaying 
Labour government, the results would be fatal for the government's survival. Devolution in 
Wales was favoured by only 11.8 per cent of the electorate, whilst devolution in Scotland 
was favoured by 32.85 per cent  (Morgan,  2007,  p.365).  The Welsh result was a disaster, 
falling well  short  of  Cunningham's amendment whilst  the Scottish result,  despite being 
more respectable still  fell  short of Cunningham's amendment. The Scottish Nationalists 
were outraged, and pledged to turn against the government. A vote of no confidence was 
put forward in the Commons; without the aid of Welsh or Scottish Nationalist parties, the 
government lost the confidence vote and was forced to call a general election (Cronin, 2004, 
p.195). 
Foot  was  willing  to  fight  on.  Because  he  had  argued  that  the  referenda  were  to  be 
consultative, he attempted to argue that the SNP should remain loyal to the government. It 
was still possible, Foot believed, to rescue Scottish devolution from the electoral defeat. 
When he tried  to  convince Callaghan of  this  strategy,  however,  it  seemed as though 
Callaghan had accepted defeat. Sensing their opportunity, the Conservatives put forward 
the Confidence Motion which aimed to bring down the Labour government  (Pugh,  2010, 
p.359-360).
The Lib-Lab pact had now ended and, during the confidence debate, Foot attacked the 
Liberal leader as much as the Conservatives, saying
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What the Right Hon Lady has done today is to lead her troops into battle snugly 
concealed behind a Scottish nationalist shield, with the boy David holding her hand. 
I must say to the Right Hon. Lady — and I should like to see her smile — that I am 
even more concerned about the fate of the Right Hon. Gentleman than I am about 
her. She can look after herself. But the Leader of the Liberal Party — and I say this 
with the utmost affection — has passed from rising hope to elder statesman without 
any intervening period whatsoever (Hansard, 1979, pp.461-590).
With  the  debate  concluded,  the  Labour  Whips  began  a  hard  fight  to  ensure  Labour 
succeeded in defeating the Conservative motion. The Whips negotiated with MP's and 
pushed hard to ensure their own backbenches voted the motion down. Despite valiant 
efforts, three supporting MP's did not vote for the government. These were Gerry Fitt and 
Frank Maguire of the northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sir Alfred 
Broughton; Maguire and Fitt abstained, whilst Broughton was extremely ill and unable to  
physically visit Parliament (Morgan, 2007, p.367). As a result of the Whips inability to secure 
more supporters, the confidence vote was carried by a single vote (Turner, 2008, p.269). By 
losing the Confidence vote, a general election became an inevitability.
The Labour government had been brought down by the result  of  the failed devolution 
referenda. The confidence motion was lost because Labour had lost the support of the 
Liberals and the nationalists.  Had Cunningham's amendment not  been included in the 
Scotland Act, then it would have been a victory, and the Conservatives would have been 
unable to confidently put forward their motion. Had the Conservatives still done so, then it  
is likely the SNP would have voted with Labour. Cunningham had postponed devolution,  
but at the expense of the life of the Labour government.
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4.6: Conclusion.
Foot  underwent  a  transfiguration  of  his  political  identity  as  a  member  of  the  Labour 
Government.  No  longer  was  he  the  outside  rebel  who  campaigned  on  issues  which 
mattered to him regardless of the embarrassment inflicted upon the Labour government. 
As a member of the Labour government, Foot had to consider the effect his speeches and 
actions had upon the government to which he belonged. Granted, this did not prevent him 
from deviating from the Party line on subjects such as the Common Market, however given 
Wilson  had  suspended  the  convention  of  collective  responsibility,  this  can  hardly  be 
described as disloyal. 
As  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Employment,  Foot  successfully  negotiated  a  peaceful 
settlement with  the NUM, whilst  also repealing the Industrial  Relations Act.  These two 
moves alone would endear him to those most likely to vote Labour. They also ensured that 
the Labour government's life expectancy would be prolonged, thereby moulding his image 
as a figure of stability and change. It became possible to rely on Foot as a loyal member of  
the government, and not a potential maverick. This fostering of his loyal reputation enabled 
him to progress his image towards the Party leadership. He became a credible inside left  
contender for the leadership,  who would not  be bogged down in socialist  doctrine but  
rather  understood  the  practical  issues  faced  by  a  government  on  a  daily  basis. 
Consequently, when Wilson stood down, he was able to demonstrate his ability to appeal  
to many centrist MP's as well as to his ideological bedfellows. Foot was unable to secure 
the leadership because of Callaghan's strength of experience in the key positions of state. 
However, Foot was able to show that he was a credible alternative future leader, and in so 
doing  became  a  figure  of  some  authority  in  Callaghan's  cabinet.  His  successes  as 
Secretary of State for Employment would not be replicated so easily as Leader of  the 
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House as he was plunged into an economic argument following the IMF debate. Foot was 
an advocate of the Alternative Economic Strategy, but not at the expense of the lifetime of 
the Labour government. He did not resign when the idea was rejected, choosing instead to 
remain loyal to Callaghan and the Labour government. He continued as Leader of the 
House, and became involved in devising the devolution legislation. Opposition was strong, 
but the legislation passed through the Houses. However, the referenda failed. This led to  
the nationalists abandoning the government to a Conservative confidence motion, which 
ultimately brought the Labour government down. Foot had attempted to save the Labour  
government, but failed due to the lack of support from Callaghan, who simply had become 
tired of the debates. 
Foot's transformation was based upon his loyalty to Labour. He was loyal to the Labour  
government,  because  it  was  the  most  effective  means  by  which  to  bring  about  the 
changes in society he believed was needed in order to emphasise equality and social  
justice. This sometimes meant compromising on issues such as the economic theory. But 
in return, Foot was able to push forward legislation that he believed in. Foot's personal  
success in this final Labour government before his leadership was his transition from being 
a broadly likable rebel of the left to being a criticised loyalist of the government.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Michael Foot and the 1980 Labour Leadership Election
5.0: Introduction.
The 1980 Labour leadership election provides an insight into the nature of the ideological  
arguments  within  the  Party  as  well  as  an  opportunity  to  evaluate  non-ideological 
motivations in the election of Foot and the rejection of Healey. As a member of the 1974-
1979 government, Foot's loyalty to both Wilson and Callaghan enabled him to become the 
Labour leader at a time of considerable and destructive ideological debate  (Clark, 18 May, 
2010). This loyalty enabled him to develop a cross-ideological appeal in a way which Benn 
or Healey could not. Both Benn and Healey had appeal to a specific ideological position 
that served to divide rather than unite (ibid).
The  Labour  Party  was  returned  to  opposition  in  1979  with  no  more  of  an  electoral  
challenge to  overcome than they faced following previous general  election defeats.  In 
October  1974,  Labour  secured  11,457,079  votes,  yet  in  May  1979,  Labour  secured 
11,532,218 votes  (Dorey, 1995, p.341). Consequently, in selecting the leader, the Party did 
not initially face a situation which was insurmountable.
The  amended  Heppell  approach,  utilised  for  the  1976  leadership  campaign  is  again 
utilised for the 1980 leadership campaign. An examination of the PLP is justified because 
the circumstances in which the Party found itself were vastly different to those faced four 
years previously. The Party was in opposition, and facing strong demands for reforms from 
the outside left  which included reselection, the electoral  college, and controls over the 
manifesto. 
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A key difference was also the advances made by the outside left within the mindset of the 
Party.  In  addition,  the  social  democrats  were  increasingly  uneasy about  the  apparent  
success of the outside left, and were becoming disillusioned with the Party. They believed 
that the survival of the Party which they recognised was at risk from these constitutional 
reforms, and some felt unable to remain within the 'broad church'. During the debates, they 
made their position known and sought to advance the alternative reform of One Member 
One Vote and the abolition of the block vote for the election of the leader (Labour Weekly, 31 
October, 1980; New Statesman, 31 October 1980, p.6).  As a result of these divisions, as the new 
Labour leader, Foot, would be called upon to navigate the Party through the demands 
whilst retaining Party unity.
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5.1: Michael Foot and the Labour Leadership Election.
Because the Labour Whips had been unable to save the Callaghan government from a 
vote of no confidence following the result of the devolution referenda, a general election 
became a constitutional inevitability.  Margaret Thatcher, the leader of the Conservative 
opposition had, with the voting assistance of disgruntled Welsh and Scottish Nationalist  
parties, succeeded in bringing down the Labour government. The nationalist parties held 
Labour accountable for the failure of devolution, and so they became the turkies that voted 
for Christmas by supporting the Conservative move.
It  is  worth  noting  that  commentators  often  lay  blame  for  the  economic  failure  of 
Callaghan's government at the door of the trade unions and the left, yet the Alternative 
Economic Strategy advocated by some on the left in cabinet was never put into practice. 
Indeed, Callaghan's preferred monetarist polices were lukewarm proto-Thatcherite in tone 
which laid the foundations for future accusations of betrayal. Those blaming 'the left' for 
Callaghan's  economic  policies  is,  therefore  an  oxymoron.  Callaghan  had  followed  the 
policies of the social democratic right, which favoured policies that had common economic 
ground with  those seeking  to  reform Labour  following Foot's  period  of  leadership.  An 
illustration  being  that  both  Callaghan  and  Healey  were  pro-Common  Market,  which 
ultimately became the orthodox policy of the modernised Labour Party under Kinnock's 
post-Foot  leadership.  Yet  the  trigger  for  the  public  divisions  and  debates  which 
characterised  Foot's  period  as  leader  was  Labour's  electoral  defeat.  It  is  therefore 
necessary  briefly  to  consider  the  1979  General  Election  and  the  role  it  played  in 
transforming Foot's fortunes in ultimately becoming the Labour leader.
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For Foot,  the election defeat provided him with  a personal opportunity to return to his 
literary activities. Although still deputy leader of the Labour Party, Foot was able to find  
time to write Debts of Honour. Debts of Honour was a broad collection of essays regarding 
an eclectic mixture of his political and personal influences, some of which were pivotal in 
developing his political education, as discussed in Chapter 2. The work opens up with an 
essay on  his  father,  Isaac  Foot,  which  is  followed  by  essays  on  Hazlitt,  Disraeli  and 
Beaverbrook amongst many others (Foot, 1981). It is unnecessary at this point to consider 
the contents of Debts of Honour in any great detail, however it is worth noting that it was a 
reflective examination on Foot's key inspirations at a time of degeneration for Labour. It  
was a moment of personal reflection and introspective political analysis for Foot given the 
electoral  position of  the Labour  Party,  which  was  in  the  process of  being  engulfed  in 
debates regarding constitutional  reform.  Debts of  Honour  enabled Foot  to  restate  and 
reaffirm his political  beliefs at  the end of his first  and only period in government.  This 
reflection  was  the  closest  Foot  came  to  writing  an  autobiography,  despite  lacking  a 
personalised historical  narrative.  The outside left  had laid the criticism at Foot,  having 
unrepentantly served in Callaghan's government, that he was a traitor to the left. Debts of  
Honour seeks to restate his ethical credentials as a liberal socialist of the inside left, and to 
separate himself and those of his ilk from the militants of the outside left (ibid).
Within 18 months of Labour losing the general election, Foot was elected leader of the 
Party. Between Labour's loss and his assumption of the leadership, it was a time of great 
discontent within the Party. The CLPD, who circulated to all CLPs "a suggested resolution 
on the reselection of MP's" made significant advances at securing support for its objectives 
at subsequent Labour conferences (Labour Weekly, 23 April 1976, p.12; Cronin, 2004, p.218). Yet 
they  had  not  succeeded  in  achieving  them.  The  argument  against  the  reforms  they 
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advocated  was  that  the  changes  would  lose  Labour  a  significant  portion  of  their  
mainstream  electoral  appeal. The  social  democrats,  who  were  becoming  increasingly 
disgruntled with the arguments and advances of the outside left, argued that a manifesto 
composed by conference, a leader elected by conference, and the mandatory reselection 
of  MP's  would  be  "a  disaster"  (Crewe  &  King,  1995,  p.92).  David  Owen,  describing  the 
constitutional changes, attacked them arguing that "four trade union barons in a smoke 
filled room was no way to elect a Prime Minister" (ibid). The social democrats had preferred 
any constitutional amendments to be restricted to One Member One Vote, believing this to 
be more genuinely democratic and less ideologically dogmatic (Hayter, 2005, p.14). However, 
Labour's  inability  to  retain  power  on  the  social  democratic  manifesto  composed  by 
Callaghan and his social democratic advisors had made the arguments advanced by the 
CLPD more compelling to a rank and file who were disgruntled by a Party leadership that  
was content to ignore them when in government. 
Tracy (1983) argues that Foot was "equally committed" to the development of the policies 
preferred  by  Callaghan  and  Healey,  despite  his  sympathy  towards  the  Alternative 
Economic Strategy, because of the threat of a Conservative government if he or any other 
inside left figure succeeded in undermining the support for the Labour government (Tracy, 
1983, p.33; Cronin, 2004, p.181). Once Labour had departed from office, Foot would be able to 
express his views without the governmental constraints of collective responsibility.  Foot 
remained  deputy  leader  of  the  Party  and  loyal  to  Callaghan,  even  to  the  extent  of  
defending him through the heckling of the 1979 post-election conference  (Morgan,  2007, 
p.375).
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The  CLPD  had  preferred  and  demanded  the  election  of  the  leader  by  conference.  
However, given this would be highly unlikely to succeed, they focused their efforts instead 
on securing an  electoral college system  (Cronin, 2004, p.218). The electoral college would 
shift  the bulk  of  the electorate  from being exclusively  the  PLP and towards  the trade 
unions, CLP's and the PLP. This would have the implication of making the winner the 
leader  of  the broader  Labour  movement  as well  as the  Parliamentary party.  In  future 
debates, this would have the advantage of enabling the leader to argue he or she was 
speaking for the entire Labour movement, making it harder, but not impossible, for the any 
single faction of the Labour movement to contest the validity of Labour policy (Minkin, 1991, 
pp.640-641).
The main debates over the composition of the electoral college took place at the 1980 
Labour conference in Blackpool (Thorpe, 2008, p.211). The outside left, chiefly articulated at 
the  conference  by  Benn,  blamed  the  centralisation  of  personnel  during  the  Labour 
government for the electoral defeat (Stark, 1996, p.46).  
Blaming  Callaghan  and  Healey  for  the  last  governments  failure,  they  sought 
constitutional  reform of  the Party in order  to  make the leadership more directly 
responsible to the activists like themselves (Pelling, 1985, p.176). 
Through  groups  such  as  the  CLPD,  the  outside  left  sought  to  seize  control  of  the 
leadership from the social democratic right and with it control of the Parliamentary Party. 
They disregarded the relevance of the older inside left,  to which Foot belonged. Benn 
questioned Foot's legitimacy as a figure of left, saying "he hasn't been a figure of the left 
for a decade"  (Benn, 1994, p.32). The conflict between Foot and Benn stemmed from their 
differing understanding of socialism and the role of Parliament. Benn advocated outside 
Parliamentary bodies such as the NEC dictating the policy of a Labour government, whilst  
Foot believed Parliament was sovereign and should not be circumnavigated in such a way 
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(Langdon, 16 April 1976, p.3). On this basis, both the inside left and the social democratic right 
found  themselves  under  attack  from  the  outside  left,  providing  them with  a  common 
adversary in the fight for the heart and soul of the Labour Party.
Benn sought  to distance himself  from the achievements and failures of  the Callaghan 
government in order to position himself as a credible future candidate to replace Callaghan 
amongst the anticipated new electorate. 
There was barely an MP who doubted that the move was designed to improve Mr.  
Benn's chances of winning the Labour leadership sometime in the future (Stark, 
1996, p.46). 
Yet in his diary Benn remarks that Callaghan felt the PLP would not accept him as leader 
(Benn, 1994, p.34).  Given Benn's readiness for attacking the previous government and his 
growing popularity amongst the rank and file at conference, the potential for him securing 
the leadership became a real possibility which the PLP was unable to ignore. It is worth 
noting  that  given  Benn  was  a  senior  minister  under  Callaghan,  his  desire  to  be 
disassociated  from  the  achievements  and  failures  of  Callaghan's  government 
demonstrates compartmentalised thinking that denies his collective cabinet responsibility 
in  Labour's  policies.  Speaking  to  the  conference,  Benn  made  a  number  of  'factual 
inaccuracies', which some in the hall considered simply to be lies (Hayter, 2005, p.13).
The leadership election that granted Foot the leadership was prompted by Callaghan's 
resignation which was hastened by the CLPD's victory in securing the electoral college 
(Thorpe, 2008, p.212). It must be remembered that at the time Callaghan stood down, he had 
become increasingly exhausted, which Healey characterised as being "in limbo and in 
purgatory at the same time"  (Healey, 1989, p.475).  Labour Weekly argued that "the Labour 
Party's leadership crisis has been thrown even deeper into confusion by Jim Callaghan's  
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decision  to  resign"  (Labour  Weekly,  17  October  1980,  p.1).  Despite  this  the  timing  of  the 
resignation  is  highly  significant  because  even  though  the  electoral  college  and  the 
widening of the electorate had been opened up to include unions, the CLP's and PLP, the 
exact  composition of  the  formulas  by  which  the  college  would  operate  had  not  been 
decided. This position potentially risked the advances of the outside left.  Labour Weekly 
suggests the benefits of the constitutional reforms may be jeopodised, by reporting that 
it is the worst possible outcome for the Left, which was anxious that the decision of 
the conference to widen the leadership franchise was not jeopodised by the election 
of  a  new,  and  possibly  unfairly  advantaged,  incumbent  selected  by  the 
Parliamentary Labour Party alone (ibid).
The  fear  was  that  Callaghan's  decision  to  resign  risked  a  social  democratic  leader. 
Because the October conference had been unable to agree upon the make up of the  
college, a special conference was needed to debate the outstanding issues. However, it 
must be noted that 
Callaghan decided a long time ago to step down as leader of the Labour Party after  
the 1980 conference. The changes made at Blackpool did not make him change his 
mind. However,  Mr Callaghan's decision to go, and to go now, certainly creates 
difficulties for the Labour Party (Labour Weekly, 17 October 1980, p.6).
Foot favoured retaining the election of the leader by MP's only (Owen, 1991, p.440). This was 
because Foot believed that Parliamentary socialism was the primary mechanism by which 
genuine  social  and  economic  equality  was  to  be  advanced  (Morgan  2007,  pp.374-375). 
Outside  Parliamentary  protests  achieved  little  beyond  their  populist  appeal  to  certain 
outside left groups. Owen (1991) noted that during the debates over intra-Labour electoral 
reform, Foot's objections were supported by Callaghan because they would de-emphasise 
Parliament.  Opponents  of  Benn's  preferred  method feared it  would  lead to  ideological 
purges,  potential  witch-hunts  of  social  democratic  MP's  and the dilution of  the  role  of 
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Labour MP's to being little more than a delegate at the whims of his or her constituency 
members (Kavanagh, 1982, p.217; BBC, 1995). The result of such an arrangement would be an 
MP representing the interests of the CLP rather than their constituents.  "It  was felt  by 
some", notes Shaw (1999), "that only Foot was in the position to halt the advance not only 
of Healey but of Benn, who, many believed, would use the new electoral college system to  
launch a  bid  for  the  leadership  the  following  year"  (Shaw,  1999,  p.154).  Shaw added "if 
Healey had been elected in 1981, he would have faced a challenge from Benn under the 
new arrangements, who might easily have succumbed", thereby opening the floodgates to 
more potential defections (ibid). This view is validated by Drucker (1981) who argued that...
...a Foot victory was preferred... because a Foot win in the PLP was seen as a way  
of ending an argument with the party which might conceivably end up forcing Benn 
on the PLP (Drucker, 1981, p.386).
Foot's election as an inside left, conciliatory figure who held appeal both within the left and 
right helped prevent such an occurrence. Radice (2004) remarks that "Benn is now almost 
a complete tool of the far left - and the Militant Tendency", making any suggestion of a  
Benn leadership highly divisive for the social democrats and inside left traditions within the 
Party (Radice, 2004, p.5).
The timing of Callaghan's departure, and the increasingly factious contention within the 
Labour  Party,  immediately  triggered  a  further  division.  This  new  division  concerned 
whether the old rules should be used for the election or whether the new leader should be  
a caretaker until the electoral college was operational (Labour Weekly,  24 October 1980, p.3; 
Shore, 1993, p.137). This debate provided Benn with a legitimate argument for not facing a 
potentially destructive vote at the hands of the PLP. Benn remarks that both Jo Richardson 
and Stuart Holland both recommended to him that if Foot stood, he should not contest  
against Foot (Benn, 1994, p.35, p.38). 
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In the midst of the constitutional wrangling, Foot headed to Dublin to deliver a lecture on 
one of his inspirational literary heroes, Jonathan Swift. Whilst there, well wishers continued 
to contact Foot's office in order to encourage him to stand. The long standing left-winger, 
Ian Mikardo, trade unionists Clive Jenkins, Bill Keys and Moss Evans, cabinet colleagues 
Stan Orme and Albert Booth, NUM member Arthur Scargill23 and Foot's wife, Jill Craigie 
joined the chorus of supporters (Shore, 1993, p.138; Morgan, 2007, p.377). Upon his return to the 
United Kingdom, he had been overwhelmed by the support he received and so announced 
his  intention to  stand against  the preferred social  democratic  successor,  Healey.  Foot 
neglected to inform another left-wing candidate, Peter Shore whose campaign, as a result,  
"was doomed from that moment"  (Gould, 1995, p.139). Foot's involvement in the campaign 
now ensured that he would be the only credible left-wing candidate  (Radice,  2004,  p.20). 
Although  initially  a  credible  candidate,  Shore  lacked  the  appeal  of  a  Foot  leadership 
because "only Michael was strong enough to beat Healey and that the Party would be 
plunged into civil war if Healey became the Leader" (Shore, 1995, p.139). Any other candidate 
from the left or right of the Party would not be able to survive a challenge from the electoral 
college.
The PLP would have been highly unlikely to have elected Benn, hence his preference to 
wait for the new college system with the addition of the rank and file electorate. However,  
even after the new rules had been passed, Benn would have been unlikely to mount a 
successful challenge against the well-liked Foot. Had Healey succeeded Callaghan, then 
23 Routledge's biography of Scargill notes that "he had been involved from the beginning in the secret union campaign to draft Michael  
Foot and stop Denis Healey. In late October, he sought to ensure that Yorkshire-sponsored MPs would vote for Foot. His coalfield 
area council voted to instruct miners who sat on constituency general management committees of the Labour Party to call special 
'elect Foot' meetings. They warned Yorkshire's five NUM-sponsored MPs that if they failed to toe the line they could not expect  
union backing when they came up for re-selection by local parties." (Routledge, 1993, pp.103-104).
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the PLP risked facing a Benn challenge in the new year. Consequently, Foot became the 
'stop Benn' candidate with whom the PLP was able to work. Berrington (1982) notes that
the decisive vote which elected Mr Foot as leader of the PLP may have come from 
men of the centre and right, anxious to avoid a confrontation with the party outside 
Parliament, or from those expressing their  like for Mr Foot as a man (Berrington, 
1982, p.71).
Appealing to the centre and even to some social democrats enabled Foot to become Party 
leader. Some centrists and social democrats found an appeal in a Foot leadership over 
that of Healey and so voted for him in order to have a "soft life" (Radice, 2004, p.22). In order 
to address the composition of Foot's support base, it is now necessary to consider the 
anatomy of the leadership election in greater depth. 
It  must be remembered that 97 MP's who participated in the previous 1976 leadership 
election did not participate in the 1980 leadership election because they were no longer 
members  of  the  PLP.  The following  individuals  did  not  sit  as  MP's  following Labour's 
electoral defeat.
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Through either losing their seats, taking up new roles, retirement from active politics, or 
death, the character of the PLP had changed since the previous leadership election. In 
terms  of  Parliamentary  group  memberships,  the  PLP  had  lost  55  Independents,  23 
members of the Tribune Group, and 21 members of the Manifesto Group. These figures 
reveal that both Foot's and Healey's core ideological support bases had been reduced by 
23  and  21  members  respectively.  However  the  Independents  had  taken  the  greatest 
reduction at 54. 
The PLP had benefited from 54 replacement MP's, who brought with them new positions 
on policies. Repeating the comprehensive analysis of the entire PLP as carried out in the 
previous chapter would possess limited relevance to evaluating Foot's election, given that 
Foot failed on that occasion to secure the leadership. However it is necessary to conduct 
an analysis of the composition of the PLP in order to draw out the elements which resulted  
in Foot's successful election as leader. Given the context of this leadership election had 
little in common with the previous election24, the analysis will be conducted by considering 
these changing circumstances.  The following database contains  details  of  the  eclectic 
make up of the PLP.
24 The manner in which the election was called, the constitutional debates surrounding it, the advances of the CLPD and Labour's  
return to opposition created an election of vastly different character to the previous election. This warrants a second analysis.
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Composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party Membership 1980
Region
L: London S: South of England N: North of England
WM: West Midlands EM: East Midlands
Sc: Scotland W: Wales
Ideological Classifications
Ind: Independent Man: Manifesto Group Tri: Tribune Group
Uni: Unilateralist Mult: Multilateralist
Pro: Pro Common Market Anti: Anti Common Market.
Name A S R Constituency Maj. Union Grp Nuc. EEC Yrs
Abse, Leo 63 M W Pontypool, Monmothshire 17368 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 22
Adams, Allen 34 M Sc Paisley 13755 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Allaun, Frank 67 M N Salford East 5856 NUJ Tri. Uni. Anti. 25
Anderson, Donald 41 M W Swansea East 21220 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Archer, Peter 54 M WM Warley West 10051 None Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Armstrong, Ernest 65 M N Durham North West 15280 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Ashley, Jack 58 M WM Stoke on Trent South 14246 NUGMW Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Ashton, Joseph 47 M EM Notts. Bassetlaw 7179 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 12
Atkinson, Norman 57 M L Haringey, Tottenham 7133 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Bagier, Gordon 56 M N Sunderland South 8401 NUR Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Barnett, Joel 57 M N Heywood & Royton 2287 None Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Barnett, Guy 52 M L Greenwich 6842 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 9
Benn, Tony 55 M S Bristol South East 1890 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 17
Bennett, Andrew 41 M N Stockport North 333 NUT Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Bidwell, Sydney 63 M L Ealing Southall 11278 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Booth, Albert 52 M N Barrow-in-Furness 7741 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Boothroyd, Betty 51 F WM West Bromwich 9468 None Man. Multi. Pro. 7
Bottomley, Arthur 73 M N Teeside 11409 NUPE Man. Multi. Pro. 18
Bradley, Thomas 54 M EM Leicester East 2856 TSSA Man. Multi. Pro. 18
Bray, Jeremy 50 M Sc Motherwell & Wishaw 10937 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Brown, Hugh 61 M Sc Glasgow Provan 18844 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Brown, Robert 59 M N Newcastle-upon-Tyne West 11236 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 14
Brown, Ronald 40 M Sc Leith 4017 AUEW Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Brown, Ronald W 58 M L Hackney South & Shoreditch 6704 AUEW Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Buchan, Norman 58 M Sc Renfrewshire West 8572 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Callaghan, L. James 68 M W Cardiff South East 8701 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 35
Callaghan, James 53 M N Middleton & Prestwich 1098 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Campbell, Ian 54 M Sc Dunbartonshire West 6457 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Canavan, Dennis 38 M Sc West Stirlingshire 10356 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Campbell-Savours D 37 M N Workington 5756 TGWU Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Cant, Robert 65 M WM Stoke on Trent Central 12603 None Man. Uni. Pro. 14
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Carmichael, Neil 59 M Sc Glasgow Kelvingrove 4759 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 19
Carter-Jones, Lewis 60 M N Eccles 8059 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Cartwright, John 47 M L Greenwich Woolwich East 10460 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Clark, David 41 M N South Shields 13124 NUPE Man. Multi. Anti. 1
Cocks, Michael 51 M S Bristol South 11183 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Cohen, Stanley 53 M N Leeds South East 9372 TSSA Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Coleman, Donald 55 M W Glamorganshire, Neath 18616 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Concannon, John 50 M EM Nottinghamshire Mansfield 11331 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 14
Conlan, Bernard 57 M N Gateshead East 14698 AEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Cook, Robin 34 M Sc Edinburgh Central 4661 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Cowans, Harry 48 M N Newcastle Upon Tyne Central 7413 NUR Ind. Multi. Anti. 1
Cox, Thomas 50 M L Wandsworth Tooting 5200 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Cunliffe, Lawrence 51 M Sc Leigh 9023 NUM Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Craigen, Jim 42 M Sc Glasgow Maryhill 17496 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Crawshaw, Richard 63 M N Liverpool Toxteth 6143 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Crowther, Stanley 55 M N Rotherham 13435 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Cryer, Robert 46 M N Keighley 78 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Cunningham, G 49 M L Islington Sth & Finsbury 4344 None Man. Multi. Anti. 10
Cunningham, J 51 M N Whitehaven 5455 GMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Dalyell, Tam 48 M Sc West Lothian 20082 None Man. Uni. Pro. 18
Davidson, Arthur 52 M N Accrington 3294 GMWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Davies, Denzil 42 M W Llanelli 19945 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Davies, Ifor 70 M W Gower 10641 APEX Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Davis, Stanley 52 M L Hackney Central 8788 None Man. Multi. Anti. 10
Davis, Terry 42 M WM Birmingham Stechford 1649 None Man. Multi. Anti. 1
Deakins, Eric 48 M L Waltham Forest 4403 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Dean, Joseph 57 M N Leeds West 9664 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Dempsey, James 63 M Sc Coatbridge & Airdrie 15156 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 35
Dewar, Donald 43 M Sc Glasgow Garscadden 15198 None Man. Multi. Pro. 1
Dixon, Don 51 M N Jarrow 11528 GMWU Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Dobson, Frank 40 M L Holborn & St Pancras Sth. 2323 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 1
Dormand, John 61 M N Durham Easington 17556 NUT Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Douglas, Richard 48 M Sc Dunfermline 7313 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 1
Douglas-Mann, B 53 M L Merton Mitcham & Morden 618 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Dubs, Alfred 48 M L Battersea South 332 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 1
Duffy, Patrick 60 M N Sheffield Attercliffe 18103 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Dunn, James 54 M N Liverpool Kirkdale 7709 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Dunnett, Jack 58 M EM Nottingham East 3234 NUGMW Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Dunwoody, Gwenth 50 F N Crewe 4237 NUR Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Eadie, Alexander 59 M Sc Midlothian 16936 NUM Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Eastham, Kenneth 53 M N Manchester Blackley 4504 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Edwards, Robert 74 M WM Wolverhampton South East 7901 TGWU Ind. Uni. Pro. 6
Ellis, Raymond 57 M EM North East Derbyshire 5329 NUM Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Ellis, Robert 56 M W Denbighshire Wrexham 12149 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 10
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English, Michael 50 M EM Nottingham West 2500 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Ennals, David 58 M N Norwich North 5591 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Evans, Ioan 53 M W Aberdare 20263 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Evans, John 50 M N Newton 11341 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Ewing, Harry 49 M Sc Stirling Falkirk & Grangemouth 15618 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 9
Faulds, Andrew 57 M WM Warley East 5097 None Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Field, Frank 38 M N Birkenhead 5909 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Fitch, Alan E 65 M N Wigan 12995 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Flannery, Martin 62 M N Sheffield Hillsborough 8350 NUT Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Fletcher, Edward 69 M N Darlington 1052 AEU Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Fletcher, Leopold 59 M EM Derbyshire Ilkeston 8600 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Foot, Michael 67 M W Gwent Ebbw Vale 16091 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 20
Ford, Benjamin 55 M N Bradford North 7521 AEU Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Forrester, John 56 M WM Stoke-on-Trent North 12424 NUT Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Foster, Derek 43 M N Bishop Auckland 6040 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Foulkes, George 38 M Sc South Ayrshire 1521 None Man. Multi. Pro. 1
Fraser, John 46 M L Lambeth Norwood 1940 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Freeson, Reginald 54 M L Brent East 6343 NUJ Ind. Multi. Anti. 16
Garrett, John 49 M N Norwich South 1198 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Garrett, William 60 M N Wallsend 16519 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
George, Bruce 38 M N Walsall South 1588 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Gilbert, John 53 M WM Dudley East 7687 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Ginsburg, David 59 M N Dewsbury 4381 None Man. Multi. Pro. 21
Golding, John 49 M WM Newcastle under Lyme 4228 POEU Man. Multi. Pro. 11
Gourlay, Harry 64 M Sc Kirkcaldy 13063 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Graham, Edward 55 M L Enfield Edmonton 1980 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Grant, George 56 M N Northumberland Morpeth 11831 NUM Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Grant, John 48 M L Islington Central 4139 ETU Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Hamilton, James 62 M Sc Lanarkshire Bothwell 15217 CEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Hamilton, William 63 M Sc Fife Central 18022 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 30
Hardy, Peter 49 M N West Riding Rother Valley 26002 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Harrison, Walter 59 M N Wakefield 7553 ETU Man. Multi. Anti. 16
Hart, Judith 56 F Sc Lanark 5139 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 21
Hattersley, Roy 48 M WM Birmingham Sparkbrook 8319 ASTMS Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Haynes, Frank 54 M EM Ashfield 7797 NUM Ind. Uni. Pro. 1
Healey, Denis 63 M N Leeds East 10536 None Man. Multi. Pro. 28
Heffer, Eric 58 M N Liverpool Walton 7558 ASW Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Hogg, Norman 42 M Sc East Dunbartonshire 2324 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Holland, Stuart 40 M L Lambeth Vauxhall 4700 ASTMS Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Home Robertson, J 32 M Sc Berwick & East Lothian 1673 None Man. Multi. Pro. 1
Homewood, W 60 M EM Kettering 1478 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Hooley, Frank 57 M N Sheffield Heeley 4773 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Horam, John 41 M N Gateshead West 8312 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Howell, Denis 57 M WM Birmingham Small Heath 11467 APEX Man. Multi. Pro. 19
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Hudson Davies, G 51 M W Caerphilly 18497 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Huckfield, Leslie 38 M WM Nuneaton 7688 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 13
Hughes, Robert 48 M Sc Aberdeen North 19114 AEF Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Hughes, Roy 55 M W Newport 9177 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Hughes, William 48 M N Durham 11237 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Janner, Grenville 52 M EM Leicester West 8838 NUJ Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Jay, Douglas 73 M L Wandsworth Battersea Nth 6476 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 34
John, Brynmor 46 M W Glamorganshire Pontypridd 15687 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Johnson, James 72 M N Kingston Upon Hull West 8158 NUGMW Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Johnson, Walter 63 M EM Derby South 6092 TSSA Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Jones, Daniel 72 M N Burnley 6110 AUEW Ind. Multi. Pro. 21
Jones, Barry 42 M W Flintshire East Flint 6273 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Jones, Alec 56 M W Rhondda 31481 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 13
Kaufman, Gerald 50 M N Manchester Ardwick 7272 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Kerr, Russell 59 M L Hounslow, Feltham & Heston 4105 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Kilroy-Silk, Robert 38 M N Ormskirk 858 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Kinnock, Neil 38 M W Monmouthshire Bedwellty 20436 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Lambie, David 55 M Sc Ayrshire Central 11704 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Lamborn, Harry 65 M L Southwark Peckham 10811 USDAW Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Lamond, James 52 M N Oldham East 4632 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Leadbitter, Ted 61 M N Hartlepool 8162 NUPE Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Leighton, Ronald 50 M L Newham North East 10040 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 1
Lestor, Joan 50 F S Eton & Slough 1340 GMWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 14
Lewis, Arthur 63 M L Newham North West 10455 NUGMW Ind. Uni. Anti. 35
Lewis, Ronald 71 M N Carlisle 4566 NUR Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Litherland, Robert 50 M N Manchester Central 5992 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Lofthouse, Geoffrey 55 M N Pontefract & Castleford 19901 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Lyon, Alexander 49 M N York 1250 None Ind. Uni. Pro. 14
Lyons, Edward 54 M N Bradford West 7755 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 14
Mabon, Dickson 55 M Sc Greenock & Port Glasgow 11282 None Man. Multi. Pro. 25
McCartney, Hugh 60 M Sc Dunbartonshire Central 12003 NGWU Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
McDonald, Oonagh 42 F S Thurrock 6419 ASTMS Tri. Uni. Anti. 4
McElhone, Frank 51 M Sc Glasgow Queens Park 9478 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 11
McGuire, Michael 54 M N Lancashire Ince 14336 NUM Man. Multi. Pro. 16
McKay, Allen 53 M N Yorks. W. Riding, Penistone 9701 NUM Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
McKelvey, William 46 M Sc Kilmarnock 11467 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
McMahon, Andrew 60 M Sc Glasgow Govan 8488 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
McNally, Tom 37 M N Stockport South 1125 None Man. Multi. Pro. 1
McNamara, Kevin 46 M N Kingston upon Hull Central 7593 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 14
McTaggart, Robert 35 M Sc Glasgow Central 2780 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
McWilliam, John 39 M N Blaydon 8509 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Mackenzie, James 53 M Sc Lanarkshire Rutherglen 8023 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Maclennan, Robert 44 M Sc Caithness & Sutherland 2539 None Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Martin, Michael 35 M Sc Glasgow Springburn 12771 NUPE Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
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Magee, Bryan 50 M L Waltham Forest Leyton 4403 None Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Marks, Kenneth 60 M N Manchester Gorton 6284 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 13
Marshall, Edmund 40 M N Goole 11251 None Man. Multi. Pro. 9
Marshall, David 39 M Sc Glasgow Shettleston 9161 TGWU Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Marshall, James 39 M EM Leicester South 1998 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Mason, Roy 56 M N Barnsley 22622 None Man. Multi. Pro. 27
Maxton, John 44 M Sc Glasgow Cathcart 1600 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Maynard, Joan 59 F N Sheffield Brightside 17693 NUAAW Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Meacher, Michael 41 M N Oldham West 5777 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Mellish, Robert 67 M L Bermondsey Southwark 11756 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 34
Mikardo, Ian 72 M L Twr Hamlets, Bethnal Gn, Bow 7554 ASTMS Tri. Uni. Anti. 35
Millan, Bruce 53 M Sc Glasgow Craigton 10472 None Man. Multi. Pro. 21
Miller, Maurice 60 M Sc East Kilbride 14273 MPU Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Mitchell, Austin 46 M N Grimsby 6241 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Mitchell, Richard 53 M S Southampton Itchen 1602 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 9
Morris, Alfred 52 M N Manchester Wythenshawe 12113 NUGMW Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Morris, Charles 54 M N Manchester Openshaw 7144 UPOW Ind. Multi. Anti. 17
Morris, John 49 M W Aberavon 18973 None Man. Multi. Pro. 21
Morton, George 40 M N Manchester Moss Side 4531 Mus. Union Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Moyle, Roland 52 M L Lewisham East 1593 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Mulley, Frederick 62 M N Sheffield Park 20324 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 30
Newens, Arthur Stan 50 M L Harlow 1392 NUT Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Oakes, Gordon 49 M N Lancashire Widnes 10281 None Man. Multi. Pro. 9
O'Halloran, Michael 52 M L Islington North 4456 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 11
O'Neill, Martin 35 M Sc Clackmannan & E Stirlingshire 984 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 1
Ogden, Eric 57 M N Liverpool West Derby 8220 None Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Orme, Stanley 57 M N Salford West 7254 AEU Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Owen, David 42 M S Plymouth Devonport 1001 ASTMS Man. Multi. Pro. 14
Palmer, Arthur 68 M S Bristol North East 5652 None Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Park, George 66 M WM Coventry North East 10523 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Parker, John 74 M L Dagenham Barking 10107 None Man. Multi. Pro. 45
Parry, Robert 47 M N Liverpool Scotland Exchange 11656 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Pavitt, Laurence 66 M L Brent South 11616 MPU Ind. Uni. Anti. 21
Pendry, Tom 46 M N Stalybridge & Hyde 6580 NUPE Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Powell, Raymond 52 M W Ogmore 16087 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Prescott, John 42 M N Kingston Upon Hull 23692 NUS Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Price, Christopher 48 M L Lewisham West 1050 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Race, Denys 33 M L Haringey Wood Green 2515 NUPE Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Radice, Giles 44 M N Durham Chester le Street 22560 GMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 7
Rees, Merlyn 60 M N Leeds South 14330 None Man. Multi. Pro. 17
Richardson, Jo 57 F L Barking 7008 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Roberts, Albert 72 M N Normanton 12193 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 29
Roberts, Allan 37 M N Bootle 15159 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Roberts, Ernie 68 M L Hackney N & Stoke Newington 5221 AUEW Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
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Roberts, Gwilym 52 M WM Cannock 7346 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Robertson, George 40 M Sc Lanarkshire Hamilton 14799 GMWU Man. Multi. Pro. 1
Robinson, Geoffrey 41 M WM Coventry North West 3971 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 4
Rodgers, William 52 M N Teeside Stockton 11127 None Man. Multi. Pro. 18
Rooker, Jeffrey 39 M WM Birmingham Perry Bar 491 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Roper, John 45 M N Farnworth, Lancashire 8107 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Ross, Ernest 38 M Sc Dundee West 10457 AUEW Tri. Uni. Anti. 1
Rowlands, Edward 40 M W Merthyr-Tydfil 17960 None Man. Multi. Pro. 8
Ryman, John 49 M N Blyth 7060 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
Sandelson, Neville 57 M L Hillingdon, Hayes, Harlington 3302 None Man. Multi. Pro. 9
Sever, Eric 37 M WM Birmingham Ladywood 7759 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Sheerman, Barry 40 M N Huddersfield East 3095 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Sheldon, Robert 57 M N Ashton Under Lyne 8379 None Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Shore, Peter 56 M L Twr Hamlets, Stepney, Poplar 13015 TGWU Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Short, Renee 61 M WM Wolverhampton North East 6060 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Silkin, John 57 M L Lewisham Deptford 7753 TGWU Tri. Uni. Anti. 17
Silkin, Samuel 62 M L Southwark Dulwich 122 None Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Silverman, Julius 75 M WM Birmingham Erdington 680 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 25
Skinner, Dennis 48 M EM Bolsover 17379 NUM Tri. Uni. Anti. 10
Smith, John 42 M Sc Lanarkshire North 10820 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Snape, Peter 38 M WM West Bromwich East 1971 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Soley, Clive 41 M L Hammersmith North 3506 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
Spearing, Nigel 50 M L Newham South 12773 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Spriggs, Leslie 70 M N St Helens 15555 NUR Ind. Uni. Anti. 22
Stallard, Albert 59 M L Camden, St Pancras North 5446 AUEW Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Stoddart, David 54 M S Swindon 5899 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Stott, Roger 37 M N Lancashire Westhoughton 5287 POEU Man. Uni. Anti. 7
Strang, Gavin 37 M Sc Edinburgh East 8817 None Tri. Uni. Pro. 10
Straw, Jack 34 M N Blackburn 5490 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 1
Summerskill, Shirley 49 F N Halifax 1234 MPU Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Taylor, Ann 33 F N Bolton West 600 None Man. Uni. Anti. 6
Thomas, Jeffrey 47 M W Monmouth Abertillery 17085 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Thomas, Mike 36 M N Newcastle-upon-Tyne East 6170 USDAW Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Thomas, Roger 55 M W Carmarthen 1978 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Thorne, Stanley 62 M N Preston South 621 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 6
Tilley, John 39 M L Lambeth Central 5976 TGWU Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Tinn, James 58 M N Teeside Redcar 8053 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Torney, Thomas 65 M N Bradford South 4318 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 10
Urwin, Thomas 68 M N Durham Houghton le Spring 21076 AUBTW Man. Multi. Pro. 16
Varley, Eric 48 M EM Chesterfield 13604 NUM Man. Multi. Anti. 16
Wainwright, Edwin 72 M N Dearne Valley West Riding 22735 NUM Man. Multi. Pro. 21
Walker, Harold 53 M N Doncaster 2976 AEU Ind. Uni. Anti. 16
Watkins, David 55 M N Durham Consett 15867 AEUW Ind. Uni. Anti. 14
Weetch, Kenneth 47 M S Ipswich 3741 None Man. Multi. Anti. 6
192
Wellbeloved, James 54 M L Bexley, Erith & Crayford 2733 None Man. Multi. Pro. 15
Welsh, Michael 54 M N Don Valley 17360 NUM Ind. Multi. Pro. 1
White, Frank 41 M N Bury & Radcliffe 38 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
White, James 58 M Sc Glasgow Pollok 8492 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 10
Whitehead, Phillip 43 M N Derby North 214 None Man. Multi. Pro. 10
Whitlock, William 62 M EM Nottingham North 3072 USDAW Ind. Multi. Pro. 25
Willey, Fred 70 M N Sunderland North 12902 None Man. Multi. Pro. 30
Williams, Alan 50 M W Swansea West 401 NUT Ind. Multi. Pro. 16
Williams, William 65 M N Warrington 10274 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 19
Wilson, Harold 64 M N Lancashire Huyton 7510 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 35
Wilson, William 67 M WM Coventry South East 7486 None Tri. Uni. Anti. 16
Winnick, David 47 M WM Walsall North 5866 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 1
Woodall, Alec 62 M N Hemsworth 26043 None Ind. Multi. Pro. 6
Woolmer, Kenneth 40 M N Batley & Morley 5352 None Man. Multi. Pro. 1
Wright, Sheila 55 F WM Birmingham Handsworth 3209 None Ind. Multi. Anti. 1
Wrigglesworth, Ian 51 M N Teeside Thornaby 5524 NUT Man. Multi. Pro. 6
Young, David 50 M N Bolton East 1852 None Ind. Uni. Anti. 6
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Foot emerged victorious from the election campaign. It was a result that shifted the short 
term future of the Labour Party away from continued threats of constitutional reform from 
the outside left. With Foot as Party leader, Benn could no longer feel as comfortable as the 
most significant voice of the left, given Foot's popularity. Had Healey been victorious, then 
no such restraint would have existed, making a Benn challenge under the electoral college 
more likely. Such a challenge would not have favoured Healey, leading to an alternative 
history for the Labour Party, which would favour the new SDP.
Foot had secured 139 votes against Healey's 129 (Harris, 1984, p.143). Immediately after the 
announcement of the result Healey alienated his ideological supporters by announcing he 
would serve as Foot's deputy. For Owen, this was the moment when a breakaway party  
became an inevitability because Healey appeared unwilling to support his colleagues in 
voicing  the  social  democratic  opposition  to  any  potential  left-wing  leader.  Instead  he 
appeared subservient and powerless (Owen, 1991, p.458). Despite Foot representing an ideal 
of left-wing philosophy that differed to that of Benn, Foot still supported policies which the  
social  democrats  were  unable  to  accept.  These  policies  were  withdrawal  from  the 
Common Market, unilateral nuclear disarmament and a broad support for the alternative 
economic strategy. Despite Foot's character and relative 'soft left' nature when contrasted 
to that of the outside left, the small group of social democrat defectors began to make 
plans for an alternative platform on which to campaign. However, they made no official 
moves until after the Special Conference in January 1981. 
It is now necessary to consider the composition of the vote in closer detail. By doing so, it  
becomes possible to understand from where Foot's electoral support base derived.
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______________________________________________________________________________________
What were the group distributions for each candidate?
______________________________________________________________________________________
Manifesto Group Tribune Group Independents
Foot 10 50 70
Healey 76 3 40
______________________________________________________________________________________
Assuming the orthodox view that Foot would be expected to secure the votes of all Tribune 
Group members,  and Healey would  be expected to  secure  the votes  of  all  Manifesto 
Group  members,  then  the  data  has  demonstrated  that  Foot  was  able  to  subvert  this 
assumption by securing the votes of 10 Manifesto Group members. In contrast, Healey 
was only able to secure the support of 3 Tribune Group members. This can be attributed to 
a selection of factors. These include the unique circumstances faced by the Labour Party  
at the time of the leadership vote,the potential for future defectors to vote for Foot in the  
hope of inflaming the disputes within the Party, and also Healey alienating potential voters 
by his hesitation to campaign to their expectations. It must also be noted that Foot was 
granted the endorsement of the majority of MP's who were independent of any ideological 
group. 
Foot's vote was enhanced because the PLP chose the candidate most likely to prevent 
any  future  challenge  that  would  potentially  usher  in  a  Bennite  leadership.  This  fear,  
however was not the only issue which prevented the PLP from turning to Healey. It must 
be  remembered  that  Healey's  brash  style  of  campaigning  had  alienated  some  social 
democrats. Healey's 'arrogance' of assumed votes pushed them away,  forcing them to 
conclude that Healey had taken their support for granted. Healey expected their votes, and 
so saw no reason to spend vital time campaigning for them. 
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John Cartwright, it is thought, was the MP who said flatly 'your answers have been 
very unsatisfactory'. There are an awful lot of us. Why should we vote for you?' And 
Healey answered bluntly 'You have nowhere else to go' (Pearce, 1997, p.230).
This arrogance also helped lay the foundations for a splintering of social democrats into a  
new party, thus undermining Labour future unity. It is an irony that it was Healey's direct 
actions, not Foot's, that led to the splintering within the Party for which Foot's election is  
often attributed.
Regardless of the voting behaviour of the Manifesto and Tribune Group members, the 
significance of the Independents must be considered. On this issue, Healey secured 40 
votes whilst Foot secured 70. This is a significant endorsement for Foot from those of no 
ideological  group  membership.  This  illustrates  further  Healey's  failure  to  secure  the 
support  of  the  broadly  termed  centrists.  Foot  was  a  known  Tribunite,  and  a  familiar 
commodity  amongst  his  colleagues,  whilst  the  Manifesto  Group was  a  much  younger 
group,  with  little  pedigree  within  the  PLP  and  so  possessed  limited  familiarity  to  the 
Independents. The Independents clearly held the balance of power within the PLP, and so 
regardless of the ideological disputes between left and right, they selected a leader who 
they believed would be most likely to maintain the status quo. Pearce (1997) suggests that 
Healey may have, in fact have proven to be a more divisive force
If Healey had been outspoken from the Labour right, would he have reconciled 
rather fraught people like Neville Sandelson and Tom Ellis who are thought to have 
voted for Foot to bring on the fever? One doubts it. Would he have scared off a  
larger  number than that  group of  about  five  by heightening the panic  of  those 
already running scared? On balance, Healey had more to lose from the mice than 
the rats (Pearce, 1997, p.253).
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Far  from being the  reconciler  which  the  Labour  Party  found in  Foot,  Healey  had the 
potential,  Pearce  argues,  to  aggravate  further  those  irritated  by  the  advances  of  the 
outside left. It must be remembered that unlike many of the social democrats within the 
Manifesto Group and the inside left within the Tribune Group, the Independents operate as 
a homogeneous group. Rather, they were a collection of individuals of differing priorities.  
Collectively their vote had the ability to sway the result. 
The main battle, however, was for the votes of MP's who had no strong political 
alignment, but were torn between their desire for a quiet life and their desire to at 
least hold their own seats at the next election (Healey, 1989, p.477). 
Had Healey sought to make greater penetrations into this group rather than alienating his  
own potential  voters,  then his potential  for success would have improved. Given these 
factors, it was Foot who they broadly turned to.
______________________________________________________________________________________






The issue of nuclear disarmament was very close to Foot's political  heart,  and so his 
position  could be expected to have affected the election result.  Yet,  given Foot's likely 
inability  to  enact  his  preference within  the  shadow cabinet,  the  issue  possessed  less 
relevance than either  the Group membership or  the Common Market  issue.  It  should, 
however be included because of the importance to which Foot placed the issue. The PLP 
were aware that Foot, even as leader, would be highly unlikely to be given an opportunity  
or the support he needed to succeed in implementing a unilateralist policy at Parliamentary 
level.  Indeed,  the  PLP  had  a  larger  number  of  multilateralist  than  unilateralist  MP's, 
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thereby ensuring a unilateralist bill would be unlikely to pass through the Commons were it 
ever to be placed before them. Given this reduced practical political  impact,  the issue 
played only a symbolic role within the electoral processes. The symbolism of a unilateralist  
as the Labour leader did possess electoral  impact  and so must be considered in any 
analysis  of  Foot's  political  career.  Foot's  unilateralism  was  a  declaration  of  political 
principle  in  favour  of  nuclear  disarmament,  contrasted  with  the  social  democrats  and 
especially to Healey, highlighting a clear difference of view between the two candidates. 
Foot's ability to attract the votes of 25 multilateralists demonstrates an improbable success 
for  the  unilateralist  issue.  Healey's  ability  to  secure  the votes  of  14 unilateralists  also 
demonstrates, yet  in smaller figures, that the issue of nuclear disarmament possessed 
reduced impact upon members' voting decisions. Unilateralism was not, however, merely 
symbolic  to  Foot.  Rather,  he  believed  passionately  in  the  issue  as  a  committed 
unilateralist,  and would express this position throughout his period as leader. This also 
ensured that during the leadership election, there was no issue of ambiguity and that those 
who  voted  for  Foot  were  fully  aware  of  his  position  on  the  issue.  However,  broadly 
speaking both candidates were able to secure the votes of the bulk of their ideological  
bedfellows. Given Heppell's approach appears to rely on ideological pigeon holes for each 
individual  MP,  the  deviations  illustrate  the  limitations  of  assuming  a  one  size  fits  all  
mentality.
______________________________________________________________________________________
How was the Pro and Anti Common Market vote distributed for each candidate?
______________________________________________________________________________________





Foot's long-standing view regarding the Common Market was one of British withdrawal, 
and he retained this position despite the decision of the electorate to remain members of  
the Common Market following the 1975 referendum  (Heffernan, 2000, p.391). The potential 
perception for such a view disregarding the referendum did not prevent Foot attracting the 
votes of 29 pro Common Marketeers, whilst Healey secured the votes of 26 anti-Common 
Marketeers. Both figures represent a significant number of MP's who would have been 
expected to have voted for their opposing candidate. Pro-Common Marketeers were more 
secure in their position given the result of the recent referendum had been in their favour,  
reducing  the  chances  of  Foot  succeeding  in  securing  Britain's  withdrawal  from  the 
Common Market. Had Foot pushed for and succeeded in gaining a second referendum, it  
is unlikely to have reversed the decision of the earlier result, thereby keeping Britain within 
the Common Market. With this in mind, the Party benefits of a Foot leadership outweighed 
the potential for Britain's relationship with the Common Market being changed. In addition,  
as with the nuclear issue, had Foot become Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliamentary 
procedures  would  have  ensured  that  Foot's  position  could  not  become  a  reality.  
Considering these issues, it can be argued that the issue of Britain withdrawing from the 
Common Market under a Foot Premiership possessed limited impact. Rather, the benefits 
of  Foot's  leadership  to  the  cohesion  of  the  Labour  Party  outweighed  the  issues  of 
European integration  and the  debates  concerning  the  virtues  of  Britain's  membership. 
Electoralism and intra-party management diluted ideological determinism, therefore, in the 
choices made by individual MP's.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Did this affect the leadership result?
______________________________________________________________________________________
It  can  not  be  assumed  that  those  MP's  who  voted  for  Callaghan  also voted  for  his 
ideological successor. Broadly speaking, Foot attracted a comparable ideological support  
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base to those who voted for him in 1976. However, the same suggestion can not be made 
for Healey.  Leo Abse, Ronald Brown, Ian Campbell,  Tam Dalyell,  John Fraser, James 
Hamilton, Peter Hardy, Neville Sandelson, and Harold Wilson had voted for Callaghan in 
1976. However, in 1980 the context of the previous general election affected the voting 
behaviour of the PLP. Those who shifted position from the social democratic candidate to  
support Foot in the final ballot did so because they had the potential to affect the result by  
their combined action. Had they voted for Healey, Foot would not have become Labour 
leader. Healey emphasises this voting behaviour by arguing that his defeat was the result  
of mavericks voting for Foot rather than voting for him  (Healey, 1989, p.478). 
Yet Abse, Campbell, Fraser, Hamilton, and Wilson - the mavericks, as Healey called them 
-  were not a member of any campaign group and so had the luxury of switching their vote.  
These MP's were a part of the vital centre ground which the candidates must appeal to in  
order to win the contest, and Foot was able to garner their support. As discussed in the 
previous chapter however, figures within the left had voted for Callaghan for what they 
believed  to  be  the  electoral  benefit  of  the  Party.  However,  this  could  not  be  said  of 
Sandelson, who voted for Foot believing this would hasten a destructive side effect rather  
than act as a conciliatory influence upon the Party. Owen confirmed this tactic had been 
used, remarking that
...some on the right had deliberately abstained or even voted for Michael Foot in the 
belief that it was better to bring all the Party's problems to a head by electing Michael 
Foot (Owen, 1991, p.458).
The Manifesto Group was under ongoing pressure from within to make a stand against all  
advances of the left, yet felt alienated by Healey's complacency. The Group later provided 
key defectors to the SDP. These were individuals who Healey would have expected to 
have supported him in the leadership election. 
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Foot's election as leader needed the support of a significant number of centrist and social 
democratic MP's as well as supporters from the left. Most turned to Foot in order to offer 
him a positive endorsement to hold Labour together during the cataclysmic implosion of 
bitter ideological debates. With the outside left apparently in the ascendancy in the Party  
beyond Parliament, the PLP turned to Foot to guide the Party. Healey had shown himself  
to be a potentially de-stablising leader, who faced the threat of a leadership election by 
Benn in the new year. His earlier attitude also alienated his supporters more extensively 
than he initially comprehended. He had lost the emotional support of vital social democrats 
such as David Owen because he simply had not shown the will to fight (Owen, 1991, p.458). 
An  illustration  would  be  whilst  Foot  was  happy  to  write  an  article  for  The  Guardian 
attacking  Thatcher's  government,  Healey  declined  to  do  likewise  (Jones,  1994,  p.452). 
Healey's brash style and unwillingness to "peddle bullshit" had contributed towards him 
making "quite a few" enemies  (Pearce, 2002, p.538; BBC, 1995). Foot was also a candidate 
who  represented an almost  romantic  era of   Labour  socialism; the era of  Bevan,  the 
intellectual rather than dogmatic left and ethical Parliamentary socialism (New Statesman, 2 
April 1976, p.422; Harris, 1984, p.143). This appealed to those wishing to made a stand against 
the  outside  left.  The  rise  of  groups  such  as  the  CLPD  had  portrayed  the  left  as 
constitutionalists with a zeal for power and revenge over the Parliamentary Party, whilst  
Foot was of the intellectual left who respected the vital role and sanctity of Parliament. The 
gradual rise of the outside left had also fostered a broad sense of detachment from the 
Labour  Party  by  a  small  group of  social  democrats  as  illustrated  by Jenkins'  stirrings 
towards a new centrist Party. Jenkins had become disillusioned with the advances of the 
outside left  over the course of the 1970s, arguing that "the disputes about who should  
elect the party leader and who should prepare the party manifesto raise wider questions 
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than can be solved by a simple defensive battle within the Labour Party"  (Jenkins,  1982, 
p.25). The Jenkins lecture called for a re-assessment of the British political system, and 
whether  proportional  representation  would  produce  a  more  realistic  representation  of 
voting intentions amongst the electorate. A further question concentrated on whether a 
small Labour Party constituency had the right to de-select the representative mandated by 
a majority of the electorate (ibid). Underpinning the mood amongst some social democrats 
was the belief "that the old Croslandite assumption that the purpose of social democracy 
was to increase the social wage25 as rapidly as possible... had collapsed" within the Labour 
Party because of the outside left  (Tracy, 1983, pp.40-41). As a result, remaining within the 
Labour Party became increasingly difficult for some social democrats.
Heppell's approach places ideological analysis at the centre of any analysis of MP's voting 
behaviour.  However,  given  the  inadequacy  of  this  simple  understanding  of  voting 
motivations,  the  following  discussion  introduces  variables  which  Heppell's  approach 
excludes.  Despite  the  clear  relevance  of  ideology,  these  other  factors  must  also  be 
included in order to produce a meaningful analysis of the vote. 
________________________________________________________________________
1: What variations in MP's majorities were evident in the voting behaviour?
________________________________________________________________________
(1): 2,000 or less (2): 2,001-5,999 (3): 6,000-11,999 (4): 12,000+
Healey 17 25 51 26
Foot 20 28 46 36
________________________________________________________________________
Within the first field relating to the size of an MP's majority in the above table, Healey  
secured 46 per cent whilst Foot secured 54 per cent of the vote. This field represents MP's 
who can be characterised as being in the ultra-marginal seats, and are considered to be at 
25 The social wage is defined as additional benefits above and beyond an employees wage. These can include medical services, tax 
credits and free services such as education and social welfare.
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a high  risk  of  losing  their  seats.  With  the  majority  of  these MP's  favouring  Foot,  this  
demonstrates that they believed him most likely to be an electoral benefit to themselves 
given  their  potentially  precarious  electoral  position.  With  MP's  also  relying  upon  the 
support  of  their  CLPs to  effectively  operate  and campaign during  elections,  it  can be 
argued that MP's potentially voted for the candidate which constituency members, rather 
than they themselves as individuals, preferred to lead the Party. This being the case, MP's  
potentially acted as delegates for their CLPs, voting for either Healey or Foot respectively  
dependant upon local whims. 
The second field relating to the size of an MP's majority continues to illustrate that Foot 
appears to be the preferred candidate of MP's with a potentially marginal majority. Whilst 
Foot enjoyed the support of 53 per cent, Healey found support amongst 47 per cent of 
MP's within this category. Within the third field of the majority table, the position shifted 
with Healey securing 52.5 per cent whilst Foot secured 47.5 per cent of the vote. This field  
represents  MP's  who  can  be  characterised  as  being  in  the  marginal  seats,  and  are 
considered to be at moderate to minimal risk of losing their seats. The shift within this field 
towards Healey suggests that they felt  he, rather than Foot,  would be the leader most 
likely to secure their positions. This suggests that MP's within moderate risk of losing their  
seats felt that Foot may have been a greater electoral liability than Healey. MP's within this  
category potentially also enjoyed greater autonomy than those with a reduced majority 
given their safer position, and so potentially become less inclined to act as a constituency 
delegate. 
Within the fourth field of the majority table, Healey secured 39 per cent whilst Foot secured 
61 per cent of the vote. This field represents MP's who can be characterised as being in  
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the safer seats, and are not considered to be at risk of losing them. This field represents 
Healey's lowest support rating, whilst representing Foot's highest. This shift towards Foot  
suggests that those who are at a very limited chance of losing their seats favoured Foot.  
Without the risk of electoral challenge, the greater number of MP's in this field are less  
likely to pay as much attention to electoralism. They would be more inclined to select a 
leader who placed party interests ahead of electoral advancement.
These figures indicate a shift towards Foot in the marginal seats, towards Healey in the 
moderately marginal seats, and back to Foot in the safer seats. This is indicative of MP's  
belief that Healey was the leader most likely to appeal to MP's who are at moderate risk of  
losing their seats, whilst Foot is the preferred candidate of those with higher risk or safer 
seats. However, it must be noted that no single variable was all determining in relation to 
the voting behaviour of MP's. It  was a complex combination of, for example the ideas, 
individual circumstances faced by each MP within their constituency, and also potential 
future re-election concerns which affected an MP's vote. 
________________________________________________________________________





Foot secured the support of 53.5 per cent whilst Healey secured the support of 46.5 per 
cent of trade union MP's. Healey's role in the previous Labour government, which had 
culminated in the so called  winter of discontent,  had reduced Healey's potential support 
amongst  the  trade  union  movement  and,  importantly  amongst  the  rank  and  file 
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membership within the CLPs. Given these had come under greater influence from the 
dictates of the outside left since the general election defeat, the MP's with trade union  
affiliations became less inclined to vote for the former Chancellor to be their new leader. 
Knowing the alienation and resentment which had grown between the former government 
and the trade unions following the demise of the Social Contract, the policies of income 
restraint  and  the  fallout  which  occurred  as  a  result,  trade  union  MP's  instead  turned 
towards Foot. Foot had worked well with the unions following Labour's first electoral victory 
in 1974, and helped successfully resolve the ministers dispute. In the 1976 leadership 
election, Callaghan secured the vote of the majority (51.5 per cent) whilst Foot secured the 
minority (48.5 per cent) of trade union MP's. This shift towards Foot reflects both his ability 
to successfully work with the unions, as well as the dis-satisfaction with Healey following 
on from the period of industrial action which characterises the winter of discontent. 
However, given the narrow nature of the vote split, the shift in support towards Foot should 
not be overstated.  The difference of 6 per cent between the two candidates does not  
suggest  a  landslide  endorsement.  Indeed,  given  the  trade  unions  disagreements  with  
those on the inside  left,  such as  Barbara  Castle  regarding  In  Place of  Strife and the 
defence they received from Healey's political ally, Callaghan, it must be concluded that the 
support  Foot  received  from  the  union  affiliated  MP's  were  as  a  result  of  the  unique 
circumstances taking place within the Labour Party at the time, particularly relating to the 
constitutional reforms being pushed forward by the outside left.
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________________________________________________________________________










Healey attracted the support of 43 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 57 per cent  
of  MP's  with  shorter  length  of  service.  In  terms  of  determining  the  vote  distribution 
amongst longer and shorter serving MP's, it is the shorter serving MP's who comprised the 
larger of the two groups. It is from the shorter serving MP's from where Foot's key support 
was derived, this suggesting that his support derived from less experienced members of 
the PLP. It is likely, as noted by Shaw (1988) that the earlier abolition of the proscribed list  
had enabled the "b-list of available Parliamentary candidates" to become Labour MP's by 
the time of Foot's election (Shaw, 1988, p.65). The so called "b-list" consisted of prospective 
and  successful  candidates  during  the  1970s  who  held  outside  left  sympathies  whose 
raison d'être was to oppose the social democratic dominance of the PLP. The implication 
being that the newer MP's possessed stronger left-wing sympathies,  and so would be 
more inclined to vote for Foot over Healey. 
In contrast, Healey attracted the support of 57 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 
43 per cent of longer serving MP's. This suggests that the longer serving MP's felt that 
Healey  rather  than  Foot  would  have  the  greater  success  in  leading  the  Party.  The 
implication also suggests that Foot's support  from longer serving MP's was lower than 
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Healey's because their experience and potential careers within the PLP restrained their 
ability to break away from a traditional social  democratic leadership in favour of Foot's 
inside left credentials. Having seen the development of the Labour Party over a longer 
time frame, their preference to remain with the status quo suggests an inert conservatism 
amongst some members of the PLP. With Foot deriving his support from shorter serving 
MP's whilst Healey gained his support from longer serving MP's, it must be concluded that 
the length of service of an MP affected the candidate to whom they gave support. Again, 
however it must be considered a contributory rather than decisive factor. Longer serving 
MP's tended towards more right-wing positions. In the north, Scotland and Wales they had 
been there for a long time before the outside leftist surge, and had origins within CLPs 
which  had run  local  councils,  therefore  providing  them with  a  less  idealistic  tendency 
towards political philosophy.
________________________________________________________________________















With Foot pioneering the legislation for devolution in the previous Parliament, the issue of  
Scottish representation must  be considered when evaluating the anatomy of  the vote. 
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Healey attracted the support of 32.5 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 67.5 per  
cent of MP's representing Scottish seats. This indicates a much greater support base for 
Foot from the Scottish nation, and carries with it an implication of support from Scottish 
Labour  MP's  for  Foot's  views  regarding  devolution.  This,  however  assumes  that  the 
growing issue of devolution was a significant consideration for Scottish MP's,  many of  
whom were also likely to be drawn from the inside left. Indeed, when taken in isolation, 
Foot attracted the support of 7 Scottish Tribune Group MP's whilst  Healey attracted 0. 
Foot also attracted the support of 19 Scottish Independent MP's whilst Healey attracted 
the support  of  4.  Healey was only able to gain the support  of the majority of  Scottish 
Manifesto Group members, securing 9 MP's against Foot's 1. These figures demonstrate 
Foot's broad ideological appeal in Scotland remained consistently high amongst Tribune 
Group and, most importantly Independent MP's. When combined, this also indicates that 
Scotland was represented by more Manifesto Group MP's rather than Tribune Group MP's 
whilst  the  majority  remained  independent  of  any  group,  again  demonstrating  the 
dominance of the non-aligned vote. It  is worth remembering that Foot had also gained 
greater support  from Scottish MP's in the 197626 leadership election, and so posses a 
tendency to gravitate towards him regardless of devolution. However, Foot's support from 
Scottish MP's had increased from 57.5 per cent in 1976 (43 per cent nationally) to 67.5 per  
cent in 1980 (52 per cent nationally). These figures reveal that Foot's share of the vote 
increased by approximately the same in Scotland when compared to the national average.  
However, the additional percentage points towards a slight increase in his support base in 
Scotland. It must be remembered, however that his support in Scotland remained high in  
both  leadership  elections,  and that  his  increase  in  support  was  in  line  with  the  trend 
throughout the rest of the United Kingdom.
26 The Labour Party had increased its representation in Scotland at the 1979 general election.
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Healey attracted the support of 52.6 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 47.4 per  
cent of MP's representing Welsh seats. This is a significant increase upon Foot's support 
from the 1976 leadership election, when he gained the support of only 32 per cent. Again, 
this increase of support for Foot implies a tacit support for his performance in government. 
The  inverse  can  also  be  concluded  regarding  Healey's  support,  who  reduced  the 
percentage of support for the social democrats from 68 per cent in 1976 to 52.6 per cent in  
1980. Although Healey was able to secure the greater number of votes from Welsh MP's, 
he had failed to retain the significant margin between Callaghan and Foot. This failure 
prevented  Healey  from gaining  the  support  he  needed  in  order  to  prevent  Foot  from 
becoming leader. Therefore this should be considered to be a successful swing towards 
Foot, although Healey's strong showing might suggest that Welsh MP's did not see Foot in 
national terms despite Ebbw Vale.
Foot's  ideological  vote  in  Wales  derived  mainly  from Tribune  and  Independent  MP's, 
having secured the support of 5 Tribune Group, 4 Independent and 1 Manifesto Group 
MP's. Healey was able to secure the support of 5 Manifesto Group, 4 Independent and 0  
Tribune Group MP's.  Broadly,  therefore, both candidates produced a like-for-like result 
relating to the ideological group membership.
Healey attracted the support of 50.7 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 49.3 per  
cent of MP's representing English seats. Again, Foot increased his support by 4 per cent 
since the 1976 leadership election, however in the immediate term, this result represents a 
broadly even split in England between Healey and Foot. With England providing an even 
division between the two candidates, it must therefore be concluded that Foot's nationwide 
support  and distribution of votes derived mainly from the votes of Scottish and Welsh 
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MP's, with Scotland providing the greater support for Foot in terms of percentages. Had 
the Scottish votes favoured Healey, then the balance of support would have tipped in his 
favour. However, the role of the English vote can not be discounted. Granted, it produced 
an even division between the two candidates, but the composition of the English vote is 
likely to reveal issues of regional variation which may impact upon the vote. 
________________________________________________________________________
8: How many MP's representing Northern, Southern, East Midlands, 
West Midlands or London seats voted for Healey or Foot?
________________________________________________________________________
Nth Sth EM WM L
Healey 51 (49%) 5 (55.5%) 8 (57%) 12 (52%) 20 (50%)
Foot 53 (51%) 4 (44.5%) 6 (43%) 11 (48%) 20 (50%)
________________________________________________________________________
The above figures reveal that, with the exception of the north of England, Healey was, in 
terms of percentages, the preferred choice of English MP's. Only in the north did Foot gain  
the greater support than Healey, and barely so. It must be noted, however that the north  
represents the heartlands of the English Labour vote. Northern MP's represented 104 of  
the above votes,  whilst  the combined vote of MP's from other regions represented 86 
seats, and so it was the north where the balance of the English vote resided. With Foot 
securing the greater number of votes from the north, and combining his support from the 
Scottish and Welsh nations, it can be concluded that the national distribution of Foot's vote  
derived from MP's who represented seats outside of the middle England characteristic. 
In England, Foot secured the support of 38 Tribune Group, 8 Manifesto Group, and 49 
Independent MP's. Healey secured the support of 3 Tribune Group, 62 Manifesto Group 
and 30 Independent MP's. The Manifesto Group has stronger support in England than the 
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Tribune Group. The main strength of the groups can be found in the north, where the 
Tribune Group had 21 MP's whilst the Manifesto Group had 38. Both are subsequently  
overtaken  by  the  45  northern  Independent  MP's.  Consequently,  the  main  ideological 
strength in England alone favoured the social democrats rather than the inside left. 
Throughout the rest of England, the divisions of ideological support for each candidate 
within the regions remained broadly in favour of the Manifesto Group. London, for example 
had 14 Manifesto Group MP's against 8 Tribune Group MP's. Both groups are dwarfed by 
the 18 Independent MP's. In terms of vote share in London, Foot secured the support of 
the 8 Tribune Group, 2 Manifesto Group, and 10 Independent MP's. Healey attracted the 
support  of  12 Manifesto Group MP's,  0 Tribune Group MP's and 8 Independent MP's. 
Healey attracted the greater number of votes from his ideological support base, yet Foot 
secured the greater number of the vital Independent MP's. In this region, therefore, Healey 
had failed  where  Foot  had  succeeded in  appealing  beyond  his  ideological  bedfellows 
towards the Independent MP.
The East Midlands had 3 Tribune Group MP's, 3 Manifesto Group, and 8 Independent 
MP's.  Foot secured the vote of 2,  whilst  Healey attracted the vote of 1 of the Tribune 
Group MP's. Healey secured the support of the 3 Manifesto Group whilst both candidates 
each secured the support  of  4 Independent MP's.  When combined, Foot attracted the 
support of 6 whilst Healey attracted the support of 8 MP's from the East Midlands, with 
both appealing equally to the Independents. 
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The  West  Midlands  had  6  Tribune  Group  MP's,  10  Manifesto  Group  MP's,  and  7 
Independent MP's. These figures reveal that the social  democrats had a stronger hold 
over the West Midlands, greater than even the Independents. Therefore, this region could 
be assumed to be natural territory for Healey to do well in. Foot secured the support of 5  
Tribune Group MP's, 2 Manifesto Group MP's and 4 Independent MP's. Healey secured 
the support of 1 Tribune Group MP, 8 Manifesto Group MP's, and 3 Independents. Again, 
Foot was securing the support of the larger number of Independent MP's whilst holding 
onto  the  majority  of  his  ideological  support  base.  Healey,  in  contrast  was  losing  the 
support  of  the Independents and also the larger  number of  his ideological  bedfellows. 
However, despite this, Healey was able to secure the support of the majority of MP's within  
the region. The analysis does demonstrate Foot's penetrations into support bases Healey 
should have expected to retain. 
In the South, the Labour Party did not have a large number of MP's. However,  of the 
number of MP's available, Foot secured the support of 3 Tribune Group MP's, 0 Manifesto 
Group MP's and 1 Independent. Healey secured the support of 0 Tribune Group MP's, 5 
Manifesto Group MP's and 0 Independents. These reveal that Healey secured the greater 
support  of  southern MP's,  however,  given the majority  of  MP's were  Manifesto Group 
members, this is is unsurprising. However, even here, Foot secured the penetration into 
the  centre  ground  by  gaining  the  support  of  the  Independent  MP whilst  retaining  his  
ideological vote. 
These figures reveal that Foot's greatest numerical support base derived from the north 
amongst Independent MP's. In contrast, Healey's greatest support base derived from the 
north but amongst Manifesto Group MP's. This indicates that if group membership is to be 
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utilised as a broad weathervane of ideological positioning amongst MP's, then it must be 
concluded that  the  candidate  attracting  an ideological  rather  than pragmatic  vote  was 
Healey. The orthodox view that the Party had swung to the left must yield to the discovery  
that Foot was able to secure the support of the larger number of Independents. It must be 
noted, however, that the non-aligned MP's may have maintained their centre position but 
in an increasingly leftwards trend. This would suggest that the centre position shifted more 
towards a point where Foot would be able to make greater penetrations.
________________________________________________________________________
Why was Michael Foot elected leader of the Labour Party?
________________________________________________________________________
The conclusion of this analysis is that ideology is a significant factor when considering the  
composition of the Labour Party. However voting behavour can be affected by factors that 
go  beyond  it.  Ideology  is  not  mono  causal  in  determining  voting  behaviour  because 
political realities are not restricted to ideological or theoretical debates. Foot's election was 
achieved by his ability to appeal to members of the PLP who did not subscribe to his  
political ideology or necessarily sympathise with his philosophy. Rather it was his personal 
character  and,  most  importantly  the  needs  of  the  Party  that  made  him  a  credible 
candidate.  Previous  Labour  leaders  tended  to  originate  from  a  social  democratic 
background because they were  broadly considered to  be  more  able  to  appeal  to  the 
majority of centrist and social democratic members. However, in the case of 1980, it was 
Foot, who had evolved progressively towards more mainstream positions during the 1970s 
and so was able to fulfill this necessity. Foot's election as leader continued the tradition of  
the successful candidate needing to appeal across the various traditions within the Party. 
The  PLP  voted  for  Foot  in  order  for  him  to  keep  the  coalition  of  inside  left,  social  
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democratic right and independent centrists together in the Party, a necessity which Healey 
and certainly Benn would have been less likely to achieve.
Foot's broad appeal and ultimate election as leader of the Labour Party derived from his  
progression  towards  more  mainstream  positions  as  a  member  of  the  Wilson  and 
Callaghan governments. Foot's loyalty and evolution towards the mainstream made Foot's 
election  less  incredible.  His  election  becomes understandable  when  the  nature  of  the 
divisions within the Party and his personal evolution are considered. During the 1970's,  
Foot's loyalty enabled some of the social democrats to place greater trust in his abilities 
not  to  open the  Party  to  the  outside  left.  Equally,  more  left  leaning  MP's  had longer  
standing loyalties to Foot because of his record of supporting their causes. 
When combined with the concerns and aspirations of individual centrist members, each 
faction had less to fear from a Foot leadership than either a Healey or even a possible  
future  Benn  leadership.  Healey's  personal  campaign  failures  had  prevented  him  from 
gaining  the  emotional  support  of  fellow  social  democrats.  He  also  simultaneously 
presented  the  possibility  of  becoming  a  doorway  to  an  unappealing  successful  Benn 
challenge shortly after his election. Such an outcome would have accelerated the growth 
of the SDP at the expense of the Labour Party. Given these factors, Foot became the clear 
choice at maintaining the Party as the broad coalition of left, right and centre views which  
had been its strength and appeal within postwar British Politics.
In addition, the tensions within the Party were such that they could only be navigated by a 
figure  who  was  not  clearly  affiliated  to  either.  Foot's  record  of  consideration  for  his  
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colleagues views contrasted to  those of  Healey's  clear social  democratic  loyalties and 
brutish  approach,  raising  concerns  about  his  ability  to  maintain  the  Labour  coalition.  
Healey's  potential  failure  to  be  a conciliatory leader  increased the  chances of  Labour 
becoming an openly fractured Party,  possibly even destructively so. The narrowness of 
Foot's victory indicates, however that many within the PLP remained loyal to Healey, who 
tended  to  focus  on  electoral  success  rather  than  maintaining  the  Party.  Such 
considerations  did  not  fully  reflect  the  splintered nature  of  the  Party  at  the  time,  and 
although a vote for Healey may have appeared more consistent with the needs of the 
Party under more conventional circumstances, the facts remain that the Party was facing 
an outside left determined to reform the Party towards its agenda. Effectively, the Party 
was not able to concern itself with conventional political activities whilst its fundamental 
raison d'être was being hotly debated. During the period, the Party had little choice than to 
consider  its  own  future  direction  over  that  of  conventional  electoral  issues.  Foot  was  
selected because of his political background, legitimate position within the Party, and his  
skills at being a standard bearer around whom more within the Party could rally.
The election of Foot reflected a need to address the debates which had been evolving 
within  the  Party  during  the  previous  decade in  a  conciliatory  manner.  These debates 
concerned the type of party Labour aimed to be and the type of socialism it wanted to 
represent.  It  had  little  option  than  to  begin  to  address  these  debates  and  aim  at  
maintaining its coalition of factions. Any of the other likely leaders available would have 
ultimately, though unwittingly led Labour to potential fragmentation. The extent to which 




No single variable can explain the outcome of the vote. It can neither be attributed solely to 
ideology still  less to any of the other factors considered. Rather, each factor discussed 
played a contributory role in understanding Foot's election, resulting in an eclectic mixture 
of motivations. Foot's success at securing the Labour leadership must also be seen as a 
result  of  the  circumstances  which  the  Labour  Party  were  navigating.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  had  the  Labour  Party  not  engaged  in  a  dispute  over  constitutional 
issues, then Healey would most likely have been the victor. However, that was not the 
case. The Labour Party  was in the midst of a dispute, and so an alternative role for the 
leadership  was  necessary.  Heppell's  method  has  value  as  an  approach,  however,  its 
usefulness is curtailed unless it permits the consideration of the political circumstances of 
when it  is  being applied.  In  the Conservative  periods considered by Heppell,  ideology 
made a more significant impact than in other periods even within that Party.  The post-
Thatcherite  Conservative  Party  had  become more  prone  to  ideological  concerns  than 
during the pre-Thatcherite period. Equally, within the Labour Party, constitutional disputes  
and  outside  left  infiltration  led  to  circumstances  likely  to  detract  from  concerns  with 
mainstream electoral appeal.
The  Labour  Party  became  inwardly  focused  and  potentially  locked  in  a  destructive 
ideological  debate  initiated  by  the  outside  left  following  the  election  defeat.  These 
circumstances threatened the cohesive survival of Labour as a party capable of capturing 
the  mainstream  electorate.  The  evident  threats  were  the  outside  left  potentially 
transforming Labour into a radical socialist Party, and the flood of defections this would 
cause to the new SDP. Consequently, Foot's role as leader was to prevent these events  
from occurring and, in so doing, preserving the Party. It was a mission to which neither 
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Benn nor Healey were suited. Foot's broad appeal and record of loyalty in government  
was able to appeal to the majority within the Party and to hold it together. Granted, some 
social democrats splintered from the Party, but most remained within and aided Foot in his 
mission. As the defeated candidate,  Healey acted as Foot's deputy whilst  other social  
democrats continued to sit in his shadow cabinet. Therefore, Foot's election can not be 
seen as a high risk shift to the left, but rather as a healing and holding measure. It is also 
necessary  to  consider  Foot's  performance  as  leader  in  order  to  fully  understand  the 
justification for his election. It would be remiss of any analysis of Foot's election not to 
consider his subsequent success or failure, as well  as his ability to be the conciliatory 
leader the Labour Party determined that it needed (New Statesman, 7 November 1980, p.2).
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CHAPTER SIX
The Labour Leadership of Michael Foot
6.0: Introduction.
To determine whether  Foot  was  a conciliatory leader,  it  is  necessary to  evaluate  key 
episodes during his leadership from 1980 to 1983. When Foot assumed the leadership, 
the Party's  poll  rating increased to 50 per cent against the Conservatives 35 per cent 
(Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Thatcher's government was under pressure from high oil 
prices, taxation reforms such as the doubling of VAT, and increased prescription charges 
(Gamble, 1988, pp.98-99). Britain was enduring the early birth pangs of Thatcherism. Despite 
the promising showing for Labour its support declined. The figures below illustrate Labour 
benefitting from an unpopular Conservative government until the Falklands War restored a 
Conservative lead. 
1980 1981 1982 1983
Quarter 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
Conservative 39 39 37 35 32 30 28 27 31 43 43 42 42 43
Labour 45 45 47 50 41 38 36 28 32 29 30 34 30 27
SDP/Liberal Alliance 13 13 14 14 24 29 34 38 34 27 24 22 25 25
(Source: Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100).
Foot's  election  as  leader  coincided  with  both  a  special  conference  to  discuss  the 
establishment  of  an  electoral  college  to  elect  the  Party  leader,  and,  a  subsequent 
challenge to his new deputy from the outside left's personality, Benn. Both these displays 
of disunity conspired against Foot's impressive initial opinion poll rating, setting Labour on 
course  for  electoral  defeat.  Any  hope  Labour  had  of  victory  at  the  polls  had  been 
jeopardised by these events and the electoral impact of the Falklands War was 'the final  
nail  in  the  coffin'.  It  therefore  must  be  concluded  the  1983  election  outcome  was 
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determined well before the actual election date, and that the key events which brought it 
about were out of Foot's influence.
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6.1: A Summary of the Splintering Social Democrats.
The first major challenge to Party unity Foot faced related to the reform of the leadership 
electoral system. The special conference, held in January 1981, was convened to resolve 
the issue. The question facing the conference was not whether an electoral college system 
should be used, but how. The Times argued that Foot preferred a formula of 25 per cent, 
50 per cent, 25 per cent27, with the PLP gaining the greatest voting block (Clark, 23 January 
1981, p.5). The CLPD advocated 50 per cent, 25 per cent, 25 per cent in favour of the trade 
unions, whilst the NEC preferred the equal distribution of 33 per cent, 33 per cent, 33 per  
cent (Stark, 1996, p.55). The social democrats had attempted to argue for One Member One 
Vote  as  an  alternative,  however  this  suggestion  did  not  impact  significantly  upon  the 
conference, increasing the isolation of the future defectors to the SDP (Stark, 1996, p.54).
The CLPD gained the greatest support by switching their preferred option to 40 per cent,  
30 per cent,  30 per cent  (Kogan & Kogan,  1982,  p.93).  Kogan & Kogan (1982) quote Jon 
Lansman of the outside left as saying it
won against the National Executive Committee, the Transport and General Workers 
Union, the Parliamentary Party, and Michael Foot (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.97).
The inside left and the social democrats had been defeated by the sheer determination 
and zeal of the outside left. This was the pinnacle of its power over the conference. 
On the back of these debates, Labour's poll rating dropped almost ten points (Derbyshire & 
Derbyshire,  1988,  p.100).  Whilst  the  Conservatives  were  struggling  with  an  economy  in 
"nosedive", the Labour Party were caught in an ruinous cataclysmic debate (Gamble, 1988, 
p.108).  The electorate was, however,  excluded from the debate and so appeared to be 
27 Trade union, Parliamentary Labour Party, Constituency Labour Party.
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alienated from both parties, creating fertile ground for another party claiming to represent 
the centre of British politics. 
At the conclusion of the special conference, Foot gave a speech arguing that it was in the 
interests of the Party that the ideological factions combine against the Conservatives (The 
Times, 26 January 1981, p.4). Foot argued "we must fight like men who have the enemy at their 
gates and at the same time like people working for eternity" (ibid). Foot failed to secure the 
formulae he preferred, yet  he accepted the verdict  of  the conference and called upon 
others  to  do  likewise.  Some  social  democrats  did  not  heed  Foot's  advice.  Almost 
immediately after the conference, Foot begged Shirley Williams not to consider leaving 
(BBC,  1995).  Foot  attempted to  reassure  her  that  the  Party  would  navigate  the  current 
problems and that  her  career  would  advance within  it.  However,  following the special 
conference,  the  social  democrats  splintered  and  a  small  group  formed the  new SDP 
because of fundamental policy differences.
The Limehouse Declaration of 26th March 1981 was a forerunner for the formation of the 
Social  Democratic  Party  (Owen,  1991,  p.482).  However,  the  divisions  within  the  social 
democrats belied the unity the key defectors endeavoured to portray.  Owen argues in 
Time to Declare  that Jenkins wanted to create a new party as a route into the Liberal 
Party, making the SDP a bridge from Labour to the Liberal Party as its raison d'être (ibid, 
p.483).  Also  a  significant  number  of  social  democrats  remained  within  the  weakened 
Labour  Party such as Healey, Hattersley and Kaufman. 
Foot  survived  the  first  quarter  as  Labour  leader  despite  the  splintering  of  the  social 
democrats  and  the  formula  decided  for  the  electoral  college.  The  splintering  social 
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democrats saw this as vindication of the view that Labour was disintegrating. By departing,  
the SDP weakened the remaining social democrats within the Labour Party, splintered the 
opposition to the Conservatives, and ensured that Labour appeared disunited. Despite this 
Labour remained ahead in the polls until the late summer of 1981, but for much of that 
year was shaken by an unwelcome deputy leadership challenge that again distracted the 
attention of the Party from challenging the Conservative government, plunging Labour's 
poll rating to the depths which set them on a course for certain electoral decimation.
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6.2: A Summary of Tony Benn's Challenge for the Deputy Leadership.
Benn's destructive challenge for the deputy leadership increased the pressure upon Foot 
considerably. Benn's challenge embroiled Labour in a bitter dispute which they could ill  
afford. Coupled with the splintering of the social democrats, the outside left appeared to 
perpetuate  the  view that  Labour  had  become divided  beyond  repair.  The  outside  left  
campaigned for Benn by threatening pro-Healey MP's with deselection if they did not vote 
for Benn, heckling Healey as he attempted to make public speeches and as Foot remarks 
"belittle democracy itself" by reducing "the affairs of the Labour Party to the politics of the 
kindergarten" (Foot, 1986, p.123; Rosen, 2005, pp.426-427). As leader, Foot would need actively 
to differentiate his inside left views from those of outside left supporters by highlighting 
Benn's willingness to prolong the agony of the Party. Whilst the inside left served critically 
to support Labour, the outside left demonstrated its willingness to disregard the broader 
issues of Party unity in favour of advancing itself. 
Foot  emphasised the  need for  the  Party  to  remain  united,  and that  further  discontent  
damaged  Labours'  future.  Writing  in  Loyalists  and  Loners,  Foot  described  how Benn 
pushed ahead for the deputy leadership "despite pleadings from almost every quarter" 
(Foot, 1986, p.123). 
Michael  Foot  reiterated  his  fear  that  month  after  month  there  would  be  mutual 
attacks in the Party, and said he had told the Shadow Cabinet this and he hoped 
there would be a speedy end to the discussion... Neil Kinnock said that Michael Foot 
had appealed to the Shadow Cabinet for a truce last week and that we now needed 
unity (Benn, 1994, p.112).
Foot characterised Benn as being "out to win, whatever happened" to the Party (Foot, 1986, 
pp.123-124). During the six months of hostile campaigning Labour's electoral chances were 
undermined as their poll ratings collapsed from 38 per cent to 28 per cent, where they  
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remained  (Derbyshire  &  Derbyshire,  1988,  p.100).  Benn's  challenge  had  placed  Labour  on 
course for certain defeat at the general election, and cemented the view that Foot's tenure 
as leader was a period of destructive divisions.
Benn was unable to challenge Foot directly because of Foot's popularity amongst the left.  
Because  of  this,  Benn's  only  potential  penetration  into  the  Party  leadership  was  to 
challenge  Healey  (Cronin,  2004,  p.226).  Supporters  of  Benn's  challenge  for  the  deputy 
leadership argued that the previous Labour leadership team had to be purged (ibid). Such a 
purging  negates  the  fact  that  both  Foot  and  Benn  were  key  players  in  Callaghan's  
government,  and that  such an argument would preclude either Foot or Benn from the 
Labour leadership.
Foot firmly supported Healey as his deputy. Benn wrote in his diary that Foot described the 
challenge as "most inadvisable", and that Foot had asked him to delay the announcement  
of his candidature  (Benn, 1994, p.114). Given the SDP had launched as an official political 
party only the previous day, Foot was extremely keen not to allow Benn to splinter Labour 
further, thereby potentially undermining Labour's core cohesion. Benn disregarded these 
pleas, and went ahead with the announcement in the early hours of the morning  (BBC, 
1995).
Supporters of Healey made their position known. The Solidarity Group, who were opposed 
to  Foot's  political  philosophy,  announced  that  they  "deeply  regretted  Tony  Benn's 
announcement" and that Benn's move was also "an attack on Michael Foot" as well as 
Healey (Hayter, 2005, p.137). Ironically, Benn had managed to unite some inside left groups 
with the social democrats in opposing his challenge. However, it must be noted that prior 
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to standing, Benn had joined the  Tribune Group  and had promptly split  them over the 
legitimacy of his challenge (Foot, 1986, p.123). Foot argues that Tribune were "not quite so 
used to his methods as those of us who had seen him operate elsewhere" (ibid).
Irritated, Foot called upon Benn to challenge  him for the Party leadership  (Morgan, 2007, 
p.399). In reply to this, Benn issued a statement saying 
I voted for Michael Foot when he stood for the leadership of the Party against Denis  
Healey last November. I continue to support him in that role, and there is no question 
of my standing against him for the leadership (Benn, 1994, p.135).
Healey was the target because Benn believed he had a greater chance of victory over the 
social democrat. Healey described the campaign as "the busiest and least agreeable of 
my life" (Healey, 1989, p.481). He fought hard to deny Benn the victory he sought because 
...if he had become Deputy Leader there would have been a haemorrhage of Labour 
defectors to the SDP both in Parliament and in the country (ibid).
Healey's comment illustrates the consequences of a Benn leadership and why Foot, as a 
non-militant inside left  leader kept the majority of both ideological wings of the Labour 
Party together. Simply because of who he was and his reputation amongst some Labour  
activists,  Benn  became  a  cult  figure  within  the  Party  despite  taking  pride  in  his 
denouncement of political personalities (Foot, 1986, p.121).
Healey  saw  standing  up  to  Benn  as  vital  to  save  Labour's  dwindling  support  from 
intensifying. Benn's campaign team, organised mainly by the outside left Rank and File 
Mobilizing Committee, comprised of young militants who were subject to radical socialist 
influences  (Morgan,  2007,  p.399).  This demonstrates a key aspect of  a pro-Soviet  stance 
adopted  by  some  within  the  outside  left,  who  were  willing  to  subvert  Parliamentary 
democracy. The Committee targeted Healey personally, seeking to destroy his position, 
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his career and reputation within the Party by jeering at and mocking his speeches  (BBC, 
1995).
On Sunday 27th September 1981, the ballot took place using the new electoral college at  
the  conference  in  Brighton.  Before  the  announcement  of  the  result,  Benn  had  been 
assured  in  various  messages  that  he  had  won  (Benn,  1994,  p.154).  The  Transport  and 
General  Workers Union (TGWU) had voted for  Silkin in the first  ballot,  and sought  to  
abstain during the second; however, some of the delegates on the conference floor defied 
this wish by voting for Benn (Healey, 1989, p.483). Healey (1989) argues that if the union had 
not voted in this way, then his majority would have been as high two and a half million. The 
final result of the ballot was 50.426 per cent for Healey and 49.547 per cent for Benn (Benn, 
1994, p.154). Benn had failed in his attempt to unseat Healey, saving Foot from an outside 
left  incursion  into  the  Labour  leadership  and  preventing  a  mass  exodus  of  social 
democrats. The tide towards the outside left  began to turn, but only after the electoral 
damage to Labour was done. 
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6.3: A Summary of the Conservative Ascendancy.
It is an oversimplification to assume the Labour Party lost the 1983 general election solely 
because  of  their  internal  divisions.  Rather  the  surge  of  popularity  enjoyed  by  the 
Conservatives  also  played  a  significant  role  in  Labour's  defeat.  It  is  also  worth  
remembering that SDP support "crept up on Labour as polling day approached", however 
the Conservative revival redressed the balance (Pelling, 1985, p.185). The internal divisions 
within the Labour Party provided Foot with a highly damaged electoral position from which 
to  start.  The  Conservative  Party  had  endured  a  tormented  period  of  office,  which  in 
summer 1981 led to riots in Brixton, London and other major cities (Seldon & Collings, 2000, 
p.18). However in the closing years of the first term, the Conservatives enjoyed a significant 
increase in their polling support from 31 per cent to an average of 43 per cent (Derbyshire & 
Derbyshire,  1988,  p.100).  In  contrast,  Labour's  poll  rating  had  remained  consistently  low 
following Benn's divisive campaign for the deputy leadership. 
The Conservative Party had been granted only a respectable mandate from the electorate 
in  1979.  This  acted  as  a  constraint  against  any  significant  degree  of  ideological 
experimentation given their fear of defeat at the next general election. Consequently, the 
policies enacted by Thatcher's first government were not as economically liberal or socially 
conservative as they appeared to become following the 1983 victory.  Thatcherism is a 
contested concept that does not completely represent the traditional Conservative Party.  
For much of the post-war period, the Conservatives worked within the loosely-termed post 
war  consensus  and  maintained  the  social  advances  introduced  by  various  Labour 
governments. However, Thatcherism emphasised a strong aspect of social conformity that 
revolved around traditional family values and law and order whilst simultaneously striving 
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for an economically liberal state (Evans & Taylor, 1996, p.231). These were key aspects of any 
elementary understanding of Thatcher's core political philosophy. 
The Conservatives also emphasised a growing confidence in Britain as an independent 
state. Key alliances, such as with the United States, would be preserved. This included 
taking pride in the nation through patriotic loyalty, as illustrated by the surge of national  
pride unleashed throughout the country following the Falklands War. It is not necessary to 
consider the ideological arguments of Thatcherism or One Nation Conservatism in any 
greater  depth  at  this  point,  however,  the  changes  within  the  Conservatives  failed  to 
undermine their  growing electoral  success given the electoral  alienation of  the Labour 
Party.
Thatcher had to achieve her policies during the first term of office through compromise, 
negotiation  and  hard  work  (Evans,  1999,  p.55).  She  had  to  prove  that  she  was  able  to 
maintain  both  her  and  the  Party's  position.  The  government  first  attacked  public 
expenditure, inflation and made cuts in the rate of income tax (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.10).  
The Conservatives also combated the dominant role trade unions enjoyed in industrial 
relations via the 1980 Employment Act. Jim Prior, an economic wet, drew up the plans for 
immediate reforms because "the economic effects of union power were still painfully clear" 
(Thatcher, 1993, p.98). The effects were the increasing pay levels whilst a recession loomed 
(ibid).  The  trade  unions,  having  undermined  the  Callaghan  administration,  now  found 
themselves dealing with a much less sympathetic Conservative government.
The  results  of  Conservative  policies  on  the  economy  had  resulted  in  a  drop  in 
manufacturing production by 16 per cent and had turned a falling unemployment level 
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when they assumed office to a sharp rising level, hitting two million in November 1980 
(Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.14). The early Conservative government had, within a short space 
of time, appeared to be repeating Heath's mistakes. A key difference between the two,  
however, is that Thatcher did not retreat from the policies she sought to implement. Whilst 
Heath retreated to the decaying yet comfortable Keynesian economic theories, Thatcher 
continued with policies that she believed would provide an alternative to Keynes.
With critics within her cabinet calling for a Heath-style retreat, in January 1981 Thatcher 
asserted her authority over the cabinet by removing 'the wets'. Figures such as St. John 
Stevas, Francis Pym and John Nott were reshuffled out of important ministerial positions 
(Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.15). This was a significant moment as Thatcher assumed a position 
of dominance over her critics within cabinet (Gamble, 1988, p.110). Thatcher appeared to be a 
strong leader who attacked critics head on, whilst Foot tolerated his chief critics. Strength  
and authority were characteristics which the electorate expected in a Prime Minister whilst 
Foot was tolerant and compassionate. 
Electorally, however, the Conservatives were trailing Labour in the opinion polls (Derbyshire 
& Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Despite the trauma the Labour Party was putting itself through, the 
Conservatives  were  being  blamed  for  the  mass  unemployment  and  growing  civil 
discontent.  It  was  a  time  when  "recession  was  most  sharply  experienced  in  the  old 
industrial  areas"  (Evans,  1999,  p.60).  Thatcher  came under  mounting  pressure  from the 
cabinet  for  a  change  of  policy.  However  at  the  1980  Conservative  conference  she 
famously attacked both her colleagues and outside critics saying
...to those waiting with bated breath for that favourite media catchphrase, the 'U-
turn',  I  have only one thing to say.  'You turn if  you want to.  The lady's  not  for 
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turning.' I say that not only to you, but to our friends overseas - and also to those  
who are not our friends (Thatcher, 1993, p.122).
The electorate were suffering the effects of monetarist Conservatism, whilst the Labour 
Party were too busy fighting its own battles to adequately fulfill  their oppositional  role.  
Despite  the  economic  problems,  however,  the  government's  unpopularity  was  set  to 
change.
In 1982 a  wartime mentality  acted as a reminder of the minor Victorian wars, creating a 
sense of patriotic fever (Pugh, 2004, p.353). Overstating the electoral role the war played in 
the re-election of the Conservatives and the defeat of Labour is a possibility. However its 
relevance can not be discounted. The Falklands War unified the political leaders in their 
condemnation of Argentina, however Foot reserved some criticism for the government. 
During a special debate held on Saturday 3rd April 1982, Foot attacked the government 
arguing that the islanders had been betrayed and that...
...the responsibility for the betrayal rests with the government. The government must 
now prove by deeds - they will never be able to do it by words - that they are not 
responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with that charge (Hansard, 1982, 
p.641.
In attacking the government for not taking sufficient actions to protect the islands, Foot  
was showing solidarity with the islanders against the invaders. He specifically attacked the 
government for withdrawing the HMS Endurance from the vicinity of the islands, which had 
been stationed there by Callaghan for protection. However the Defence Secretary was 
determined to deliver the cuts the cabinet demanded  (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.20; Morgan, 
2007, p.410). 
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Concerning the effect the war had on the outcome of the election, Thatcher commented 
that 
...it is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of the Falklands War transformed the 
British  political  scene...  I  could  feel  the  impact  of  the  victory  where  ever  I  went  
(Thatcher, 1993, p.264).
Clearly  the  wartime  mentality had rallied a significant  portion of  the  electorate  behind 
keeping Thatcher as Prime Minister, as well as supporting the broader Conservative Party.  
Commenting on the position of the parties, Healey remarked that
Gallup showed the Tories at 46.5 per cent, Labour at 27.5 per cent and the Alliance 
at 24 per cent. By August Michael Foot's popularity had shrunk to 15 per cent. The 
Tories kept  their  lead in  the opinion polls.  On May 12th 1983,  after a tax-cutting 
budget, Gallup gave the Conservatives 49 per cent, Labour 31.5 per cent and the 
Alliance only 17.5 per cent. Mrs Thatcher dissolved Parliament and called a general 
election (Healey, 1989, p.484). 
With the economy improving and a strong leader as Prime Minister, the Conservatives 
were  electorally  convincing.  Contrasting  the  two  parties,  Foot  appeared  much  less 
convincing as a potential Prime Minister. The Conservatives faced a Labour Party which 
had endured a period of sustained disunity. The electorate had seen how Thatcher would  
govern,  and  a  sufficient  portion  decided  that  they  wanted  more,  thus  starting  the 
dominance of the Conservatives over the 1980s.
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6.4: A Summary of Labour's By-Election Performances.
There  were  sixteen  by-elections  during  Foot's  leadership.  Each  acted  as  a  test  of 
popularity for either Labour or the Social Democratic Party against the government. The 
SDP was keen to be seen as the future main opposition, whilst the Labour Party hoped to  
form the future government. However the aspiration of the SDP to overtake Labour quickly 
became unrealistic. As Drucker (1983) notes, the public arguments concerning the division 
of seats between themselves and their Liberal allies had taken the initial gloss from their  
high poll ratings: "while they had won Hillhead, their peak had passed. In November 1981,  
they were the most popular party in the country; by the summer of 1982 they had fallen to 
third behind Conservative and Labour"  (Drucker,  1983 pp.71-72).  The SDP, having gained 
initial support from disaffected Conservative voters, found themselves unable to capitalise 
upon this following the resurgence of the Conservatives following the Falklands war (ibid). 
This helped restore Labour to its position of main opposition, relegating the SDP to third 
place. The following illustrates the verdicts of each by-election throughout the Parliament, 
demonstrating that Labour remained a significant electoral force.
28_____________________________________________________________________________________
Constituency Candidate Party/Group Date Held
Fermanagh & South Tyrone Robert Sands Anti H Block April 9 1981
Warrington Douglas Hoyle Labour July 16 1981
Fermanagh & South Tyrone Owen Carron Anti H Block Aug. 20 1981
Croydon North West William Pitt SDP / Liberal Alliance Oct. 22 1981
Crosby Shirley Williams SDP Nov. 26 1981
Belfast South Rev. Martin Smyth Ulster Unionists Mar. 4 1982
Glasgow Hillhead Roy Jenkins SDP Mar. 25 1982
Beaconsfield Timothy Smith Conservative May 27 1982
Mitcham and Morden Angela Rumbold Conservative June 3 1982
Coatbridge & Airdire Thomas Clark Labour June 24 1982
Gower Gareth Wardell Labour Sept 16 1982
Birmingham Northfield John Spellar Labour Oct. 28 1982
Peckham Harriet Harman Labour Oct. 28 1982
Glasgow Queens Park Helen McElhone Labour Dec. 2 1982
Bermondsey Simon Hughes SDP / Liberal Alliance Feb. 24 1983
Darlington Oswald O'Brien Labour Mar. 25 1983.
28 (Thomas, 1981, p.1; Haviland, 1981, p.1; Thomas, 1981, p.2; Webster & Haviland, 1981, p.1, Ford, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; 
Bevins, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; The Times, 1982, p.2; Bevins, 1982, p.1; Bevins, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; The Times,  
1982, p2; Haviland, 1983, p.1; Faux, 1983, p.1).
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Following on from the by-election Labour victory in Darlington in March 1983, Foot led the  
Labour Party into the general election. Although the Party were on a course for certain 
defeat, Foot seized upon the opportunity afforded to him by his position as leader of a  
major political party to express his inside left socialist views to the electorate. He sought to  
utilise the opportunity to debate unilateralism, given the issue was a central feature of his  
political ideology. However, given the nature of the forum, his debate included arguing with 
staunch political  opponents both amongst the outside left,  the Conservative Party,  and 
social democrats inside and outside the Party. 
As stated earlier,  the by-elections can be used as an indicator of  broad party support 
during the Parliament. Given the staunchly working-class, historical Labour-character of 
Warrington, the Conservatives could not be considered a serious contender.  Campbell 
(1983)  characterises  Warrington  as  "a  rock  solid  Labour  constituency  in  industrial  
Lancashire, fifteen miles east of Liverpool" (Campbell, 1983, p.210). It was also a constituency 
which had a history of flirtations with militant infiltration, setting the scene for a potential 
outside left  stronghold.  Against this militant potential,  the SDP were fielding Jenkins, a 
credible threat given his Labour background (Seton, 2 July 1981, p.2).  Jenkins hoped that he 
could "light a torch which could not be put out for decades" for the SDP (ibid). Despite the 
long standing association with Warrington, Labour were not complacent in their election 
campaign. Recognising the threat posed by Jenkins and the SDP, Foot, Eric Heffer, and 
Clive Jenkins visited the constituency to campaign, underlying the importance they placed 
on victory (Johnson, 14 July 1981, p.1). For the Party leader to visit the constituency was an 
unusual demonstration of concern. On polling day, Labour held the seat. However their 
majority was slashed considerably to 1,759 (Haviland & Webster, 17 July 1981, p.1). Although 
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the SDP failed to take the seat,  they succeeded in turning a solid Labour seat into a  
marginal overnight.
In the Croydon North West election, both the Labour and Conservative Parties collectively 
targeted  the  SDP  Liberal  Alliance  through  conventional  tactics  such  as  pamphlets, 
speeches and interviews (Witherow, 12 October 1981, p.2). The Alliance claimed to relish the 
attacks, as it showed them to be a credible threat to the established parties. In this context, 
the Alliance had become the early challenger it sought to be. On the day of the election, 
the Alliance candidate continued to canvass very hard to convince the electorate that both 
Conservative and Labour were inadequate alternatives (Haviland & Webster, 22 October 1981, 
p.1).  The  candidate,  William  Pitt  fought  a  passionate  campaign  and  was,  ultimately,  
rewarded with success when he took the seat from the Conservatives with 13,800 votes to 
10, 546, securing a majority of 3,254 (Haviland & Webster, 23 October 1981, p.1).  This was the 
first  by-election victory for the Alliance, and so marked the beginning of their electoral  
challenge against the established orthodoxy.
At Crosby,  Shirley Williams succeeded in turning another Conservative, turning a solid 
19,272 Conservative majority into a respectable 5,289 SDP majority (Haviland, 27 November 
1981, p.1; Webster, 23 November 1981, p.3). This seat was won for the SDP without the aid of 
the  Alliance,  and  so  officially  was  the  first  independent SDP  by-election  victory.  Its 
significance  derives  from  the  scale  of  the  swing  from  the  Conservatives.  With  both 
Croydon and Crosby coming from the Conservatives, it indicates that their advances were 
the result of disgruntled Conservative voters before the signs of economic recovery and 
the Falklands war.
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Bruce Douglas-Mann, another SDP defector was one of the few who sought re-election. 
Foot had expressed the view that the SDP defectors should face the electorate again in 
their new colours. The defectors argue that they remained loyal to the manifesto upon 
which they were elected. However,  Douglas-Mann did seek re-election for his Mitcham 
and Mordan constituency. The election occurred in 1982 at a time when the Falklands War 
and nationalistic pride were at their highest. The Conservative Party had no intention of 
losing, with approximately 40 MP's and Ministers visiting the constituency to canvass for 
Angela Rumbold (Haviland, 3 June 1982, p.2). When Rumbold won the seat, she said that it 
was  "a  great  victory  for  Mrs  Thatcher  and the  Conservative  government  at  a  time of 
national  crisis",  thereby validating  the  view that  the  Falklands War affected the  result  
(Haviland, 4 June 1982, p.1). The Falklands War was a turning point for the fortunes of the 
SDP, as their victories vanished from the electoral arena. No more were the Conservative  
voters disgruntled.
Following on from two expected Labour victories in Coatbridge & Airdire and Gower, the 
anti-Bennite  John  Spellar  was  able  to  capture  Birmingham  Northfield  from  the 
Conservatives for Labour with a very small majority.  The Times  correspondent, Anthony 
Bevins (1982) had argued that "...a failure here might have so damaged Labour as to bring 
Michael  Foot's  leadership  to  an  end"  (Bevins,  29  October  1982,  p.1).  The  Conservatives 
secured  15,  615  votes  against  Labour's  15,904  (ibid).  Spellar  was  a  passionate  anti-
Bennite and his win illustrated the limited support of Bennite ideology. 
The  Bermondsey  by-election  was  the  most  devastating  of  Foot's  leadership.  The 
campaign became a debate about the kind of candidate the Party felt was appropriate to 
represent it in Parliament. Foot believed that Parliament is the primary institution by which 
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change can be implemented. However, some on the left argued that extra Parliamentary 
action is justified as a way of conveying messages to MP's. The selection of Peter Tatchell  
as  the  candidate  appeared  to  suggest  that  those  who  are  subservient  to  outside  left 
committees would be able to represent Labour in Parliament. For Foot, this overrode the 
primacy of Parliament. But, Militant Tendency rejects the supremacy of Parliament whilst  
promoting the primacy of  Party committees. Foot argued that Militant Tendency was a 
faction of hard liners who were a significant  threat to Party cohesion (Cronin, 2007, p.229). 
This  debate  over  the  nature  of  the  Labour  Party  became  a  central  focus  for  the 
Bermondsey by-election.
It is important to remember that Tatchell was not a member of Militant Tendency. Despite 
this, however, he did gain Foot's disapproval because of his beliefs regarding Parliament.  
The press delighted in highlighting these divisions:
Friday's Sun led with 'Furious Foot Disowns Red Pete - Militant Will Never Be an 
MP, says Labour chief'. More sedately, the Guardian reported the discussion at the 
meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party the previous evening Foot had justified 
his action with the claim 'Parliamentary democracy is at stake. There can be no 
wavering on that' (Tatchell, 1983, p.58).
In retort Tatchell argued that "Labour has long lost the radical and defiant spirit of its early 
pioneers" and that the Labour movement had grown dramatically as a result of a century 
of direct action (Tatchell, 1983, p.53). 
In the House of Commons, Foot pledged that Tatchell will  never be a Labour  member  
rather than a Labour candidate (Morgan, 2007, p.421). This error caused Foot a great deal of 
personal humiliation prior to and during the Bermondsey campaign. Labour Party rules did 
not give the leader the authority to select the candidate for an election. In this sense, Foot 
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had exceeded his authority  (ibid).  The disquiet that followed was the result  of  an error 
which Foot had made in a most public of arena. 
Because of Foot's condemnation of Tatchell, the right-wing press took this as a signal they 
were open to attack him  personally as well as politically without any recourse from the 
Labour leadership. Tatchell's sexuality was also used against him. Tatchell argued that 
some within the press had launched a witch-hunt against him (Tatchell, 1983, p.131; Webster, 
11 February 1983, p.2; The Times, 1983, p.2).
It  is no exaggeration to argue that Bermondsey had become a battle for the  future of 
Labour, and that the outcome would determine the ideological distribution within the Party. 
If the outside left Tatchell could not be stopped, then neither could other potential outside  
left candidates. As part of the growing fightback against the outside left, the day before the 
Bermondsey by-election, the NEC expelled five members of Militant (Benn, 1994, p.271). 
After a bitterly divisive year the Alliance secured victory with 17,017 vote to Labour's 7,698 
(Haviland,  25 February 1983,  p.1).  Foot had presided over a public ideological war and, as 
leader, was to be held accountable. It was a heavy price to pay for the ideological debate, 
and the Bermondsey constituents would not forgive either the Labour left or right for their  
collective indulgence. Possible threats to Foot's leadership were curtailed by Labour's later 
victory at Darlington, yet few expected Labour to win the general election  (McLaughlin, 25 
February 1983, p.3; Labour Weekly, 1 April 1983).
The Labour Party chose not to fight the Darlington by-election on internally divisive issues 
such as defence, but instead opted to focus upon domestic policy  (Morgan,  2007,  p.427). 
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Labour Weekly describes the result as "the best by-election performance for Labour since 
Southend"  and  that  "its  significance  can  not  be  underestimated"  in  boosting  Labour's 
morale (Labour Weekly, 1 April 1983, p.8). The candidate, Oswald O'Brien was a non-militant, 
traditional socialist who was in the inside left tradition of older Labour MP's. Foot related 
the success of Darlington to potential success at the general election, saying
One concrete reply I sought to use was that the Labour Party would summon up 
'the spirit of Darlington', and having been there a few weeks before and participated 
in that considerable victory, I had a right to do so. The point was that the Darlington 
by-election,  apart  from sending an excellent  new Labour MP, Ossie O'Brien,  to 
Westminster, showed that  the work Labour could do on the doorsteps in a few 
weeks of real campaigning could confound the pollsters. And clearly it was the task 
of any leader to re-awaken that spirit (Foot, 1984, p.29).
The result silenced disgruntled Labour figures29 from sniping at Foot's leadership. This 
also ensured that Healey would not challenge Foot for the leadership. Had he done so he 
would have demonstrated a degree of disloyalty to Foot which may threaten to unite the 
inside  left  with  the  outside  left  against  him  and  in  favour  of  a  subsequent  Bennite  
challenge  (Thorpe, 2008, p.218). 
The early success of the SDP at constituencies such as Warrington and the subsequent 
popularity  of  the  Conservatives  produced  an  inconsistent  message  during  the 
Parliamentary by-elections. Birmingham and Darlington provided Foot with an indication 
that  Labour  remained  capable  of  winning  elections,  but  the  Bermondsey  by-election 
produced a disastrous year for the Labour Party, which, despite the optimism of Darlington 
underpinned  a  depressed  mood  for  the  Party  as  it  went  into  the  general  election 
campaign.
29 Benn, Holland, Skinner and Race discussed a possible change in Party leadership following the Bermondsey result. Ultimately, they 
opted to show public support for Foot, whilst deeply critical of him in private (Benn, 1994, p.275).
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6.5: A Summary of the 1983 General Election.
Despite Foot's calls to summon the 'spirit  of  Darlington',  Labour's performance can be 
justly characterised as chaotic and disorganised  (Butler  & Kavanagh, 1984, p.60). "Mr. Foot 
certainly thought, on the basis of Darlington and the local election results, that Labour 
could make up enough ground to deny the Conservatives an overall  majority"  (Butler  & 
Kavanagh,  1984,  p.65).  This  was  not  possible  because  the  campaign  lacked  a  cohesive 
theme, co-ordination in expressing the Party message, and any meaningful comradeship 
from some who understood more than most the position faced by the leadership. "It was a 
recurring theme of complaint that speeches by leading Party figures appeared often to be 
uncoordinated" (Mortimer, 1983, p.1). The campaign was fought using traditional canvassing 
methods  such  as  national  tours,  speeches  to  the  party  faithful,  and  rallies  whilst  the 
Conservatives  utilised  its  familiarity  with  the  media  (BBC,  1995).  However,  despite  this 
difference of campaigning style, Labour did itself few favours. Healey's insult suggesting 
Thatcher had been "'glorying in slaughter' during the Falklands war" courted controversy 
(Thatcher, 1993, p.301). Despite his subsequent apology, it is indicative of Labour's ability to 
damage its  own  cause  whilst  simultaneously  enabling  the  Conservatives  to  claim the 
moral high ground.
The Labour and Conservative parties were effectively fighting the same election in two 
different periods. Whilst the Conservatives were able to capitalise on the strength of their 
leader, the Labour Party felt unable to similarly rally around Foot. Thorpe (2008) notes that  
"Foot was a liability, looking uncomfortable on TV, rambling when interviewed and lacking 
presence" (Thorpe, 2008, p.219). Yet, for Foot himself, he was "at his happiest pressing the 
flesh and addressing rallies of the party faithful", demonstrating a form of electioneering 
which had benefitted Labour historically (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p.272). Many of the Labour 
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rank and file were unable to comprehend some methods the Conservatives used, and so 
had little way of countering their effect (Jones, 1994, p.508).
As part  of the election preparations, Foot chaired a meeting of the shadow cabinet to 
compose the manifesto. Hattersley anticipated a very long and drawn out process which 
had the potential to last through the night; the meeting, however  was over within an hour 
(Haviland,  12  May  1983,  p.1;  BBC,  1995).  Rather  than the expected arguments  from social 
democrats, Golding supported the inclusion of the most electorally contentious, outside left 
inspired policies devised by the conference since 1973 (Rosen, 2005, p.442; Haviland, 12 May 
1983, p.1). Shocked and dismayed by Golding's position, Hattersley asked why he adopted 
this position. In reply, Hattersley quotes Golding saying
...this  election is  going to be fought  on Tony Benn's  terms,  so we might  as well  
thoroughly incriminate him. We can't win this election, so we might as well hang all 
his policies around his neck. (BBC, 1995)
With  defeat  accepted as  a  virtual  certainty  after  Benn's  challenge  to  Healey,  Golding 
appeared to utilise the anticipated defeat for the benefit of the right by ensuring a sound 
foundation from which to transform the Labour Party into a prominently social democratic 
party  after  the  election.  Kaufman's  often  quoted  remark  that  the  manifesto  was  "the 
longest suicide note in history" would, ultimately,  benefit  his social democratic ideology 
(Cronin,  2004,  p.232).  Because of  previous convention and the degree of  discontent  that 
Callaghan faced following the composition of the previous general election manifesto, Foot 
was unable to contest the decision of the unexpectedly unified meeting  (Foot, 1984, p.31; 
Haviland,  12  May  1983,  p.1).  Whilst  Hattersley  was  willing  to  argue  for  a  more  cautious 
manifesto, Golding had ensured that the manifesto was used as a means of blaming the 
left for the defeat. 
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As leader, Foot wrote an introduction to the manifesto, where he discussed Labour's plans 
over nuclear disarmament. He wrote
One  bunch  of  smears  and  scares  with  which  Tory  propagandists  have  already 
disfigured this election campaign suggests that the Labour Party proposes to throw 
away our defences, to abandon our alliances. It is just not true. And it should not be 
forgotten that one of the last acts of Mrs. Thatcher's government was to stop the 
debate in the House of Commons when these slanders could have been nailed. 
What we do propose to do is to get rid of the nuclear boomerangs which offer no  
genuine protection to our people but, first and foremost, to help stop the nuclear arms 
race which is the most dangerous threat to us all (Labour Party, 1983).
Disarmament was a subject on which Foot and Healey disagreed fundamentally,  thus 
forcing the campaigners for Labour within both the inside left and social democratic right to 
be  in  opposition  to  either  the  leader  or  deputy  leader.  Ultimately,  the  issue  was  de-
emphasised by the leadership, circumnavigating the division on a major policy area. The 
leadership "knew, above all, that our peace policy would be misrepresented and maligned" 
(Foot, 1984, p.36).  The media, Foot argues, sought to misrepresent Labour's defence policy 
by emphasising fictitious divisions within  the leadership  (Foot,  1984,  p.75).  However,  the 
former leader, Callaghan did emphasise the split. Foot remarks that Callaghan's approach 
"was not to support any Healey line. He had a line of his own; one which he had chosen to 
publicise with the maximum effect at the most critical moment"  (Foot, 1984, p.79). Healey 
remarks that Callaghan's speech made it  "impossible to conceal our deep divisions on 
defence any longer"  and that "our defence policy certainly cost  us the votes of many 
traditional Labour supporters"  (Healey,  1989, pp.500-501). Callaghan's decision to voice his 
opposition to the official Labour policy agreed to by both Healey and Foot undermined 
further Labour's electoral chances (Harris, 1984, pp.204-205).
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Few  within  the  Party  expected  a  Labour  victory.  Kaufman  asked  Foot  to  resign  the 
leadership before the election date. Foot argued that...
...I had considered and rejected all ideas of throwing my hand in and abandoning 
the Party leadership. If those reasons were good before, they were stronger still at 
such a moment at the start of the campaign itself...
...However, I feel I must record that one member of the Shadow Cabinet, Gerald 
Kaufman, did come to  see me on Monday morning,  16 May,  and renewed the 
suggestion  which  only  Jeff  Rooker  had  put  to  me  before.  He  put  his  point 
courteously and I replied, I trust, with equal courtesy, and that was that (Foot, 1984, 
p.41).
Kaufman believed that if Foot continued, then the result would be worse than if Labour  
was led by an alternative figure. However, as Thorpe (2008) has argued... 
...Labour did not lose in 1983 because of Foot. The party would have been divided, 
and the economy recovering, whoever had been leader. In reality, it was an election 
that Labour could not have won (Thorpe, 2008, p.219).
Thorpe continues to argue that had Healey been Labour leader, then the outside left would 
have had a stronger position to lay siege to the leadership, thereby making Labour appear 
even less unified (ibid). 
Indeed, James Curran of The Times and Peter Kellner of the New Statesman30 noted that 
the Labour Party had become much more united in the 12 months preceding the general 
election. Curran attributes this to Foot's leadership, saying 
one year ago, it would have seemed inconceivable that the Labour Party would enter 
the general election with both its left and right-wings bonded in a close partnership. 
That this has been been achieved is a tribute to Michael Foot's dogged pursuit of 
party unity (Curran, 11 May 1983, p.10). 
30 New Statesman, 3 June 1980, p.7.
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The  accepted  portrayal  of  Labour  as  fundamentally  divided  during  the  campaign  is 
challenged by the factions submerging their policy disagreements. This accomplishment 
must  be  attributed to  Foot's  reconciliatory  style  of  leadership  enabling  the  factions  to 
function within the traditional broad church. 
On a personal level, Foot relished the challenge of the campaign. To paraphrase Gaitskell 
in 1960, he fought, fought and fought again for the Labour Party he loved. Foot was able 
to convey his political beliefs and philosophies to a much wider audience than previously.  
His opponents, however mocked Foot's image.
The Conservatives drew attention to Foot's appearance by using a poster parodying The 
Wizard of Oz with the phrase "if only I had a brain"  (The Times, 26 April 1983, p.1). As  The 
Times remarked, this was an abusive tactic, mocking Foot personally rather than debating 
policy. Further unfortunate reporting came following a visit Foot made to an old peoples 
home in the safe Conservative constituency of Banbury  (Morgan, 2007, p.430).  The press 
made connections between Foot and the residents, portraying him as a retired leader of 
the Party as well as cruelly comparing his walk to Charlie Chaplin  (New Statesman, 3 June 
1980, p.10). 
"Michael Foot conceded the election shortly after 2am on Friday morning. He called it 'a  
tragedy for the nation', adding 'we have got to sit down and re-build the Labour Party'"  
(Harris, 1984, p.212). The election results were
______________________________________________________________________________________
Party Total Votes % of Vote Seats
______________________________________________________________________________________
Conservative 13,012,315 42.4 397
Labour 8,456,934 27.6 209
Liberal 4,210,115 13.7 17
Social Democrats 3,570,834 11.6 6
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(The Alliance) (7,780,949) (25.3) (23)
Plaid Cymru 125,309 0.4 2
Scottish Nationalists 331,975 1.1 2
N.I Parties 764,925 3.1 17
Others 193,383 0.6 0
______________________________________________________________________________________
(Source: Dorey, 1995, p.342)
Given the stronger position of the third party and the changes to constituency boundaries 
since the 1979 general election, a like-for-like comparison would prove hazardous (Pelling, 
1985,  p.185).  Even with  that caveat,  however,  the Labour Party suffered a considerable 
electoral defeat for which Foot would be blamed.
The election should be regarded "as a verdict not so much on the campaign and the run 
up to it, as on the party's performance over a long period" and "Labour's major problems 
did not emerge over the few weeks of the campaign"  (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, pp.278-279). 
This view is confirmed by Jim Mortimer, then General Secretary of the Labour Party. He 
remarked in the post-election interim report to the NEC that
the Labour Party entered the 1983 general election burdened by a reputation for 
disunity. In the months preceding the election efforts were made to build bridges 
between different views within the Party but the public view persisted that Labour's 
unity was shallow. It received some confirmation during the election campaign. But 
the most damaging impression of disunity caused by the earlier breakaway of a 
number of Members of Parliament and the formation of the SDP, including former 
cabinet ministers. Undoubtedly this breakaway represented a minority trend within 
the Labour Party but,  when encouraged and boosted by the press, it  evoked a 
response among a section of the public (Mortimer, 1983, p.4).
The  Labour  Party  was  judged  by  the  electorate  as  unfit  for  government  before  the 
campaign had begun. Its judgement was based upon the earlier actions of some social 
democrats, and subsequently encouraged by an unsympathetic press. Foot's leadership 
had attempted to, and to some extent succeeded in bringing the inside left  and social 
democratic right of the Party closer together in order to unite the Party against the outside 
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left.  Yet  they were  highly  unlikely  to  be  able  to  benefit  from these  embryonic  moves 
towards drawing a line under the divisions because of the public displays of disunity since 
losing office. Radice (2004) notes in his diary that prominent figures within the inside left  
and social democratic traditions began to meet to discuss removing the outside left  by 
targetting Militant with the help of Foot  (Radice, 2004, p.72). This indicates a tentative step 
towards a realignment within  the Party away from the traditional  battles of  immovable 
ideological  dogmatic  positions  and  towards  a  more  unified  pragmatism,  which  slowly 
matured over the course of the next Parliament. Mortimer confirms that "the reputation for 
disunity and for internal strife was reinforced by other events during the preceding four 
years"  (Mortimer,  1984,  p.4). Other  controversies  included  the  divisions  fostered  by  the 
outside left  within  the Party during the first  post-defeat  years  which  conspired against  
Labour and Foot during the subsequent years to produce the heavy defeat regardless of 
the policies within the manifesto or the presentation during the campaign. Labour lost the 
election  before  campaigning  had  started.  Presentational  failures,  however  can  not  be 
entirely disregarded as impacting upon the public view of Labour given they confirmed the 
existing view of a disunited Party.
To consider Foot's legacy exclusively as his failure to secure power for the Labour Party is 
to disregard his successful navigation of the Party through these turbulent years. To do 
that, it is necessary to remember that
Foot faced an endless succession of crises - over the constitution of the party, the 
formation of the SDP, the deputy leadership election, the drive against Militant and 
the Falklands War (Shaw, 1999, p.167).
As Peter Shore notes, "no leader of the Labour Party - not even George Lansbury in 1931 
- inherited so disastrous and bankrupt an estate as did Michael Foot in November 1980" 
(Shore, 1993, p.137). It is Foot's success that Labour emerged as a coherent political entity 
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from the years of crises which were mostly not of his making. Quoted by The Times, Neil 
Kinnock remarks that
the roots of defeat which were put down by some of the elements of our Party in the 
two or three years after 1980 made victory difficult to achieve (Haviland, 10 June 
1983, p.1).
Kinnock argues that Labour was on the course for defeat because the Party had been 
undermined by some within earlier in the Parliament. "It  undoubtedly suffered from the 
legacy of the bitter internal fighting of the past four years" (New Statesman, 10 June 1983, p.3). 
Any consideration for a possible alternative to Foot can be dismissed. As Peter Shore 
confirms
...if Healey had won the 1980 PLP election for the leadership on a programme of 
resistance and conflict with the NEC, there is no question that he would have had to 
face an immediate challenge from Tony Benn for the leadership itself just as soon 
as the new electoral college system for electing a leader had been adopted. Even if 
- and that is a big 'if  - he had won that further contest against Tony Benn, it is 
difficult to believe that he would have had the persuasive power that Michael Foot 
undoubtedly had in prising the soft left away from the hard left on the NEC. That  
'ultimate peril' would not then have been averted (Shore, 1993, p.151).
Because Benn had lost his own Parliamentary seat he would be unable to put himself  
forward  for  the  leadership.  This  defeat,  along  with  the  overall  defeat  of  the  Party,  
demonstrated the chance and need for change. The change, which Foot preferred was to  
return  the  Labour  Party  to  a  position  of  electoral  success  by  improving  their 
communication with the electorate.
How to  present  policies  and  personalities  effectively;  how to  organize  for  their 
presentation; how to put ourselves on even terms with our opponents, at least in 
the sense of recognising what advantages can be secured and what dangers can 
be avoided; how to ensure that the devil  does not have the best tunes and the 
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cleverest instrumentals - no Labour supporter, no Labour leader, who lived through 
the agony of the 1983 defeat will question the significance of these considerations 
(Foot, 1984, p.167).
Foot, recognising Labour's failure to communicate its message to the electorate because 
of the methods utilised by their opponents, argued that the Labour Party had to adopt 
different campaigning styles. However in order for this to be achieved, Foot would need to 
pass on the  mantle  of  leadership  to  another  generation.  The era  of  Callaghan,  Foot, 
Healey and Benn would need to be abandoned in order for the changes he advocated 
could take place under new leadership. 
Foot's legacy to the Labour Party was its survival. It was a future, however which would  
only be possible if he resigned, which he did on 12 th June 1983 (Bevins, 13 June 1983, p.1). At 
the Labour conference in October 1983, Foot gave a speech about his time as leader of  
the Party. Foot delivered a tribute to his deputy, Healey:
Sometimes it is suggested in some quarters that Denis and I have not always seen 
eye to eye on every subject. I am not sure whether this is intended as a tribute or a 
criticism.  However,  I  can  assure  you  that  during  this  time  Denis  has  given  me 
wonderful support and encouragement, and I am deeply grateful to him (The Times, 
5 October 1983, p.4).
The tribute suggests that Foot advocated a Labour Party which was an alliance between 
the social democratic right and the inside left. Indeed, Foot argued that the outside left  
Bennite solution to Labour's unpopularity "was no solution at all; rather it was one source 
of the disease" which had caused the decline (Foot, 1984, p.161).
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6.6: Conclusion.
Under Foot's leadership, the brewing arguments of the outside left exploded in the faces of  
the old social democratic Labour leadership. Foot's political credentials, philosophy and 
history with the inside left enabled him to counter those demanding a more militant Labour 
Party. A social democrat such as Healey would have been unable to engage in the same 
undertaking given his association with the policies the outside left despised. 
Some members  of  the  social  democratic  right  splintered  from the  Labour  Party,  thus 
splitting that wing within the Party,  giving the impression of a party in terminal decline.  
Benn challenged Healey for the deputy leadership illuminating a highly divisive period. 
These  were  difficult  circumstances  for  any leader.  Simply  to  maintain  a  party  in 
circumstances such as these is an achievement in itself. Healey was able to maintain his 
position as deputy by a fraction of a vote, thereby starting the slow retreat of the outside 
left. However, at this stage, Labour was on an unavoidable course for defeat because the  
electorate had lost faith in Labour's ability to govern itself. 
In contrast, the slow economic recovery and the Falklands War revived the Conservatives. 
Thatcher  commanded  strength  over  the  Conservatives,  which  contrasted  badly  to  the 
divisions within Labour. After the Falklands War, the general election became a battle for  
second place between the newly formed SDP and the Labour Party.
Foot led a principled campaign behind a manifesto supported by the social  democrat,  
Golding and his ability to alter the manifesto was limited. Despite the poor election result, 




Reconciling Protest and Leadership: A Vindication of Michael Foot?
The purpose of this thesis was to argue that a range of issues explain Foot's emergence 
as the Party leader. But it also serves two other purposes. First, in utilising the leadership  
elections of 1976 and 1980, it  casts light and redefines the ideological divisions of the 
Labour Party in the period under review, during which Foot was a member of the front  
bench.  Second,  it  tests  an  approach  of  analysing  party  leadership  elections,  that  of  
Heppell, to examine whether it has validity in this case.
This thesis has demonstrated Foot's appeal to the Labour Party by discussing his political 
education, political history and broader career along with assessing the composition and 
ideological  make up of the PLP during a specific historical  period. Coupled with these 
discussions was an analysis of the 1976 and 1980 leadership elections, which argued that 
the complex nature of the PLP demonstrated  that no single variable can be adduced to 
account for Foot's election or for the rejection of Healey. Ideology was a significant but not 
a  mono-causal  factor.  To  draw out  the  ideological  composition  of  the  PLP,  Heppell's 
approach  was  central.  Heppell's  approach  was  chosen  because  it  had  previously 
produced useful and meaningful discussions of leadership contests within the PCP during 
its periods of ideological disputation. For the PCP, Heppell's approach had revealed that 
ideological  divisions  between  'wets'  and  'dries'  specifically  on  economic  issues  had  a 
tendency to affect voting behaviour in leadership elections as discussed in chapter one. 
Given, however, the vastly different compositions and histories of both parties, a simple 
transfer of Heppell's approach as utilised for his research on the Conservative Party has 
proved to be inadequate. A like for like comparison without significant revision to Heppell's 
approach would  produce  problematic results  given  the  blurred  and complex  nature  of 
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Labour's  ideological  composition.  Within  the  Labour  Party,  the  selection  of  the  leader 
became a contested issue following the resignation of Wilson in 1976 and the resignation 
of  Callaghan  after  the  1979  election  defeat.  The  fluidity  and  diversity  of  ideological 
allegiances within the PLP proves a challenge to Heppell's approach as did the analysis of  
other influences upon MP's. The region, size of majority,  union affiliation and length of 
service  of  individuals  have  been  included  in  this  analysis  in  order  to  take  Heppell's  
approach beyond ideology,  making it  possible  to  produce a broader,  more meaningful 
analysis of the Labour leadership elections. The conclusion of the analysis in chapter five  
was that Foot's election can not be entirely attributed to any single variable. Ideology was 
crucial,  but simplistic 'left'  and 'right'  dualisms as preferred by Heppell  are a barrier  to 
understanding the totality of Foot's appeal.
The ideological history and character of the Labour Party is also significant in order to 
understand Foot's election. The Labour Party evolved as an organic body throughout the 
twentieth  century,  absorbing  characteristics  and  personalities  from  across  a  broad 
ideological spectrum. Gaitskell and Crosland both contributed towards the foundations for 
a social democratic tradition on the right, whilst Bevan, Mikardo and others developed an 
inside left opposition to the established leadership. The outside left, however, did not have 
a sustained contributory history within the Labour Party until later in the 1960s, given its 
militancy and radical socialist outlook. A more penetrating ideological typology of the PLP 
is discussed in chapter four.
The centrists, who are ignored by many commentators, such as Kellner and even some 
political scientists such as Heppell, did not associate themselves formally with either of the 
major  groups,  remaining  free  to  gravitate  from one leadership  candidate  to  the  other. 
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These independents were the effective king makers in any leadership contest, and any 
candidate must attract the support of this informal group in order to achieve a majority. It is 
a  reasonable  assumption  that  a  Manifesto  Group  member  would  vote  for  the  social 
democrat  and that  a  Tribune Group member would  vote  for  the  inside left  candidate,  
although  this  research  demonstrates  that  it  is  not  automatic.  It  would  also  be  an 
oversimplification to assume that an MP would remain a social democrat or a member of 
the inside left over long periods of time. An inside left MP in 1955 may well have become a  
social democrat by 1975. This reflects the continuing evolution of the Labour Party,  the 
changing character of the PLP following major events such as the 1983 general election 
defeat along with the impact of changing political issues (Clark, 18 May 2010).
Ideologically,  neither the inside left  nor the social  democrats were dominant within  the 
PLP.  In  1976,  Callaghan  had  succeeded  in  securing  his  leadership  by  extending  his  
support base beyond his social democratic allies and towards the centrists. At that time, 
the  Labour  Party  had  opted  to  elect  Callaghan  who,  as  a  former  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer had more economic experience over that of any other candidate from either 
ideological  camp.  Callaghan had "hinged his request"  for  unity on "the success of the 
economic policy" (Labour Weekly, 9 April 1976, p.1). Indeed, his closest potential rival, Foot had 
very  little experience  of  economics,  which  in  a  time  of  economic  crisis  could  prove 
problematic. Many Labour MP's would have considered that perceived general economic 
competence is an electoral asset and in the troubled economic circumstances of 1976, 
economic credibility was clearly important. Callaghan's stronger electoral appeal was also 
a factor in a general  election. Other social  democratic or left-wing candidates such as 
Jenkins or Benn respectively appealed too greatly to a set and divisive ideological stance, 
and so were seen as dogmatic by the centrists. This is apparent in Jenkins case for his 
252
very pro-Common Market views, and for Benn for his moves towards a more radical form 
of socialism. By 1980, however the context of the political situation which Labour faced 
had changed dramatically. Now in opposition, some within the rank and file had, following 
a long campaign throughout the 1970s, established and placed themselves in powerful 
positions throughout the broader Labour movement. The outside left, which defined itself 
in opposition to both the inside left and social democrats, was a threat to the two traditions 
which had evolved since 1945.
Foot,  as  a  long-standing  figure  of  the  familiar  inside  left,  emerged  as  an  attractive 
candidate given his ability to appeal across the Party towards the concerns of the centrists 
as well as the social democrats. Both felt able to work with a man willing to stand behind  
his record of loyalty towards Callaghan both in government and opposition. Foot's loyalty 
to Callaghan in government must not be underestimated when considering his position 
with  the  social  democrats.  He  also  possessed  long-standing  left-wing  intellectual 
credentials which continued to appeal to many within the rank and file as well as to social 
democrats. There was a wide acceptance that despite the contrasting ideological positions 
the  social  democrats  and  those  on  the  inside  left  possessed  a  credible  intellectual 
foundation.  Clark  (2010)  argued  that  the  importance  of  other  variables  such  as  the 
capacity to unite the Party and personal likability were also important factors in an MP's 
voting  behaviour31.  However,  the  outside  left's  ideology  was  not  welcome  within 
mainstream democratic socialism. From where he had been placed intellectually, Foot was 
neither tainted by the outside left nor scorned by the blame directed towards the social  
democrats in 1980 for the alleged betrayal of the 1974 manifestos. There can be no doubt 
that Foot drew his understanding of the Party from the inside left, having evolved from an  
31 Lord Clark realistically stresses the importance of personal  relationships,  that can prove as important in defining behaviour as  
ideological positions.
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early supporter  of  the Liberal  Party  to becoming a liberal  socialist  within  Labour.  This 
evolution brought him into contact with the rank and file of the Labour movement and with 
trade unionists particularly after this time as Secretary of State for Employment from 1974-
1976.
Foot's inside left position was for the PLP a positive tradition from which to govern the 
Labour Party following its electoral defeat in 1979. This was because the social democrats 
had appeared to fail  in government,  and so were blamed  by the left for Labour losing 
office. The accusation was articulated strongly by the outside left,  who were vying for  
reforms designed to transfer power away from the traditional social democratic leadership 
of the Party and towards committees dominated by themselves. The inside left was not 
initially a target of their attacks, enabling Foot to appeal to the social democrats whilst also  
appealing to the left-wing amongst the rank and file of the broader Labour movement. Foot 
would  also  manage  to  gain  some  support  from  the  outside  left  in  so  much  as  their 
antipathy towards the social  democrats made him a preferred alternative,  if  temporary, 
leader to Healey.  Yet  other MP's voted for Foot to prevent  a challenge by Benn, also 
assuming that his leadership would only be short term. Foot was in the unpleasant position 
of  satisfying  conflicting  wings  of  the  Party,  both  of  which  anticipated  a  temporary 
leadership, which was different from his own view of the significance of his election. His 
determination  to  remain  leader,  which  can  by  seen  by  his  rejection  of  Kaufman's 
suggestion  that  he  resign  shortly  before  the  1983  general  election,  demonstrates  his 
intention to be something other than merely a caretaker leader.
In  describing  how Foot  was  elected leader  of  the  Labour  Party,  this  thesis  draws  on 
previous academic work by Heppell. Heppell's approach is very suggestive and valuable in 
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its previous applications and has yielded significant results relating to the Conservative 
Party.  In  testing  it  against  other  political  parties  and  other  leadership  elections,  its 
strengths emerge in demonstrating the undoubted importance of ideology and factionalism 
within the Labour Party, but its mono-causality meant it lacked universal application. The 
adaptations to  Heppell's  approach in  this  thesis  to  address variables  beyond  ideology 
produce a more rounded analysis. 
Heppell's  approach  has  been  revised  to  incorporate  considerations  of  other  political 
phenomena.  The value  of  Heppell's  approach rests in  its  ability  to  extract  information 
based on a searching analysis of the ideological stance of individuals. Its weakness rests  
in its assumption of the unique importance of ideology rather than on a more extensive use 
of the other data available on MP's. These include consideration of the electoral success 
of the Labour Party and sometimes its very survival, individual career prospects, pressures 
from constituency parties and other characteristics of individual MP's such as background, 
region or union affiliation. 
As an individual, Foot was a man of philosophical and political substance. He was armed 
with the writings of many liberal thinkers and writers as well as the inspiration derived from 
contemporary political figures. Hazlitt, Cobbett, Swift, Wells, and Marx helped give Foot's 
socialism a rich texture of romanticism which enabled him to develop a strong reputation 
and position within the Labour Party as a literary intellectual figure.
He also felt Labour's policies under Wilson during the 1960s were dominated by social  
democrats and so failed to promote his inside left ideology. It would be facile to suggest  
this was the sole reason he did not join Wilson's cabinets given the earlier withdrawal of 
255
the whip doubtlessly retarded his chances of Wilson appointing him to ministerial office in  
1964, which undoubtedly suited him as it is likely he did not wish to join the mainstream at  
this point. By 1970, the changing political  circumstances brought about by the growing 
challenges to Labour's electoral prospects, convinced Foot that a move towards the Party 
mainstream would be more beneficial in aiding the advancement of his political ideals. 
Foot's  intellectual  heritage  facilitated  his  increasingly  influential  role  as  leader  of  the 
Labour Party. As a writer, political commentator, critic, journalist and ultimately a minister 
and  Party  leader,  Foot  remained  throughout  his  career  committed  to  the  ideals  of 
reshaping  Britain  towards  a  fairer  society  with  a  strong  commitment  to  Parliamentary 
socialism. Foot had striven to bring his literary intellectualism into the Labour Party since 
he joined in 1935. His in-depth knowledge of literary figures provided his socialism with a 
rich texture of romanticism which endeared him to many in the wider Labour movement. 
While a series of ideological disputations about socialism and Britain's role in the world  
raged within the Party during his period as a party member, Foot proved to be consistent  
in his application of his liberal, Parliamentary democratic socialism to the changing political  
environment.
The heavy defeat endured by Labour at the 1983 general election should not lead to the 
facile conclusion that Foot's leadership failed. It must be understood that Foot's role as 
leader was to keep the Party together; to prevent a considerably greater splintering of  
social  democrats  towards  the  SDP,  and  to  prevent  an  outside  left  incursion  into  the 
Parliamentary leadership. If success is to be determined by these factors, then Foot was 
indeed a successful leader. Foot did not preside over a mass desertion of Labour's social  
democrats, nor did his election herald an era of unmanageable outside left infiltration into 
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the mainstream of the Party. Indeed, under Foot the Labour Party remained an eclectic 
mixture of members dedicated to opposing Conservatism in favour of a fairer and more 
equal society. 
Foot's emergence as leader of the Labour Party would have seemed implausible given his 
reputation as a rebel, however likable, throughout his career, even as late as 1969 as 
earlier chapters have made clear. Yet, his developing political philosophy and his political 
activities after 1935 help to explain how a party riven with ideological ferment, and whose 
centre of gravity had shifted to the left, could elect a candidate with Foot's credentials. If  
his  candidacy  for  the  leadership  was  premature  in  1976,  it  most  certainly  acquired 
credibility by 1980. 
Foot's characteristics, including his personal charm, public oratory and deep affection for 
the  Labour  Party  were  important  elements  in  elevating  him  to  the  Party  leadership. 
Ideological factors alone are insufficient to explain his electability although it provided the 
base from which he could widen his appeal. For this reason, Heppell's approach, for all its 
heuristic merits, is an incomplete tool to explain why politicians become party leaders. Nor 
is personal character all important. Other determinants of voting behaviour can play a part.  
To understand Foot's emergence as leader, his personal history, liberal socialist ideology, 
character, and record in government and opposition must all be taken into account. The 
evidence of this thesis demonstrates that ideology matters but is not all determining in all  
circumstances. As a leader, Foot ensured that a fractious party could appear sufficiently 
united and politically relevant to remain electable. 
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